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Abstract 
 
In this dissertation, I assess the ethical debate surrounding the development of                       
pre-emptive psychiatry, and propose to reframe it around models of vulnerability. This                       
leads me to advocate for nonspecific staging models over the creation of attenuated                         
syndromes.   
 
Chapter 1 delineates the ‘mid-level’ approaches I selected for the ethical appraisal of                         
various models of vulnerability: mainly, Beauchamp and Childress’ principlism and                   
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. It is followed in Chapter 2 by an outline of the                           
current state of research in pre-emptive psychiatry. I argue in Chapter 3 that the debate                             
surrounding these new developments has missed an opportunity to discuss the ethical                       
issues they raise in a constructive manner. Various conceptualisations of psychiatric                     
vulnerability ought to be more clearly at the heart of this conversation. I explore in                             
Chapter 4 the wide-ranging relevance of the concept of vulnerability in ethical theory,                         
so as to explain in Chapter 5 how it can serve as the foundation of a normative                                 
approach that favours resilience and relational autonomy over outright protective                   
responses to vulnerability. Consequently, I highlight in Chapter 6 the advantages of                       
integrating more traditional nosologies into the larger framework of nonspecific                   
staging models. I aim to show that, through fostering a greater focus on resilience                           
rather than on diagnosis and treatment, hybrid diagnostic models promote a better                       
management of the ethical issues associated with pre-emptive psychiatry. 
 
The main outcome of this project is a new framework for discussions regarding the                           
ethics of pre-onset early detection and interventions in psychiatry, re-centring them                     
around conceptualisations of vulnerability. Altogether, this dissertation shows how                 
ethical concerns arise concretely in pre-emptive psychiatry, and defends its prospects                     
for addressing them. 
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Introduction 
Initially, this project was structured in the very same way that eventually came                         
to be at the heart of what I now criticise. My former aim was to expose a series of issues                                       
in the development of pre-emptive psychiatry, in line with concerns expressed by its                         
detractors. This dissertation now proposes to re-frame the ethical debate on                     
pre-emptive psychiatry around conceptualisations of vulnerability, rather than focusing                 
directly on its undesirable consequences. In place of answering the question ‘Is                       
pre-emptive psychiatry a form of care worth developing?’ (which I think is still central                           
in the debate surrounding pre-sonset early detection and interventions in psychiatry),                     
this dissertation attempts to provide a response to the following interrogation: ‘How                       
should vulnerability be conceptualised, and how ought we respond to it?’.   
 
The current ‘standard understanding’ of pre-onset early detection and                 
interventions based on attenuated syndromes raises seemingly insurmountable moral                 1
problems, from overmedication to stigmatisation. However, I firmly believe that                   
alternative conceptualisations of vulnerability should be considered more attentively, as                   
they can cast the role of pre-emptive psychiatry in a different light (one which would                             
not be so medically-oriented). I thus argue that the relatively common assumption that                         
attenuated syndromes are the main contenders for pre-onset early detection methods                     
should be overturned. I also argue that this ‘re-framing’ of the debate is not a mere                               
conceptual shift, but also highlights the extensive ramifications that models of                     
vulnerability have for psychiatric practice.   
 
1 In a few words, attenuated syndromes can be thought of as attempting to ‘capture’ the                               
prodrome (or set of earlier symptoms) of a disorder at a specific point in time, immediately preceding the                                   
onset of that full-threshold disorder. Staging models, on the other hand, postulate that distinct,                           
progressive phases of a disorder can be distinguished from one another, from an asymptomatic stage to a                                 
chronic, full-threshold disorder. While attenuated syndromes are mostly static, staging models of                       
vulnerability tend to be dynamic. I will take the time to explain both types of model in more detail in                                       
Chapter 2, and the idea of nonspecificity attached to some staging models will be addressed in Chapters 2                                   
and 6. 
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This, in turn, leads me to favour nonspecific staging models over attenuated                       
syndromes. Rather than thinking of vulnerability as an attenuated version of a                       
full-threshold disorder - so, as a diagnosable and treatable condition - we ought to                           
recognise it as a ‘corrosive disadvantage’ threatening a person’s central capabilities.                     2
Morally appropriate responses to vulnerability are therefore those which aim, first and                       
foremost, to empower vulnerable, at-risk individuals and promote their resilience.   
 
I. CONTEXT 
I started out this research project with the profound conviction that delving                       
into the ethics of pre-emptive psychiatry was a worthwhile endeavour as, whatever it                         
was, there was sure to be something suspicious and unscrupulous underneath current                       
efforts to develop pre-onset early detection and interventions in psychiatry. At-risk                     
individuals were in danger (from those who ventured to widen existing diagnostic                       
categories and their possible collusion with interested pharmaceutical parties), and I                     
was to expose exactly in how many ways they were so. At-risk individuals - perfect                             
representatives of the excesses of over-medicalisation, inflating statistics of                 
overdiagnosis and overmedication, plagued by stigma and anxiety and, lastly, twice                     
victims of injustice (to which they owe many of their vulnerabilities as well as their                             
relative lack of access to healthcare) - did appear to be in a very unenviable                             
predicament indeed.   
 
The development of pre-onset early detection and interventions in psychiatry,                   
especially in the past twenty years, has very quickly given rise to a divisive discussion                             
on the ethics of pre-emptive psychiatry. The higher the predictive validity of the                         
criteria established for the detection of at-risk individuals, the louder the voices                       
expressing apprehension regarding these new developments got. The detractors of                   
pre-emptive psychiatry saw in it the embodiment of wider problems related to current                         
tendencies in psychiatric care, while its proponents presented it as the best hope for                           
2 I am borrowing Wolff and de-Shalit’s formulation (2007), which will be analysed in Chapters                             
1 and 5. 
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improved prognoses and the prevention of serious mental health issues. Like the                       
former, I was concerned that identified at-risk individuals, suddenly perceived and                     
labelled as patients, would see their lives ‘pathologised’ either too early, or even entirely                           
unnecessarily in the case of those who would not have gone on to develop more severe                               
symptoms. The spectre of mostly asymptomatic teenagers and young adults being                     
prescribed antipsychotics and suffering from damaging side-effects was raised: a                   
warning sign that pre-emptive psychiatry was deeply problematic for ethical reasons.                     
The culmination of this debate occurred when, in 2013, the psychotic disorders Work                         
Group for the fifth edition of the  Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of mental disorders                           
(DSM-5) elected to relegate the Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome (APS) to the                     
Appendix, Section III of the  Manual, under ‘conditions for further study’ . The APS was,                           3
as a new diagnostic category, supposed to open more official doors for the                         
implementation of pre-onset early detection and interventions in psychiatry, but the                     
ultimate decision to lessen its inclusion in the main body of the text brought a first                               
answer to the central enquiry of this debate. To the overarching question: ‘Are                         
pre-onset early detection and interventions worth implementing in psychiatry?’, many                   
answered that the dangers incurred by at-risk individuals still outweighed the benefits                       
they could hope to gain from them. Even proponents of pre-emptive psychiatry                       
graciously acknowledged that the diagnostic criteria proposed for the APS needed to be                         
refined before the APS’ full integration into the  Manual .   4
 
Wary of the dangers posed by the development of pre-emptive psychiatry, I                       
thus agreed that potential stigma, discrimination, overmedication, overdiagnosis,               
over-medicalisation, anxiety and disadvantage needed to be shown as credible and                     
powerful threats to at-risk individuals. The detrimental aspects of this rather piecemeal                       
approach to the ethics of pre-emptive psychiatry - its redundancy and, more than                         
3 The APS is still present in the main body of the  Manual under ‘Other Specified Schizophrenia                                 
Spectrum and Other Psychotic Disorder’, section 3: 298.8 (F28) (APA, 2013, p.122), but its presence                             
remains mostly inconspicuous. Its relegation to the Appendix might have been more symbolic than ‘real’,                             
but it only helps to show how disputed and controversial its full integration was at the time of                                   
publication. 
4 I will focus exclusively on the DSM in this dissertation, despite the significance of other                               
diagnostic manuals, such as the International Classification of Diseases (and ICD-10, in particular).                         
Because the APS was proposed for the fifth edition of the DSM, its role in the debate surrounding the                                     
development of pre-emptive psychiatry overshadowed that of other nosologies.   
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anything, its overly pessimistic outlook on the possibility ever to develop                     
ethically-informed pre-emptive measures in psychiatry - only became apparent to me                     
with time.   
 
II. RE-FRAMING THE ETHICAL DEBATE 
What I hope to contribute to this debate is a way to re-frame it around                             
conceptualisations of vulnerability, so as to encourage more constructive conversations                   
about the ethics of pre-emptive psychiatry. Understanding how one ought to respond                       
to vulnerability might provide a way to assess available pre-onset early detection                       
methods and proposed pre-onset early interventions. For that contribution to be                     
effective, I intend to address the mental health professionals as well as the ethicists and                             
philosophers involved in this particular discussion. 
 
I believe that my original mistake was one that is commonly made by                         
participants in this debate: I assumed that the APS was to serve as the primary                             
diagnostic model for the development of pre-onset early detection, and thus, of                       
pre-onset early interventions. After all, similar ‘attenuated’ categories could be                   
envisaged for other types of mental disorder, such as mood or anxiety disorders. One                           
must say that the grounds for this assumption are not overly mysterious: not only does                             
the case of the APS and the Ultra High Risk (UHR) criteria from which it derives                               
occupy a large place in the more general discussion about pre-emptive psychiatry, but it                           
is also presented by medical professionals themselves as the diagnostic model upon                       
which most of their hopes (and fears) hinge. That assumption, however, should be                         
dismissed. The development of pre-emptive psychiatry is a heterogeneous process, and                     
to think that it points uniformly to a single model is to misunderstand what those who                               
work on the elaboration of diagnostic criteria are trying to achieve. Constructing                       
diagnostic models which can encompass the prodrome of a mental disorder and help                         
identify what makes a person more vulnerable than others is central to the work of                             
those who aim to develop pre-onset early detection and interventions. I believe that                         
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any enquiry into the ethics of pre-emptive psychiatry should be more overtly focused                         
on these goals themselves, rather than directly questioning their potential outcomes.   
 
Asking whether pre-onset early detection and interventions are worth                 
implementing in psychiatry challenges it as a whole, without allowing for a thorough                         
evaluation of the various models of vulnerability that have been suggested. Each of                         
these models, however, can have significantly different implications for the                   
implementation of pre-emptive measures, both with regards to pre-onset early                   
detection and to pre-onset early interventions. In other words, the question of whether                         
these pre-emptive measures are a good thing can quickly lead to outright negative                         
answers, especially if one simply assumes that the diagnostic models under scrutiny are                         
limited to attenuated versions of existing disorders. One can adopt a more fruitful                         
approach by looking into our conceptualisations of vulnerability and examining what                     
our responses to identifiable vulnerabilities ought to be: an ‘ethical litmus test’ to assess                           
various early detection methods and proposed pre-onset early interventions. 
 
Re-centring conversations on the ethics of pre-emptive psychiatry around                 
models of vulnerability facilitates the adoption of clear normative guidelines for what                       
our responses ought to be once vulnerability is identified. The concept of vulnerability                         
is value-laden, and has been argued to give rise to specific moral duties in myriad ways.                               
Working on conceptualisations of vulnerability within the context of pre-emptive                   
psychiatry, and determining which responses are morally appropriate, and which ones                     
are harmful, might thus help change the way we think and talk about the ethics of                               
pre-emptive psychiatry. I have no intention to dismiss any of the concerns I outlined                           
earlier, but I do believe that considering them through the scope of vulnerability                         
models can pave the way for a more constructive conversation on this topic. 
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III. A DEFENCE OF STAGING MODELS 
Posing the problem in these terms has led me to offer a defence, on ethical                             
grounds, of staging models over diagnostic models based on attenuated syndromes like                       
the APS.   
 
It is possible to demonstrate that vulnerability is widely recognised as giving                       
rise to strong moral obligations; and I intend to explore what these obligations have                           
been said to be following various philosophical traditions. However, determining how                     
vulnerability should be conceptualised and the kinds of answers that ought to be                         
brought to it in the specific context of pre-emptive psychiatry is another matter                         
entirely. 
 
I believe that the account of vulnerability developed by Rogers, Mackenzie and                       
Dodds manages to capture remarkably well the ideas and concerns expressed by                       
researchers who are attempting to elaborate early detection criteria. The distinction                     
they make between  inherent vulnerabilities , which refer to the sources of vulnerability                       
that are ingrained in the human condition - those that arise from our corporeality, our                             
neediness, our dependence on others - and  situational ones, more context-specific and                       
generally caused or exacerbated by personal, social, political, economic or                   
environmental circumstances (Rogers, Mackenzie, Dodds, 2012, p.24), reflects mental                 
health professionals’ consideration of  markers of vulnerability and their interactions with                     
environmental risk factors . Therefore, while it does not deny the existence of universal                         
and inescapable vulnerability, Rogers, Mackenzie and Dodds’ conceptualisation does                 
acknowledge, as proponents of pre-emptive psychiatry have tried to show, that some                       
individuals or groups are more inherently and situationally vulnerable than others.   
 
What their account of vulnerability also highlights, especially when it is                     
applied to the case of pre-onset early detection and interventions in psychiatry, is that                           
some of our responses to vulnerability are  pathogenic , in the sense that they either                           
exacerbate or create vulnerabilities. Many of the ethical issues that have been identified                         
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in the development of pre-emptive psychiatry can be said to arise exactly in this way,                             
born out of inadequate, overly medicalised and paternalistic responses to vulnerability.   
 
Combined with Nussbaum’s capabilities approach (2011), Wolff and               
de-Shalit’s work on fertile functionings and corrosive disadvantages (2007) and                   
Beauchamp and Childress’ principlist account (2009), this conceptualisation of                 
vulnerability gives rise to a normative framework that favours responses encouraging                     
resilience, empowerment and relational autonomy over those which primarily aim to                     
protect and treat vulnerable persons. Responding to these vulnerabilities through                   
protective measures alone can give rise to new, pathogenic forms of vulnerability. In                         
that sense, understanding vulnerabilities as threatened capabilities emphasises the                 
duties we have to empower identified vulnerable persons, to encourage the                     
preservation and promotion of their most fertile capabilities, and of their capacities for                         
resilience. It also allows me to highlight the need to avoid adopting overly medical                           
responses to the growing ability to identify psychiatric vulnerabilities: conceptualised in                     
this way, they point to the necessity of relying on positive social relationships and                           
supportive networks, of prioritising psychosocial functioning over symptomatic               
recovery, and of adopting more holistic approaches to youth mental health. 
 
This explains why, in re-framing the ethical debate around conceptualisations                   
of vulnerability, I develop a defence of nonspecific staging models. I argue that, despite                           
their convergence and their compatibility in many respects, what distinguishes                   
nonspecific staging models from attenuated syndromes in their conceptualisations of                   
vulnerability has significant implications for the implementation of pre-onset early                   
detection and interventions in psychiatry. Strangely enough, the choice to remove the                       
notion of risk from the Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome so as to lessen the anxiety one                             
might feel in receiving this label is, I believe, one of the most problematic features of                               
this diagnostic model: it participates in shaping vulnerability into a fully-fledged mental                       
disorder - a pathology that must be treated and eliminated. On the face of it, staging                               
models themselves might appear dangerously problematic, integrating as they do                   
pre-symptomatic phases of mental disorders into their framework, leaving the door                     
open for a considerable widening of existing diagnostic categories and a continuing                       
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backlash against pre-emptive measures in psychiatry. I argue nonetheless that the                     
choices to allow for primary prevention in addition to secondary pre-emptive                     
measures, to acknowledge nonspecificity rather than only seek syndromal specificity,                   
and to prioritise overall psychosocial functioning over symptomatic recovery, afford                   
staging models considerable advantages from an ethical standpoint. In shaping early                     
detection methods accordingly, staging models facilitate the elaboration of pre-onset                   
early interventions that respond to vulnerability in ways that aim, first and foremost, to                           
provide at-risk individuals with the psychological, cognitive or neurological                 
mechanisms - and with the social and even familial environments - which could allow                           
them to become more resilient and to preserve their autonomy through supportive                       
relationships. 
 
IV. TERMINOLOGY 
I have been led to make several choices regarding terminology throughout this                       
dissertation that I feel the need to explain and justify. Many of these choices have been                               
made for the sake of clarity, but some of them could have repercussions on the way                               
several arguments are understood, which is why they need to be clarified. 
 
The decision to speak of ‘pre-emptive psychiatry’ itself might seem rather                     
perplexing. The implementation of pre-onset early detection and interventions in                   
psychiatry could perhaps fit better under the umbrella of prevention, or of ‘preventive                         
psychiatry’. I point out myself how staging models’ capacity to encompass measures for                         
primary prevention offers them an advantage over attenuated syndromes.   
 
The distinction between pre-emptive and preventive action can be understood                   
in the same way that it is in political philosophy and just war theories, meaning that the                                 
first would designate action against a target when there is incontrovertible evidence                       
that the target is about to commit a harmful attack, and the second would designate                             
action against a target when it is believed that a harmful attack, while not imminent, is                               
inevitable, and when delay in intervening would involve greater risk (Barnes, Stoll,                       
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2007). In the case of pre-onset early detection and interventions, then, pre-emptive                       
measures are those which take place when a first psychotic (or manic, or depressive,                           
etc.) episode can be said to be imminent (within one or two years after detection,                             
generally) with high predictive validity; while preventive measures anticipate harm to a                       
greater extent.   
 
In the end, the model I defend clearly advocates for dealing with threats as they                             
slowly arise, rather than immediately ahead of their realisation. It might therefore seem                         
bizarre to see the words ‘pre-emptive psychiatry’ used almost throughout this                     
dissertation. I made the decision to follow a formulation commonly used by proponents                         
of pre-onset early detection and interventions (see McGorry, 2014) for the precise                       
reason that it allows me to underline how prevalent diagnostic models based on                         
attenuated syndromes have been in their development, as well as in the ethical debate                           
that arose with them. Even those who strongly support the use of staging models often                             
prefer to speak in terms of pre-emptive measures, rather than advocating more                       
generally for the advancement of preventive action. Additionally, I do believe that                       
speaking of ‘pre-emptive psychiatry’ rather than of ‘preventive psychiatry’ is a useful                       
reminder that what is at the heart of this dissertation is indeed the growing capacity to                               
identify, with high predictive validity, those individuals who are much more vulnerable                       
to psychiatric problems than others. Referring to prevention alone (and especially                     
universal prevention) might obscure this too much. 
 
Furthermore, as the topic of my research touches upon what might be referred                         
to as a spectrum of symptoms, markers and syndromes, there have been difficulties in                           
selecting terms which encompass all of these without being too general or misleading.                         
The distinction I have just made between preventive and pre-emptive measures can                       
actually be quite porous; and I face similar issues when faced with the necessity to                             
qualify the kinds of detection methods and the therapeutic interventions that are at the                           
heart of this dissertation.   
 
First, one thing needs to be clarified: although they are somehow entangled,                       
detection and intervention are two distinct moments in care - two distinct medical                         
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practices - and each is supported by different sets of evidence. The detection of at-risk                             
individuals in psychiatry relies on a growing ability to identify with higher predictive                         
validity persons who will, at some point, transition to a full-threshold disorder. On its                           
own, it does little to indicate effective counter-measures against that eventual                     
transition. For example, a similar development can be said to have happened with                         
regards to Alzheimer’s disease: people who are more vulnerable to this                     
neurodegenerative disorder can now be identified years before its onset. Nevertheless,                     
without effective pre-emptive measures, the only thing that can be envisaged for at-risk                         
individuals is the provision of information about their vulnerability and the risks they                         
face. In the case of psychiatry, however, several types of intervention have been                         
elaborated for identified vulnerable persons, and many of them have been shown to                         
delay or prevent more or less efficiently the onset of a full-threshold disorder. Speaking                           
of ‘early detection’ and of ‘early interventions’, however, can be misleading. Many care                         
structures using these terms (Early Intervention services in the U.K., for example) aim                         
to ‘support young people with first episode psychosis’ (Marwaha et al., 2016, p.186). As                           
such, the people to whom they provide care are often already patients suffering from an                             
identified disorder, rather than at-risk individuals. While ‘early intervention’, even                   
understood in that sense, still falls under the scope of my own evaluations, its meaning                             
becomes too restricted to encompass the kinds of vulnerabilities which are at the heart                           
of my dissertation. I need to account for vulnerabilities and risks detected before the                           
onset of a full-threshold disorder or of a first episode. Both the APS and staging models                               
aim to do just that, meaning that simply mentioning ‘early detection’ and ‘early                         
interventions’ becomes inadequate. For the sake of clarity, I will thus speak of                         
‘pre-onset early detection and interventions’ and, on rarer occasions, of ‘very early                       
detection and interventions’. 
 
Thirdly, I will often speak of ‘vulnerable people’ in lieu of ‘people with                         
vulnerabilities’. I made that choice mostly for the sake of simplicity: specifying every                         
time that vulnerabilities are shared by all, but affect some people more than others,                           
appeared more confusing than helpful. I do want to use this occasion to insist on this                               
idea, however. Large parts of the line of argumentation I develop point out how                           
stigmatising, paternalistic and patronising it can be to label whole groups as vulnerable,                         
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while taking for granted that these vulnerabilities are not universally shared in one way                           
or another. The negative impact that these kinds of generalising designations can have                         
has been highlighted in various fields, and psychiatry is not spared from these excesses.                           
But the whole impetus behind the development of pre-onset early detection and                       
interventions in psychiatry hinges upon a growing capacity to identify those who are                         
indeed more vulnerable than the norm, which is what talking of ‘vulnerable persons’                         
helps me underline. I have to recognise, however, that the formulation ‘people with                         
vulnerabilities’ might have expressed this idea more rigorously, if not more efficiently. 
 
V. OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTERS 
The inaugural chapter outlines the methodology I use throughout this                   
dissertation. I delineate the reasons why I have dismissed what I call ‘high moral                           
theories’ for the evaluation of the ethics of pre-emptive psychiatry . In adopting a                         5
top-to-bottom approach, they tend not to be comprehensive and adaptable enough, and                       
they lack in explanatory power. The ‘mid-level’ approaches I have selected for the                         
ethical appraisal of various models of vulnerability are supposed to remedy this                       
problem. I believe that referring to Beauchamp and Childress’ principlism, Nussbaum’s                     
account of the central capabilities, Rogers, Mackenzie and Dodds’ vulnerability theory                     
and Wolff and de-Shalit’s work on fertile functionings and corrosive disadvantages                     
allows me to work within a coherent and comprehensive framework that is particularly                         
well-suited to the case of pre-emptive psychiatry.   
 
The methodology is followed in Chapter 2 by an outline of the current state of                             
research in pre-emptive psychiatry. This outline remains mostly descriptive; I attempt                     
to provide an up-to-date account of the pre-onset early detection and intervention                       
methods that have already been made available to at-risk individuals. Moreover, this                       
5 ‘High moral theories’, in this dissertation, designate moral doctrines which derive their                         
normative power from theoretical underpinnings and use a ‘top-to-bottom’ approach when it comes to                           
the application of their principles to concrete situations. Consequentialism, deontology or the ethics of                           
care would be categorised as such. ‘Mid-level theories’ often rely on a form of ‘back and forth’ between                                   
particular moral judgements and moral principles, aiming to reach a coherent and reflective equilibrium                           
between the two. I believe that the capabilities approach, various vulnerability theories or biomedical                           
principlism all fit better under that umbrella. 
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chapter provides the occasion for me to explain the reasoning behind the elaboration of                           
various models of vulnerability - including staging models - thus justifying why these                         
models are of medical and therapeutic interest before they undergo any kind of ethical                           
evaluation. 
 
I then argue in Chapter 3 that the debate surrounding these new developments                         
has missed an opportunity to discuss the ethical issues they raise in a constructive                           
manner: often rigidly encased in a wider conversation about general and pervasive                       
problems in psychiatry, this debate has sometimes failed to address the more specific                         
features of pre-onset early detection and interventions, consolidating newer concerns                   
into pre-existing arguments and blocking out pertinent lines of investigation. Various                     
conceptualisations of psychiatric vulnerability and of the responses we ought to bring                       
to it should be more clearly at the heart of this conversation.   
 
I explore in Chapter 4 the relevance of the concept of vulnerability in ethical                           
theory: there exists a wide-ranging consensus that vulnerability is not ethically neutral,                       
so to speak. Despite an undeniable variation in the responses that consequentialism,                       
deontology or the ethics of care bring to the recognition of vulnerability, they all point                             
to the existence of strong moral duties that are tied to it. Based on this, I argue that                                   
focusing on conceptualisations of vulnerability should lay the foundations for a more                       
constructive conversation about the ethics of pre-emptive psychiatry, and help identify                     
applicable normative principles. 
 
I then explain in Chapter 5 just how a specific conceptualisation of                       
vulnerability can serve as the basis for a normative approach that favours resilience and                           
relational autonomy over outright protective responses to vulnerability. Tensions                 
between Beauchamp and Childress’ principles of respect for autonomy and beneficence                     
should not impede the way in which we react to vulnerability: relying on Nussbaum’s                           
capabilities approach, I defend interventions which acknowledge that it is through our                       
relations to others that we can hope to gain autonomy and resilience. Early                         
interventions should aim to preserve and improve these capacities in at-risk                     
individuals. 
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 Consequently, I highlight in Chapter 6 the advantages of integrating more                     
traditional nosologies into the larger framework of nonspecific staging models: the                     
latter are more likely to account for pluripotential, nonspecific risks, leading pre-onset                       
early detection and interventions to be adapted accordingly. I aim to show that,                         
through fostering a greater focus on resilience rather than on diagnosis and treatment,                         
hybrid diagnostic models promote a better management of the ethical issues associated                       
with pre-emptive psychiatry.   
 
21 
Chapter 1 - Methodological       
Justifications 
Before attempting to lay down the foundations for a more constructive debate                       
on the ethics of pre-onset early detection and interventions in psychiatry, I want to                           
explain and justify several of the philosophical standpoints and outlooks I adopt                       
throughout this dissertation. As I have to account for a series of constraints attached to                             
the nature of this project, I believe that mid-level approaches like principlism and the                           
capabilities approach offer better prospects for the evaluation of pre-emptive psychiatry                     
and of the debate to which it gave rise than do high moral theories (and, in particular,                                 
utilitarianism). 
 
In order to carry out the kind of evaluation that I have in mind, I must                               
delineate a normative framework that is grounded on solid philosophical bases, all the                         
while being readily applicable to the particular biomedical problem at hand. By ‘readily                         
applicable’, I mean a framework which allows me to address with clarity all relevant                           
problematics and ethical issues related to the development of pre-emptive psychiatry. I                       
have to be able to account for all the aspects of these problems that I deem critical, in a                                     
way that is plausible to medical professionals and philosophers alike.   
 
For the purpose of justifying my choice to refer to one normative framework                         
over other possibilities, and aiming for both philosophical authority and accessible                     
applicability, I thus intend to outline the series of constraints which are to inform this                             
decision.   
 
The problems raised by the development of pre-emptive psychiatry are                   
incredibly varied and multifaceted, which means that whatever framework I select must                       
be suitably versatile and comprehensive. Additionally, I am bound by the limited                       
amount of data that can be gathered in the context of this project. Finally, I also need to                                   
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explain relevant concepts and principles (vulnerability and autonomy, in particular) in a                       
way that is equally convincing to medical professionals and to ethicists. This kind of                           
‘explanatory power’ is thus deemed indispensable for an adequate evaluation of                     
pre-emptive psychiatry.   
 
This, in turn, leads me to make a distinction between so-called traditional,                       
top-to-bottom ‘high moral theories’ (with a particular focus on preference and ideal                       
forms of utilitarianism), and ‘mid-level theories’, which generally rely on the practice of                         
reflective equilibrium. 
 
As I will explain more at length later on, I will not consider particularism to                             
the same extent as other theories in this dissertation, and that for two reasons: firstly,                             
because I need to move from individual to collective scales (from at-risk individuals to                           
medical professionals and to public policy-makers) in order to develop a fully-fledged                       
reflection on the ethics of pre-emptive psychiatry. A philosophy like particularism,                     
while it would allow for the detailed evaluation of all the morally-relevant features of                           
the development of pre-emptive psychiatry, might not provide the type of framework I                         
need to resolve clearly potential conflicts between these different agents. Secondly, and                       
more importantly, I do believe that particularism is actually profoundly compatible                     
with the pluralist, mid-level approaches I have selected in the end. Indeed, these                         
approaches integrate many crucial insights from particularism, which they attempt to                     
balance out with more general principles without ascribing priority to one over the                         
other: what matters most is that the whole should be cohesive. Additionally, the                         
mid-level framework I delineate in this dissertation is specifically tailored to the                       
particular case of pre-emptive psychiatry, and is not meant to be applied as such to                             
different situations. 
 
What I want to demonstrate is that, while high moral theories like                         
utilitarianism do provide insightful perspectives on the ethics of pre-emptive                   
psychiatry, there remain various difficulties preventing them from being entirely                   
adequate in this particular case. In the end, I determine that mid-level theories are                           
better-suited to an in-depth evaluation of the development of pre-emptive psychiatry                     
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and of the debate that accompanied it: in particular, I focus on Nussbaum’s capabilities                           
approach (2011); Wolff and de-Shalit’s account of corrosive disadvantages and fertile                     
functionings (2007); Rogers, Mackenzie and Dodds’ contributions to vulnerability                 
theory (2014); all combined with Childress and Beauchamp’s principlism (2009). These                     
approaches allow me to delineate an adequate philosophical framework with which to                       
evaluate the ethics of pre-emptive psychiatry. 
 
The forthcoming chapters of this dissertation are going to address many of the                         
themes and arguments introduced in this section. A considerable challenge will                     
therefore be to develop a convincing defence of the methodology I adopt throughout                         
this project, while not impinging on lines of reflection that are to be initiated more                             
appropriately later on. For this reason, I might, on occasion, mention an idea, a                           
philosophical approach or an argument without going into an in-depth analysis at this                         
stage, so as to be better able to integrate it where and when necessary. 
 
I. ACKNOWLEDGING EXISTING CONSTRAINTS 
In view of the dual objective I set for myself in this project (re-framing the                             
debate on the ethics of pre-emptive psychiatry in a way that might encourage more                           
constructive conversations and, in doing so, defending staging models), I need to adopt                         
a coherent, grounded and applicable normative framework. Several constraints must                   
first be acknowledged, though.   
 
The first of these constraints is related to the sheer variety of issues that I must                               
be able to address, necessitating a versatile and comprehensive normative framework;                     
the second is linked to my need to adapt to a certain lack of data; while the last one calls                                       
for wide-ranging explanatory power. 
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1. Varied and Multifaceted Ethical Issues 
The first constraint I wish to address is the necessity to cover  all relevant                           
ethical issues related to the development of pre-emptive psychiatry.   
 
I fully intend to question, expand or delimitate both these issues and the place                           
that they have occupied in the debate that took place with the progressive                         
implementation of pre-onset early detection and interventions in psychiatry.                 
Nevertheless, at this stage, I do need to insist on how wide-ranging this array of ethical                               
problems really is. Whatever normative framework I eventually adopt has to be                       
remarkably versatile if I am to consider each of these issues in a pertinent and                             
comprehensive manner. The research questions I outlined in the introduction should                     
be enough to emphasise the sheer scope of the concerns under consideration, and the                           
various levels of enquiry that frame them.  
 
Before anything else, it is possible to gather that there are many who are                           
questioning whether implementing pre-emptive measures is worth the risks that these                     
involve for at-risk individuals and others. Boiled down to a simple question, their                         
concerns can be formulated as such: are the gains that these measures could potentially                           
bring about for society, for at-risk individuals and for psychiatric practice worth their                         
(monetary, but also psychological, social or medical) costs? While I intend to point out                           
the limitations that are built into this formulation later on, it does highlight that some                             
of the avenues of research that I am about to explore aim for an evaluation of possible                                 
outcomes .   
 
Cost-benefit, cost-effectiveness and cost-utility analyses are widely-used in               
biomedical research and public policy for an arguably straightforward reason: their                     
primary aim is to compare the relative value of outcomes attached to various                         
interventions or measures. In a field which is dedicated to the promotion of health and                             
the elimination of disease and/or illness, but which is also tethered by limited                         
resources, these kinds of analyses provide a clear triage method and refer to                         
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widely-recognised - if not always easily definable - concepts: monetary benefits,                     
therapeutic effectiveness or welfare-related/preference-based utility. It is therefore not                 
surprising at all to see those who are preoccupied with the ethics of pre-emptive                           
psychiatry apply such methods in order to gauge the potential impact of pre-onset early                           
detection and interventions in psychiatry, and to provide an answer to the question                         
outlined above.   
 
Despite my own intentions to go beyond this line of enquiry, I have absolutely                           
no wish to question the importance of assessing (or even calculating) outcomes when                         
discussing the ethics of pre-emptive psychiatry. I am concerned with diagnostic models                       
and conceptualisations of vulnerability only insofar as they have a tangible and                       
potentially harmful impact on the lives of at-risk individuals and others. As such, the                           
normative framework I select must be able to account for these more consequentialist                         
concerns.   
 
Parallel to this, however, I am indeed very attentive to diagnostic models and                         
conceptualisations of vulnerability themselves. While it is so because I believe that they                         
encourage and bolster different views of at-risk individuals and of the ways to respond                           
to their vulnerabilities, this also means that I must be able to evaluate their accuracy,                             
their pertinence and their coherence within a wider philosophical and medical context.                       
I thus also aim to question the validity of these models and conceptualisations outside                           
of their direct and supposed consequences, and not solely in relation to them. The idea                             
that one diagnostic model relies on a more complete and sophisticated understanding of                         
vulnerability gives it an advantage over others that is not entirely dependent on the                           
ways in which it might be used and the impact it can have: it simply presents better                                 
epistemic qualities than its competitors. This, in turn, allows for a more precise and                           
responsive moral reflection on the subject at hand. I must therefore also be allowed to                             
pursue such lines of investigation unimpeded by a too rigid normative framework. 
 
It is also possible to gather, from the research questions alone, that I need to be                               
able to balance and swap between individual and more collective scales: at-risk                       
individuals themselves are, of course, at the heart of the debate surrounding the ethics                           
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of pre-emptive psychiatry. However, the wider impact of pre-onset early detection and                       
interventions must not be neglected, just like the moral responsibilities to which                       
vulnerability gives rise cannot be thought of simply at the level of the medical                           
profession. Citing ‘comprehensiveness’ and ‘versatility’ as necessary features of the                   
normative framework I am to apply to pre-emptive psychiatry is not insignificant; it                         
indicates that I must be able to evaluate pre-onset early detection and interventions on                           
various levels (individual, familial, professional and societal), and from different                   
perspectives (medical and psychiatric, psychological and political, to name a few). As                       
mentioned earlier on, this is also one of the reasons why I have not presented                             
particularist approaches as competing on the same level as principle-based, high moral                       
theories. Issues arising with the development of pre-emptive psychiatry must be                     
considered while keeping in mind the interests and responsibilities of all these different                         
individuals and institutions. Demonstrating that particularism can (or cannot) provide                   
relevant insights into solving potential conflicts is, unfortunately, outside of the realm                       
of what can reasonably be accomplished in this dissertation: I believe that it is more                             
relevant and effective to focus primarily on theories which have already been applied to                           
the assessment of the ethics of pre-emptive psychiatry. 
 
Going further, I question the manner in which the debate engendered by these                         
relatively new developments in psychiatry has been led. All the lines of investigation I                           
just mentioned are therefore implicitly mirrored in an underlying query regarding the                       
capacity of biomedical ethics to provide pertinent insights into such a practical issue. 
 
The sheer scope of information to be covered by these overlapping research                       
questions might prove to be a problematic obstacle in the search for a consistent                           
methodological approach. An ethical evaluation of the development of pre-emptive                   
psychiatry would have to integrate of a great variety of data, from psychological studies                           
to economic predictions and healthcare policies, from individual risks to societal                     
interests. This points to another restraint attached to this project: the need to adapt to                             
available data. 
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2. A Restrictive Lack of Data 
A difficulty arises from the fact that, although results regarding both the                       
identification of at-risk individuals and very early intervention techniques have been                     
highly publicised in the field of psychiatry, only a few have led to wide-ranging                           
implementation in existing healthcare institutions.   
 
Pre-emptive psychiatry mostly remains embedded in the realm of research and                     
prospective ventures. While some medical centres advertising a strengthened focus on                     
early detection and early intervention have indeed gradually emerged in the past twenty                         
years , the controversy surrounding them is still ongoing. Additionally, first                   6
psychotic-like episodes (or first manic or depressive episodes in the case of bipolar                         
disorders) remain at the heart of many early intervention services, rather than the                         
prodromal symptoms and other pre-symptomatic vulnerabilities that would be targeted                   
by pre-onset early interventions. The lack of official recognition of a diagnostic model                         7
for the purposes of very early detection, added to continuing disagreements with                       
regards to diagnostic criteria, hinder a wider expansion of pre-emptive psychiatry. As a                         
result, some elements are noticeably absent from the data that can be gathered on this                             
topic. More particularly, information about the impact of pre-emptive measures is still                       
quite fragmentary, be it in relation to economics, psychology or even health outcomes.   
 
One could argue, though, that while this might impede the process of                       
analysing the precise medical and ethical repercussions of pre-emptive psychiatry, it                     
doesn’t necessarily represent an obstacle to the possibility of an ethical evaluation itself.                         
Indeed, applied ethicists have often endeavoured to engage in the study of anticipated                         
technological evolutions, and most ethical theories do attempt to offer methods that are                         
to be applied regardless of a current lack of factual data.   
6 A few examples are: Early Intervention in Psychosis (EIP) services in the UK in the 2000’s;                                 
Outreach and Support in South London (OASIS); the Personal Assessment and Crisis Evaluation (PACE)                           
clinic in Melbourne, or the Early Recognition and Intervention Centre for Mental Crises (FETZ), in the                               
Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy of the University of Cologne. 
7 By ‘official recognition’, I mean at least a wide-ranging professional consensus regarding a                           
diagnostic model. The APS is often heralded as the most plausible option, but despite the large influence                                 
of the DSM in psychiatry, I want to undermine this assumption. 
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 A considerable amount of what is available regarding the development of                     
pre-emptive psychiatry consists in medical publications advertising the results of                   
clinical trials aiming to refine diagnostic criteria for at-risk individuals, and their                       
predictive validity. Slightly rarer are those more focused on the identification of risk                         
factors or on the efficacy of various pre-emptive measures. Several meta-analyses have                       
compiled these results and organised them according to specific axes of investigation,                       
however, and they do offer a more general outlook on the progressive development of                           
pre-emptive psychiatry.   
 
Publications on economic and financial data are still quite sparse, by                     
comparison. Some have attempted to evaluate the economic impact of very early                       
intervention for psychosis, and to analyse its cost-effectiveness or cost-utility , but the                       8
samples collected remain very limited. As for those which have taken an interest in the                             
individual perceptions of receiving the at-risk label, in potential feelings of                     
stigmatisation or experiences of discrimination, they are fewer still. Nevertheless, the                     
publications which are available on each of these topics are, as will be seen later on,                               
quite revelatory and informative, even if they remain insufficient for something like a                         
fully-fledged and thorough cost-effectiveness or cost-utility analysis of pre-emptive                 
psychiatry.   
 
As I do not have the possibility to gather data other than through published                           
materials, this considerably limits the array of normative frameworks that I can                       
reasonably expect to yield clear, accurate and applicable guidance. The only exception is                         
the interview I have conducted in 2015 with Professor Jan Scott, a psychiatrist and                           
researcher whose work is focused on the development of very early detection and                         
interventions regarding bipolar disorder. I present her insights on the prospects that                       
8 Ising, H. K. et al. (2015) 'Cost-effectiveness of preventing first-episode psychosis in                         
ultra-high-risk subjects: multi-centre randomized controlled trial',  Psychol Med , 45(7). 
McCrone, P. et al. (2010) 'Cost-effectiveness of an early intervention service for people with                           
psychosis',  Br J Psychiatry , 196(5), 377-82. 
McCrone, P. et al. (2013) 'The economic impact of early intervention in psychosis services for                             
children and adolescents',  Early Interv Psychiatry , 7(4), 368-73. 
Phillips, L. J. et al. (2009) 'Cost implications of specific and non-specific treatment for young                             
persons at ultra high risk of developing a first episode of psychosis',  Early Interv Psychiatry , 3(1), 28-34. 
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are currently envisaged by experts in the field in Chapter 6. Her vision and observations                             
are therefore integrated into the materials used in this dissertation, alongside published                       
quantitative and qualitative data. 
 
As for ethical considerations related to new developments in pre-emptive                   
psychiatry, they are often mentioned in the medical literature as part of the limitations                           
attached to the implementation of pre-onset early detection and interventions, but they                       
are only occasionally the central focus of these publications. I intend to show that these                             
ethical considerations have been problematically restricted by more general discussions                   
and disagreements regarding wider psychiatric practices.   
 
In the end, it can be said that such limitations in the range of available data are                                 
to play a large role in the way I intend to evaluate the development of pre-emptive                               
psychiatry. I have to be able to adapt to these constraints, all the while retaining the                               
capacity to yield the kind of normative guidance that a problem like this one requires.                             
Comprehensiveness and versatility should thus be accompanied by a lack of                     
demandingness in terms of data input. Lastly, in addressing both medical professionals                       
and ethicists, I need to delineate a framework that explains relevant concepts and                         
principles in a satisfactory and plausible manner. 
 
3. Explanatory Power 
Whatever framework I select to evaluate the ethics of pre-emptive psychiatry                     
must play a very specific and dual role: it must simultaneously allow me to shed light on                                 
all relevant ethical issues related to the development of pre-onset early detection and                         
interventions in psychiatry, as well as elucidate the kinds of responses we ought to                           
bring to these issues. In other words, it must be both explanatory and normative; and I                               
believe these two features to be closely interrelated.   
 
Ideally, the normative framework I select would allow this dissertation to fit                       
into a broader philosophical tradition, while exemplifying the potential application of                     
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its principle(s) to a very practical situation. The constraints I have just outlined,                         
however, tend to indicate that this framework will most likely be specifically tailored to                           
the case of pre-emptive psychiatry. It is not my aim, in this dissertation, to defend the                               
overall superiority of one moral theory over all others. What I must find is a workable                               
and fitting ethical framework so that I may apply it to the question of pre-emptive                             
psychiatry alone.   
 
If the development of pre-emptive psychiatry has engendered so much                   
controversy, if it is even now at the heart of this dissertation, it is in great part because                                   
it questions how we demarcate mental health from mental illness. It also ‘dares’ to place                             
vulnerability somewhere on that spectrum, closer or farther away from mental illness                       
depending on the diagnostic model used for very early detection. It leads us to wonder                             
if we are profoundly and irremediably unequal when facing risks of deterioration, or if                           
we are all somehow concerned by such risks. Additionally, the progressive                     
implementation of pre-onset early detection and interventions in psychiatric care                   
challenges the ways in which we think of appropriate moral responses to the                         
identification of risk and vulnerability: to what extent can we risk harm to at-risk                           
individuals? How might they be harmed? Do we have a duty to intervene, and do they                               
have a duty to accept these interventions? At this stage, all these questions, which only                             
partially cover the full scope of the ethical issues related to the development of                           
pre-emptive psychiatry, appear incredibly disparate. 
 
To try to answer each of these questions separately would be either repetitive,                         
or potentially contradictory. My hope is that the elaboration of a framework to think                           
about these interrogations methodically will provide a way for me to untangle them                         
and put them into perspective. And, here, the main question I must answer thus                           
becomes: what is really at stake in the development of pre-emptive psychiatry? (I                         
believe the most convincing answer is: models of psychiatric vulnerability and the                       
moral responses to which they each give rise). It is therefore a great priority for me to                                 
develop satisfactory and enlightening accounts of the various notions and principles                     
that are at the heart of my reply to that particular line of enquiry, all fitting into a                                   
coherent normative framework. I must speak of vulnerability and of respect for                       
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autonomy, for example, in a way that is meaningful and enriching to both mental                           
health professionals and ethicists. 
 
Various philosophical traditions and moral theories will bring diverging                 
insights into such notions and principles, and the most pertinent ones will therefore be                           
those which can best bridge the gap between the preoccupations of the mental health                           
professionals who work on pre-onset early detection and interventions, and those of                       
ethicists.   
 
For example, one might wonder whether it would be enlightening and                     
informative to formulate these problems in terms of a professional’s deontological                     
duties to provide care; or even in terms of at-risk individuals’ rights (to be informed                             
and treated or, on the contrary, not to be informed). However, neither of these                           
formulations on their own appears to facilitate an in-depth consideration of what the                         
development of pre-emptive psychiatry might cost in the end, be it in terms of                           
economic or medical resources, or even with regards to its psychological toll.   
 
A similar line of thought can be followed if one’s focus is primarily on the                             
development of medical professionals’ virtues in their pre-emptive efforts. Proponents                   
of pre-emptive psychiatry have the stated objective to become able to identify at-risk                         
individuals with the highest predictive validity possible - to detect those persons who                         
are considerably more vulnerable than others - and to offer evidence-based very early                         
interventions. Their own preoccupations centre mostly around these aims; and the                     
ethical framework elaborated might reflect this as a central concern. It might also lead                           
one to neglect other lines of investigation, however, such as problems of stigma and                           
discrimination linked to the ‘at-risk’ label. 
 
I believe that formulating the problem around conceptualisations of                 
vulnerability provides a satisfactory solution to these issues: by exploring the kinds of                         
responses we ought to bring to vulnerability (defined in a particular manner), it                         
becomes possible to delineate a normative framework that allows us to address a very                           
wide array of ethical problems in a coherent and plausible manner.   
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 Due to the particular nature of this project, the normative framework                     
eventually chosen needs to be accessible as well as efficiently applicable to this concrete                           
situation. If this dissertation is to provide any kind of insight to those who are                             
concerned with the development of pre-emptive psychiatry, the way in which I                       
identify, delineate and analyse ethical issues has to be intelligible as well as befitting                           
these people’s own experiences. It is of great importance that this framework be able to                             
account for the complexity of a multi-faceted, practical situation while offering                     
pertinent normative guidance. 
 
II. HIGH MORAL THEORIES 
Given that this project hinges entirely upon the possibility of applying some                       
form of normative framework to the development of pre-emptive psychiatry, it is now                         
time to differentiate between theories so as to determine which one fares best when it                             
comes to its actual application to this practical problem.  
 
I will not, in this chapter, focus strongly on particularist approaches, instead                       
turning first to high moral theories. If, indeed, particularism is to be thought of as a                               
family of doctrines which are at least united by adopting a critical view towards the                             
nature and the role of principles (Smith, 2011, p.2), it is more difficult to view it as an                                   
obvious candidate for a structured normative framework when, as is the case here, one                           
intends to evaluate both the development of pre-emptive psychiatry and the ethical                       
debate to which it gave rise.   
 
The first reason behind this choice not to envisage a particularist approach on                         
the same level as other high level candidates is that the latter allow for the                             
methodological and straightforward application of norms and principles to a situation                     
like the one at hand. It is for that reason that high moral theories are often privileged in                                   
applied ethics: they offer a clear-cut, and general - if quite rigid - decision-making                           
process which appeals to many. Particularism, on the other hand, focuses more intently                         
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on a specific situation, and derives moral judgements from its most salient features.                         
However, who might be best placed to recognise the most morally relevant properties                         
of the development of pre-emptive psychiatry? At-risk individuals? Psychiatrists?                 
Policy-makers? The interests and responsibilities of these various agents can be in                       
conflict with one another, and determining which one ought to take precedence over                         
others is rarely done without ascribing a ‘reason-giving capability’ (Smith, 2011, p.28)                       
to specific principles. Because of this, I believe that principle-based high moral theories                         
are more likely to offer a familiar and well-adapted framework here, which is why they                             
will be the primary focus of the upcoming subsections. High moral theories already                         
occupy a large place in the ethical debate that has surrounded the development of                           
pre-emptive psychiatry, and the choice not to go to them first while seeking to                           
elaborate a normative framework for my own evaluations would be unjustified.   
 
Nevertheless, I do join particularists in concluding that the ‘order of priority’                       
(Smith, 2011, p.53) between principles and particular judgements is indeed quite                     
problematic in high moral theories - a reason why I prefer mid-level approaches. I                           
would even go further and argue that the mid-level approaches I favour, by adopting                           
the method of the reflective equilibrium, are not incompatible at all with particularist                         
stances. On the contrary, the approach I will delineate later in this chapter relies heavily                             
on the necessity to establish coherence between particular judgements and more                     
general principles, and to do so without ascribing priority to either one. 
 
Therefore, despite the useful resources that high moral theories - and                     
especially utilitarian forms of consequentialism - provide here, I will argue that they                         
remain insufficient and too rigid for a direct, top-to-bottom application of their                       
normative principles to this particular case. 
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1. The Advantages of a Utilitarian Approach to               
Biomedical Ethics 
Debates surrounding the  applicability of moral theories are still ongoing in                     
moral philosophy, and they have rarely been as emphasised as with the development of                           
applied ethics, and more specifically of biomedical ethics. Many have embarked upon                       
this particular exercise, trying to apply philosophical reasoning and moral theories to                       
problems arising in fields like biomedical research, clinical medicine, and public health                       
in seeking normative guidance. 
 
In the tradition of applied ethics, a wide array of so-called ‘high moral theories’                           
- which draw their normative strength from theoretical underpinnings and adopt a                       
top-to-bottom approach for their application - can be considered plausible alternatives.                     
For restrictions related to time and efficacy, I need to assume that traditional high                           
moral theories such as consequentialism, deontology or virtue ethics could each be                       
supported by rigorous philosophical arguments and be potentially applied to problems                     
arising with the development of pre-emptive psychiatry.   
 
Unfortunately, while it would be quite enlightening to study in depth how                       
each of these high moral theories bears upon the case at hand, I have to follow a more                                   
direct procedure. As I mentioned earlier, the object of this project is to contribute to                             
ethical reflections on the topic of pre-emptive psychiatry, and not to evaluate the more                           
general advantages and limits of diverse ethical theories. Evidently, I do need to justify                           
the choice I make regarding the normative framework to which I will refer throughout                           
this dissertation. However, it is imperative, first, to narrow down considerably the                       
number of pertinent possibilities, which is why utilitarian forms of consequentialism                     
are presented as the most persuasive, and will be the main focus of the upcoming                             
subsections. 
 
The reason why I am focusing on utilitarianism as the primary high level                         
contender for the moral evaluation of pre-emptive psychiatry is explained, for the most                         
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part, by one of the research questions I delineated earlier. The problematic in question                           
already points to utilitarian lines of reasoning in its very formulation, seeing as it                           
questions the overall effectiveness and utility of pre-emptive psychiatry, and                   
encourages a balancing of the advantages it potentially brings about with its (monetary,                         
but also psychological or medical) costs. Since this line of interrogation brings one to                           
consider whether or not allocating limited resources to the development of                     
pre-emptive psychiatry is worth its costs, it seems that this project lends itself                         
particularly well to cost-utility calculations and welfare considerations. Using a                   
utilitarian approach might indeed provide a convincing method, allowing for the                     
defence or condemnation of pre-emptive psychiatry on ethical grounds. I intend to                       
outline in Chapter 3 why cost-effectiveness and cost-utility analyses fail to do justice to                           
the complexity that is characteristic of pre-emptive psychiatry, but what follows is a                         
brief and general evaluation this approach in applied matters. 
 
Utilitarianism is already quite a predominant ethical model in health                   
policy-making; and several forms of utilitarianism are very commonly used by those                       
who are concerned with other biomedical issues. Preference utilitarianism, for example,                     
is a widely-adopted and prevailing approach in biomedical ethics, especially with the                       
development of Quality-Adjusted Life Years (QALYs), or even the Willingness To Pay                       
(WTP) measure, which are both particularly useful when one’s aim is to rank various                           
outcomes according to costs and projected values. I do agree with Tim Mulgan when he                             
affirms that some of the most exciting work in contemporary utilitarianism is at the                           
intersection of economics and philosophy, thus offering new perspectives of                   
measurement and institutional design (2007, p.72). In the medical field,                   
cost-effectiveness and cost-utility analyses, which are both based on utilitarian                   
definitions of welfare or preferences, are frequently used as valuable instruments in                       
decision procedures and economic evaluations (Haddix, Teutsch, Corso, 2003).   
 
With regards to the development of pre-emptive psychiatry, most of the                     
ethical and economic analyses that have already been carried out do actually rely heavily                           
on such methodologies. In the debate that opposed them in the  British Journal of                           
Psychiatry (around an interrogation very similar to the one I mentioned earlier: ‘Is early                           
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intervention for psychosis a waste of valuable resources?’), both Pelosi and Birchwood                       
frame their arguments in utilitarian terms (Pelosi, Birchwood, 2003). While Pelosi                     
regrets that Early Intervention Services misleadingly divert valuable resources to                   
specialised teams, therefore hindering the capacity to provide decent care ‘to people                       
with severe and enduring mental disorders’ (Ibid., p.196), Birchwood, who focuses                     
more heavily on long-term outcomes, welcomes the UK Government’s investment in                     
new services for early psychosis. In parallel, Bentall and Morrison appeal to the                         
necessity of balancing likely benefits and likely costs in their charge against the use of                             
antipsychotic drugs to prevent severe mental illness (Bentall, Morrison, 2002, p.352).                     
After recognising the difficulty of cases in which the recipient of benefits (meaning the                           
person whose illness is prevented) is not necessarily the same person as the recipient of                             
costs (identified at-risk individuals who may never have developed the illness but who                         
are nonetheless exposed to the risk of suffering from side effects), they reach the                           
conclusion that ‘from a utilitarian perspective, the cost benefit analysis becomes more                       
favourable towards treatment the more dreadful the consequences of the illness, once it                         
develops’ (Ibid., p.352).   
 
From a more overtly economic perspective, a few small-scale                 
cost-effectiveness studies have been implemented, the results of which have, for                     
example, relied on medical and travel costs, types of intervention, as well as costs                           
arising from loss of productivity (Ising et al., 2015); or on the rates of relapse,                             
hospitalisations, vocational recovery and quality of life (McCrone et al., 2010,                     
pp.377-378). With regards to that last criterion, the use of Quality-Adjusted Life Years                         
(QALY) is a prime example of utilitarian conceptualisations of welfare applied directly                       
to public health considerations and pre-emptive psychiatry.   
 
Healthcare professionals, researchers, policy-makers - and even patients - are                   
familiarised with utilitarian reasoning in ethics, which is a great advantage for this                         
approach in the context of this dissertation.   
 
However, despite the frequent use of preference utilitarianism in biomedical                   
ethics, the utilitarian approach I consider most adaptable to the case of pre-emptive                         
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psychiatry - the one I deem to be the most pertinent - is a form of ideal utilitarianism.                                   
Such an account would rely on a pluralistic and complex account of well-being (i.e. one                             
that is not limited to hedonistic or preference considerations). I argue that ideal                         
utilitarianism is superior to other forms of consequentialism in the case that                       
preoccupies me because it recognises a diversity of ends to be promoted and ranked, the                             
value of which is seen as intrinsic rather than simply instrumental. These ends are                           
conceived as objective interests, and as constitutive of well-being (though they can be                         
sought out for themselves). Lists of valuable ends, depending on the account selected,                         
tend to incorporate elements such as political liberty, economic independence, basic                     
standard of living, access to education and healthcare, etc., each participating in the                         
collection of individual utilities. In view of the kinds of harms to which at-risk                           
individuals might be more vulnerable, I believe that ideal utilitarianism is better able                         
than other forms of utilitarianism to express how these persons could potentially see                         
their liberty, their independence, their self-image and their educational and                   
professional opportunities threatened (amongst others).   
 
Conversely, the recurrent criticism levelled against preference utilitarianism,               
which points to adaptive preferences , might be especially problematic in this case, as                         9
both prodromal symptoms and the at-risk label could be argued to have a significant                           
impact on one’s preferences. Ideal utilitarianism’s focus on welfare as the ultimate good                         
(Mulgan, 2007, p.61) is thus a characteristic that might also play in its favour here, in                               
contrast with other high moral theories: by placing the ‘objective’ interests of at-risk                         
individuals - and those of society in general - at the heart of its ethical line of                                 
justification, ideal utilitarianism allows for the consideration of a vast array of problems                         
within a coherent and systematic methodology. Without going into the particulars of                       
the concept of well-being, it is already possible to ascertain that a utilitarian approach                           
might help ground reflections on most of the ethical issues identified with regards to                           
the development of pre-emptive psychiatry, from overdiagnosis to stigma or                   
9 The problem of adaptive preferences is a criticism that capability theorists often raise against                             
preference utilitarianism. It highlights how preferences are unreliably adaptive, as many victims of                         
injustice appear quite content to perpetuate their own oppression and disadvantages. Adaptive                       
preferences might be particularly problematic for theories of distributive justice, ‘where preferences may                         
play a role in determining the goods or opportunities an individual is entitled to’ (Begon, 2015, p.241). 
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overmedication. Nevertheless, ‘going into the particulars of the concept of well-being’                     
is still necessary if ideal utilitarianism is to become an applicable normative framework. 
 
Despite this approach’s many qualities as well as its pertinence in the ethical                         
evaluation of pre-emptive psychiatry, I believe that utilitarianism remains, in the end,                       
inadequate and insufficient for this project, and so for a number of reasons. It is due,                               
first and foremost, to limits that are directly associated with utilitarian theories and the                           
definition of well-being; and, secondly, to remaining difficulties in trying to apply high                         
moral theories to practical situations such as the development of pre-emptive                     
psychiatry.   
 
2. A Rigid Framework 
Ideal utilitarianism’s focus on well-being as the ultimate good may actually                     
contribute to discredit it as an applicable and effective framework to assess the ethics of                             
pre-emptive psychiatry, despite how well-suited it might seem at first glance. That it                         
requires a rigid top-to-bottom application of its normative principles only adds to that. 
 
The difficulties inherent to the elaboration of a satisfactory account of                     
well-being are at the heart of the first criticism. Utilitarian approaches need to rely on                             
such accounts and provide specific criteria for the understanding of that notion in order                           
to apprehend, promote and calculate well-being. Ideal utilitarianism, in opposition to                     
other forms of utilitarianism, often relies on an ‘objective’ or ‘substantive’ view of                         
well-being, outlining a series of intrinsically valuable elements (Mulgan, 2007, p.61).                     
While I believe this utilitarian approach to be most pertinent in the context of this                             
dissertation - more so than theories centred on preference satisfaction or hedonism -                         
numerous difficulties must be overcome in the identification and justification of the                       
elements that are constitutive of well-being. Accusations of paternalism have been                     
thrown against such attempts, for example: who can claim for oneself the right to                           
determine what well-being objectively consists in, sometimes despite people’s own                   
preferences to the contrary? Any assertion about a feature believed to be a necessary                           
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component of well-being would most probably not be able to escape controversy                       
(Mulgan, 2007, p.85). Were the ideal utilitarian framework to be selected for this                         
dissertation, a solid account of well-being would need to be elaborated. Such an                         
endeavour seems severely overambitious in the context and limits of this research                       
project, however. One hope would be to find an existing account of well-being that                           
allows for a comprehensive analysis of all the ethical issues that arise with the                           
development of pre-emptive psychiatry without being overly restricted by limited                   
amounts of data, while also providing plausible and persuasive accounts of relevant                       
notions and principles. I am unsure that ideal utilitarianism on its own can fulfill these                             
demands satisfactorily. 
 
Additionally, defining well-being as the ultimate good through which to judge                     
all ethical features of the development of pre-emptive psychiatry would considerably                     
restrict the scope of this ethical analysis. Although making the promotion of well-being                         
the focal point of this project does bring out essential problematics and features of                           
pre-emptive psychiatry, it also precludes the study of several key ideas. If one were to                             
draw a very brief overview of the spectrum of potential ethical issues arising with the                             
development of pre-emptive psychiatry, one striking characteristic would be the sheer                     
diversity in kind of these various problems. Concerns surrounding over-medicalisation,                   
overmedication and overdiagnosis can all be traced back more or less directly to the                           
elaboration of diagnostic criteria themselves, but risks of stigmatisation and                   
discrimination may be grounded in complex and multifactorial determinants, as may                     
the possibility of unequal and disadvantaging access to healthcare resources. I must                       
therefore be able to account for problems that are directly outcome-related, and                       
problems akin to erroneous or inadequate diagnostic models and conceptualisations of                     
vulnerability.   
 
While adopting an ideal utilitarian approach might allow for an incisive and                       
pertinent enquiry into how to deal with each of these concerns in the most ethical                             
manner, then, it would also obviate several relevant lines of interrogation. One can use                           
the example of stigmatisation to illustrate this point: utilitarians would be capable to                         
explore and evaluate questions pertaining to increased risks of stigmatisation with ease,                       
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determining whether or not the development of pre-emptive psychiatry might, in the                       
end, fail to promote general welfare. These utilitarians might even, with a sufficiently                         
rich account of well-being, rest their case on a subtle understanding of the implications                           
of unjustified stigma, from its impact on at-risk individuals’ quality of life to its                           
repercussions on self-image, motivation or capacity for self-determination. However,                 
any question regarding the existence of a discourse that is deliberately ‘biologising’ in                         
order to lessen perceived stigma would be limited to the actual efficacy of such a                             
stratagem, without much regard for its value, or its accuracy.   
 
Similar remarks can be made in relation to the problem of fair access to                           
healthcare: as a consequentialist theory, utilitarianism would point to any measure that                       
maximises overall welfare as the most ethical one. In the case of pre-emptive                         
psychiatry, however, this might lead to the neglect of disadvantaged populations who,                       
although more seriously at risk than others, might possibly be less likely to have a good                               
observance of treatments and be more difficult to reach. In practice, it might indeed be                             
less effective to target disadvantaged populations due to a higher risk of disengagement                         
and the requirement of more pronounced economic and medical efforts. If these                       
assumptions were proven true, an evaluation of the fairness of that conclusion might                         
indeed give reason to utilitarian lines of thinking, but it remains legitimate to ask the                             
question, even if it falls outside of a purely utilitarian framework. 
 
In order to rely exclusively on utilitarianism, one would need to provide                         
extensive justifications for forsaking these avenues of inquiry. As mentioned above,                     
though, it is neither within the bounds of this dissertation, nor is it its object, to defend                                 
a specific moral theory. If the goal here is to produce a comprehensive ethical analysis                             
of the development of pre-emptive psychiatry, limiting the method to utilitarian                     
considerations seems to be arbitrarily restrictive, given the complexity and the diversity                       
of the issues under study. 
 
Moreover, another factor renders the use of utilitarianism in this dissertation a                       
precarious choice, although for more pragmatic - but more decisive - reasons this time.                           
As explained previously, the decision to select one normative framework over another                       
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will be partially informed by limitations in the amount of resources available. Whatever                         
the preferred account of well-being, any utilitarian analysis of a practical situation like                         
this one would have to rely on a large amount of accurate and quantifiable data, be it of                                   
patient preferences, QALYs estimations or medical costs. Most data of this type has yet                           
to be collected, however, due to the prospective nature of pre-emptive psychiatry.                       
Designing a comprehensive and pertinent cost-utility analysis, although a worthwhile                   
initiative, is an endeavour too demanding in terms of resources in the context of this                             
project.   
 
The difficulties previously mentioned are related to utilitarian approaches                 
specifically, but other obstacles appear due to utilitarianism’s status as a high moral                         
theory. High moral theories such as utilitarianism, but also deontology or virtue ethics,                         
face difficulties in providing a solid basis for the application of ethical principles. Such is                             
the case for two reasons; and the first of these is related to the nature of ethical beliefs.                                   
According to Griffin, while there is some degree of organisation to our actual ethical                           
beliefs, it remains almost impossible for them to be organised in the same manner that                             
beliefs in the sciences are - meaning that they cannot take a holistic form with                             
systematic unity (1996, p.124). Yet, this is what traditional forms of applied ethics try to                             
do when they attempt to find sanction or support for a whole set of beliefs (Ibid., p.                                 
123). In the end, ethical beliefs are best defined as what Griffin calls ‘beliefs of fairly                               
high reliability’, therefore rendering any attempt to organise them in a coherent and                         
unified system, working top-to-bottom from theory to application, rather perilous. It is                       
possible to draw a parallel between what Griffin says of environmental ethics and                         
biomedical ethics: both might be developed using the resources of an already                       
established ethical tradition, but it is also likely that the problems they present are so                             
discontinuous with the concerns that shaped older ethics that new conceptualisations,                     
tied in with older ones, must be refined (Griffin, 1996, p.127). 
 
The second reason why high moral theories often fail to be readily applicable                         
to specific situations is best explained by London, when he writes that ‘the                         
independence of practical ethics is rooted in an appreciation of the constraints that                         
non-ideal circumstances place on the role that the philosophically refined premises of                       
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moral theory can play’ (London, 2001, p.87). Most high moral theories fail to account                           
for the decidedly non-ideal circumstances in which moral judgements and moral                     
considerations actually take place. The development of pre-emptive psychiatry provides                   
a good illustration of this particular point: even assuming that a substantial and                         
satisfying account of well-being were to be developed, and sufficient resources were                       
available for a comprehensive cost-utility analysis, utilitarianism would remain bound                   
to its ideally framed, theoretical lines of reasoning. It would fail to account for the                             
disorganisation, the internal disagreements or the malleability inherent to such medical                     
evolutions. 
 
To conclude, accounts of well-being derived from ideal utilitarianism and                   
cost-utility analyses can prove to be very useful instruments, providing crucial                     
information and pertinent perspectives on the development of pre-emptive psychiatry.                   
However, taken as the sole methodological approach through which to evaluate the                       
ethics of pre-emptive psychiatry, rather than as a complementary tool, it suffers from                         
many disadvantages. For this reason, mid-level ethical theories are considered to be a                         
better potential fit for this dissertation.   
 
III. APPLICABLE MID-LEVEL THEORIES 
Now that high moral theories in general, and utilitarianism in particular, have                       
been deemed pertinent but insufficient to provide a sound methodology for the                       
evaluation of pre-emptive psychiatry, I wish to consider some pluralistic, mid-level                     
theories as a plausible alternative. Several of these approaches might be of particular                         
interest here: Beauchamp and Childress’ account of principlism (2009), and Nussbaum’s                     
capabilities approach (2011), Wolff and de-Shalit’s work on fertile functionings and                     
corrosive disadvantages (2007), and Rogers, Mackenzie and Dodds’ vulnerability theory                   
(2014). All of these are compatible with one another, referring to common principles                         
and notions, and relying on a similar procedure: the reflective equilibrium. 
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1. Principlism 
As a mid-level theory centred on four core principles (respect for autonomy,                       
nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice), Beauchamp and Childress’ account of                 
principlism does not claim to have the theoretical foundation of a complete system for                           
general normative ethics: its aim is to provide a comprehensive general framework for                         
the specific domain of biomedical ethics (Beauchamp, Childress, 2009, p.334).                   
Principlism accepts as legitimate various aspects of many theories advanced in the                       
history of ethics, but it rejects the hypothesis that all leading principles of the major                             
moral theories can be assimilated into a coherent and applicable whole (Ibid., p.334).   
 
Principlism, as developed by Beauchamp and Childress, is founded upon what                     
they call the ‘common morality’: a set of moral standards (encompassing norms, rules,                         
virtues, etc.) that are applicable to all persons in all places, and through which all                             
human conduct can be judged (Beauchamp, Childress, 2009, p.3). Their conception is                       
not ahistorical: products of human experience and history, they are nonetheless                     
universally shared (Ibid., p.3). The four principles of biomedical ethics that these two                         
authors have identified can therefore be seen as providing a much needed analytical                         
framework both articulating general norms of the common morality, and providing a                       
solid starting point for the specification of rules, obligations, rights, etc. in biomedical                         
ethics (Beauchamp, Childress, 2009, pp.12-13).   
 
Beauchamp and Childress' approach is primarily concerned with the                 
development and the justification of these four principles, so that they may be applied                           
specifically to the areas of science, medicine and healthcare. The wish to provide                         
pertinent and useful tools to researchers, medical practitioners and policymakers facing                     
ethical considerations has led them to emphasise the significance of contextual factors                       
in decision-making and in public policy: ‘the implementation of moral principles and                       
rules must take into account factors such as feasibility, efficiency, cultural pluralism,                       
political procedures, pertinent legal requirements, uncertainty about risk, and                 
non-compliance by patients’ (Beauchamp, Childress, 2009, p.9). 
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 As such, substantial flexibility is required in the articulation and application of                       
the four principles of biomedical ethics, as well as the rules, obligations, virtues, rights,                           
etc. that are specified from them. All of these must allow for compromise in situations                             
that require it, and therefore cannot be absolutely rigid. However, the                     
acknowledgement of necessary compromises should not be perceived as a weakness,                     
but rather as a strength of Beauchamp and Childress’ account: ‘it is no objection to                             
moral norms that, in some circumstances, they can be justifiably overridden by other                         
moral norms with which they conflict. Principles, duties, and rights are not absolute                         
merely because they are universal’ (Beauchamp, Childress, 2009, p.14). Flexibility and                     
adaptability, here, are an openly pragmatic choice, in that they allow for the                         
consideration of contextual elements that are specific to particular problematics or                     
situations. Be that as it may, Beauchamp and Childress both insist on method and                           
coherence in order to preserve the integrity of their mid-level theory: progressive                       
specification and balancing, both used within the bounds of a Rawlsian type of                         
reflective equilibrium, are the two main ways in which precise ethical judgements are                         
reached.   
 
In rejection of top-to-bottom high moral theories (in which general principles                     
are deemed too rigid for pertinent application) and simple casuistry (focused on                       
paradigm cases but deprived of higher justifications), Beauchamp and Childress have                     
instead opted for a method admitting the absence of a fixed order of inference or                             
dependence from general to particular, or from particular to general (Beauchamp,                     
Childress, 2009, p.381).   
 
The type of reflective equilibrium that they defend aims to ‘match, prune, and                         
adjust considered judgements and their specification to render them coherent with the                       
premises of [Beauchamp and Childress’] most general moral commitments’                 
(Beauchamp, Childress, 2009, p.381). These ‘general moral commitments’ are in                   
reference to the common morality mentioned earlier, which supplies Beauchamp and                     
Childress’ initial norms. As for the ‘considered judgements’, they encompass moral                     
convictions at all levels of generality in which agents have the highest confidence and                           
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which are believed to have the least bias (Ibid., p.382). The development of sound                           
moral judgements therefore relies on the exercise of this constant two-fold adjustment                       
aimed at preserving the coherence of the whole. Concerns for coherence are indeed at                           
the heart of the reflective equilibrium, which is accordingly in perpetual development,                       
always striving for stability without ever being able to attain it.   
 
Progressive specification, as mentioned earlier, is one way in which one can                       
handle the great diversity of ethical challenges that emerge in research, medical practice                         
or public policy: this process, aiming at reducing the indeterminate character of abstract                         
principles and at generating more specific, action-guiding content (Beauchamp,                 
Childress, 2009, p.17), offers a way to reduce conflicts where more general principles                         
fail to provide guidance. However, the process of progressive specification cannot avoid                       
the apparition of competing specifications. In such cases, though Beauchamp and                     
Childress reiterate the value of overall coherence, they concede, once again, that there                         
are occurrences of genuine ethical dilemma in which no specific moral belief can be                           
determined to be unquestioningly superior to another (Beauchamp, Childress, 2009,                   
p.388). ‘Balancing’ is another useful process, more focused on justification than scope.                       
In evaluating the strength and legitimacy of an array of beliefs, it allows for a due                               
consideration of all norms bearing on a complex, very particular circumstance (Ibid.,                       
p.21).   
 
Because principlism relies so heavily on the common morality and a process of                         
reflective equilibrium, it incorporates pertinent elements from a series of higher                     
theories - ethical theories (utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, virtue ethics, or the ethics of                         
care), but also political theories, or theories of justice (liberalism, egalitarianism,                     
contractualism…).   
 
The four principles of biomedical ethics identified by Beauchamp and                   
Childress offer a pragmatic and open starting point for a coherent evaluation of the                           
ethics of pre-emptive psychiatry. Indeed, questions of autonomy, nonmaleficence,                 
beneficence and justice seem to be at the heart of many issues that are to be central in                                   
this dissertation. It is now appropriate, though, to analyse briefly the scope of ethical                           
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considerations that these four principles can actually cover with regards to the                       
development of pre-emptive psychiatry.   
 
The principle of respect for autonomy, widely employed in biomedical ethics                     
(regardless of theoretical affiliation), is quite illustrative of the capacity of principlism to                         
cover a wide array of moral considerations, and to apply them to particular                         
problematics. However, as will be seen later on, it also highlights the existence of                           
potential limits in the scope of action that principlism can justify or motivate.   
 
Beauchamp and Childress define autonomous actions in terms of acting (1)                     
intentionally, (2) with understanding, and (3) without controlling influences that                   
determine one’s action (Beauchamp, Childress, 2009, p.101). The criteria, identified in                     
such a way, allow for various degrees of autonomous action, depending on how the last                             
two conditions just enumerated are fulfilled. Both authors estimate that, for an action                         
to qualify as autonomous according to their account, ‘it needs only a substantial degree                           
of understanding and freedom from constraint, not a full understanding or a complete                         
absence of influence’ (Ibid., p.101). This also leaves the door open for more or less                             
complex conceptualisations of autonomy, including accounts insisting on the                 
importance of social relationships and intersecting social determinants in the formation                     
of one’s identity (a crucial quality, I argue) - as long as these features of autonomous                               
action are accepted and acknowledged (Beauchamp, Childress, 2009, p.103).   
 
Beauchamp and Childress stress the idea that the principle of respect for                       
autonomy can be stated both as a negative obligation and as a positive obligation (for                             
example, the obligation to foster autonomous decision making) (Ibid, p.104). The                     
process of progressive specification can, in this way, use both types of obligation to                           
support a variety of moral norms. For example, in delineating the existence of a duty to                               
respect a person’s autonomy, in which autonomous action must fulfill (at least to some                           
degree) several conditions, this account defends a correlative ‘right to choose, not a                         
mandatory duty to choose’ (Ibid., p.105). The possibility to decline information is                       
therefore recognised and validated. In the case of pre-emptive psychiatry, as will be                         
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seen later on, this specification is of particular importance, especially considering the                       
risks of false-positives and the particularity of the ‘at-risk’ label.   
 
However, while acknowledging that ‘fostering autonomous decision making’               
might be a positive obligation, and specifying precisely what shape that obligation may                         
take, principlism fails to account for such an obligation outside of a purely medical                           
setting, therefore disregarding its wider scope. Admittedly, anything falling outside a                     
defined field (clinical medicine, medical research, or public health) should not be                       
incorporated into reflections centred on biomedical ethics, at the risk of losing clarity                         
and focus. However, I argue here that such a restriction in the scope of matters under                               
consideration would considerably hinder the pertinence of an ethical analysis -                     
especially with regards to matters of prevention.   
 
In recent years, for example, a stronger emphasis has been placed in                       
biomedical ethics on the quality of people’s actual understanding of information and                       
their consent, rather than on the duty simply to disclose that information (Beauchamp,                         
Childress, 2009, pp.117-118): clinical experience and empirical data ‘indicate that                   
patients and research subjects exhibit wide variation in their understanding of                     
information about diagnoses, procedures, risks, probable benefits, and prognoses’ (Ibid,                   
p.127). This shift in attention has led to the identification of problematic obstacles to                           
understanding that have later been overcome, at least partially, through specific                     
procedures. But the capacity for autonomous decision-making, even within the limited                     
account defined by Beauchamp and Childress’ criteria, and despite beneficial                   
refinements like the ones surrounding the notion of understanding, must be fostered by                         
a multitude of measures going far beyond what medical practitioners, researchers or                       
even healthcare policymakers can do on their own.   
 
This issue is especially salient in the case of preventive medicine. While the                         
availability of readily understandable information for populations with vulnerabilities                 
helps foster autonomy, one’s capacity for autonomous action might hinge upon factors                       
falling outside the realm of medical or scientific intervention. Preventive measures                     
cover a multitude of possible actions, many of them not immediately medical. In order                           
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to satisfy - even partially - the third condition for autonomous action identified by                           
Beauchamp and Childress (the absence of controlling influences that determine one’s                     
action), at-risk patients must, for example, be preserved from undue pressure arising                       
from the stigma associated with specific choices, or simply have access to necessary                         
resources from which they are unjustly deprived and which cannot be made available in                           
any medical or healthcare capacity. Similar remarks can be made with regards to the                           
principles of nonmaleficence, beneficence and justice.   
 
Because they accept both broad or narrow construals of harm, obligations of                       
nonmaleficence as developed by Beauchamp and Childress are particularly helpful                   
when one has to analyse the specific repercussions of the development of pre-emptive                         
psychiatry. Certainly, at the heart of many ethical concerns surrounding this question                       
are the potentially unjustified harms done to at-risk individuals: issues of                     
overmedication and overdiagnosis are central in the rationale of those who oppose, on                         
ethical grounds, the recognition of an ‘at-risk’ status in psychiatry.   
 
Beauchamp and Childress dismiss as morally dangerous the traditional                 
distinctions (such as intended versus merely foreseen effects, withholding and                   
withdrawing treatment, killing and letting die, etc.) that have occupied a privileged                       
position in professional codes, institutional policies, and writings in biomedical ethics                     
(Beauchamp, Childress, 2009, p.155). They prefer to focus on the arguably more                       
morally pertinent distinction between futile (or pointless) treatments, and obligatory                   
treatments (in the absence of valid refusal of treatment). Although both of them work                           
with this distinction in the context of a specific topic in biomedical ethics (mainly                           
intending, causing, and permitting death or the risk of death), their work on                         
obligations of nonmaleficence and futile/obligatory treatments can be applied to                   
pre-emptive psychiatry and other medical domains.   
 
The term futility, here, is used to cover many situations of predicted                       
improbable outcomes, improbable success, and unacceptable benefit-burden ratios               
(Ibid., p.167): ‘decision makers typically use futility to express a combined value                       
judgement and scientific judgement’ (Ibid., p.168) - therefore, it is a particularly useful                         
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notion to use when considering the efficacy and the necessity of pre-emptive measures.                         
A certain shift is indispensable, though: because their focus on palliative care brings                         
them to consider only life-sustaining treatments, Beauchamp and Childress associate                   
futile measures with the idea of optionality, and necessary/effective treatments with                     
that of obligation. With a wider understanding of futility, therefore including                     
treatments other than life-sustaining or life-saving, such associations are less applicable:                     
futility would be more easily associated with the idea of duty (the duty not to treat). It                                 
then becomes possible to combine considerations centred on quality of life, or                       
well-being, with medical and scientific input in order to determine whether a treatment                         
is futile or effective.   
 
Closely related, the principle of beneficence permits a precise evaluation of the                       
other side of that coin. Beneficence is a principle used to determine the legitimacy of                             
positive duties - that of providing benefits to others. A comprehensive and coherent                         
account of well-being is an essential feature of reflections centred on beneficent duties:                         
one cannot defend the idea of such duties without at least a rough account of what one                                 
should aim for. In healthcare, utilitarian conceptualisations of well-being are widely                     
used, thanks to their propensity to balance benefits, effectiveness, utility, risks, and                       
costs so as to produce the best overall results. Beauchamp and Childress expand this                           
notion to account for virtues of benevolence, various forms of care, and non-obligatory                         
ideals of beneficence (Beauchamp, Childress, 2009, p.197), and they reject stronger                     
accounts of beneficence in which the possibility of beneficence as an ideal is dismissed.   
 
As mentioned earlier, cost-effectiveness analyses (CEA), cost-benefit analyses               
(CBA) and cost-utility analyses (CUA) have become quite common in medicine - both                         
in research and in public policy. However, such quantitative instruments, centred on                       
probability and magnitude, have been at the centre of many controversies: ‘critics claim                         
that these methods of analysis are not sufficiently comprehensive, that they fail to                         
include all relevant values and options, that they frequently conflict with principles of                         
justice, and that they are often themselves subjective and biased’ (Ibid., p.222). While                         
Beauchamp and Childress recognise the usefulness and insights of techniques derived                     
from utilitarian thought, especially in the formulation of public policy, they insist on                         
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the idea that they can only provide one form of indicators for appropriate social                           
beneficence (Ibid., p.230). They balance the use of cost-effectiveness analyses (and                     
others) as ways to implement the principle of utility with principles such as respect for                             
autonomy and justice, in order to set much needed limits (Beauchamp, Childress, 2009,                         
p.233).   
 
Indeed, conflicts with ideas of autonomy and justice are the most pervasive                       
problem one faces in the implementation of duties of beneficence. In biomedical ethics,                         
accusations of paternalism highlight this situation in a very illustrative way, and are also                           
particularly relevant in the context of pre-emptive psychiatry. While Beauchamp and                     
Childress defend the legitimacy of both soft and hard paternalism in very specific                         
situations, they stress the importance of caution even with regards to some forms of                           
soft paternalism: ‘soft paternalistic policies, for example, sometimes work by                   
stigmatising certain conduct. However, in practice, it is easy to slide from stigmatising                         
conduct to stigmatising people who engage in that conduct’ (Ibid., p.212). Preventive                       
measures, in psychiatry just like in many other areas of medicine, often make use of                             
such forms of soft paternalism, from a condemnation of smoking to the encouragement                         
of balanced diets and regular exercise. Principlism, therefore, provides once again                     
useful concepts to undertake the ethical evaluation of medical practices, and of                       
pre-emptive psychiatry.   
 
The principle of justice, as elaborated by Beauchamp and Childress,                   
incorporates elements from various theories of justice in an effort to bring coherence                         
and comprehensiveness to visions of how healthcare resources ought to be distributed                       
in a way that adheres to ideals of social justice. From a Rawlsian acceptance of the                               
fair-opportunity rule (stating that undeserved disadvantaging conditions need to be                   
compensated), to a utilitarian focus on maximisation, or a rights-based and egalitarian                       
attention to the idea of a decent minimum, Beauchamp and Childress try to delineate a                             
conceptualisation of justice and fairness as comprehensive as can be for the field of                           
biomedical ethics. In doing so, they manage to account for a multitude of justice-based                           
concerns, as varied in scope as they are in substance. Applied to the specific problems                             
appearing with the development of pre-emptive psychiatry, the principle of justice can                       
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be used in reference to a wide range of concerns. For example, disparities in healthcare                             
based on social and gender properties are social problems that fall under the                         
fair-opportunity rule (Beauchamp, Childress, 2009, p.250), and such disparities can be                     
evaluated both at a national or at a global level.   
 
Issues of disparity and disadvantage are particularly prominent in psychiatry,                   
in which environmental risks are pronounced (low income, migration, sleep-patterns,                   
abuse, insecurity, etc. are all recognised factors in the existence of higher risks for                           
specific disorders or symptoms). Furthermore, the right to a decent minimum of                       
healthcare is seen by Beauchamp and Childress as an attractive, moderate, egalitarian                       
point of view that offers a possible compromise among libertarians, utilitarians,                     
communitarians, and egalitarians (Beauchamp, Childress, 2009, p.261), by allowing the                   
recognition of a two-tier system consisting of a unitary system at the first tier of                             
healthcare, and a pluralist system at the second tier (Ibid., p.272). Both authors defend                           
the idea that the recognition of global, enforceable rights to a decent minimum of                           
healthcare can be used to condemn the piecemeal approach taken by many countries to                           
their healthcare system, despite the fact that principlism recognises the relevance of                       
various theories of justice (Ibid., pp.280-281). This perspective recognises the                   
legitimacy of trade-offs between efficiency and justice, a position that mirrors                     
Beauchamp and Childress’ insistence on the possibility of contingent conflicts between                     
beneficence and justice (Ibid., p.181). 
 
Although it has been determined that Beauchamp and Childress’ approach                   
allows for the possibility of a practical, multi-factorial and pluralistic ethical evaluation                       
of pre-emptive psychiatry, it is necessary to acknowledge the limitations attached to                       
this choice. The absence of higher-level justifications, even though it permits greater                       
comprehensiveness and pertinence than most ethical theories, does leave upcoming                   
arguments potentially open to criticism due to a lack of higher theoretical grounding. It                           
also circumscribes ethical reflections to the realm of medicine and public health policy. 
 
In conclusion, Beauchamp and Childress’ principles of biomedical ethics                 
provide the opportunity to cover a very large array of issues, at diverse levels of medical                               
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practice and with regards to a variety of agents, despite some restrictions. It has the                             
advantage of being flexible enough to provide practical guidance without removing the                       
possibility to appeal to ethical principles, norms and theories in grounding diverse                       
moral judgements. Principlist lines of reasoning will thus be very present in the rest of                             
this evaluation of the ethics of pre-emptive psychiatry, although, more often than not,                         
not overtly so: the avenues of reflection introduced in this subsection will often be very                             
closely tied in with other mid-level theories that I believe to be profoundly compatible                           
with Beauchamp and Childress’ work.   
   
2. The Capabilities Approach and Others 
In order to account for problematics that exceed the limits of purely                       
biomedical considerations, another mid-level theory has been selected. The choice to                     
focus on the account of capabilities developed by Nussbaum reflects a resolution to                         
formulate such problematics within a more politically-informed framework. Indeed, a                   
considerable amount of deliberations surrounding the development of pre-emptive                 
psychiatry falls directly under the scope of public policy - be it healthcare measures or                             
more general programs - and therefore needs to be politically motivated in addition to                           
being ethically justifiable. 
 
Adopting a form of political liberalism, Nussbaum’s account of the capabilities                     
approach borrows what one might call a ‘statement of intent’ from Rawls, in the sense                             
that one of its primary aims is to provide principles which can be recognised as                             
legitimate and applied in a pluralistic society. Consequently, the idea of a potential                         
overlapping consensus in which holders of a variety of views - philosophical, secular or                           
religious - can convene, is at the heart of the capabilities approach (Nussbaum, 2013,                           
p.79). As a mid-level political doctrine relying on a similar kind of reflective equilibrium                           
as Beauchamp and Childress’ principlism, then, I argue that the capabilities approach                       
brings a distinct, though complementary, set of concepts to the table.   
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Nussbaum follows Sen in defining capabilities as ‘substantial freedoms’: a set of                       
(usually interconnected) opportunities to choose and to act (Nussbaum, 2013, p.20).                     
The notion is complex, as well as multi-faceted: the substantial freedoms mentioned                       
above - or  combined capabilities - encompass both the fluid and dynamic abilities residing                           
inside a person, but also the freedoms or opportunities created by a combination of                           
personal abilities and a certain political, social, and economic environment (Nussbaum,                     
2013, p.20).  Internal capabilities , which are ‘trained or developed traits and abilities,                       
developed, in most cases, in interaction with the social, economic, familial, and political                         
environment’, must be distinguished from innate aptitudes that can potentially be                     
nurtured ( basic capabilities ) (Ibid. p.21). Additionally, on the other side of capability is                         
functioning : ‘a functioning is an active realization of one or more capabilities’                       
(Nussbaum, 2013, pp.24-25). A list of ten central capabilities has been identified by                         
Nussbaum:  life ;  bodily health ;  bodily integrity ;  senses, imagination, and thought ;  emotions ;                     
practical reason ;  ailiation ;  other species ;  play ;  control over one’s environment (Nussbaum,                     
2013, pp.33-34). 
 
To include the intricate notion of capabilities in the context of this dissertation                         
opens up highly pertinent perspectives. First and foremost, it allows for the                       
introduction of a clearer idea of governmental and societal responsibility, especially                     
with regards to groups and individuals presenting specific vulnerabilities. As a                     
grounded theory enriched by the experiences, the stories and the identified needs of the                           
people concerned, the capabilities approach also provides fundamental tools for the                     
identification and the management of such vulnerabilities. 
 
Nussbaum’s approach is indeed deeply normative, adopting from the very start                     
a clear evaluative and ethical stance (Nussbaum, 2013, p.28). At its heart is the notion of                               
dignity, and the idea that society has a responsibility both to protect and to promote                             
living conditions worthy of people’s dignity (Ibid., p.30). Indeed, the capabilities                     
approach asserts that an affirmative task for governments stems from the existence of                         
such entitlements (Nussbaum, 2013, p.65): ‘fundamental rights are only words unless                     
and until they are made real by government action’ (Ibid., p.65). Closely related to                           
Beauchamp and Childress’ account of the ‘fair-opportunity rule’, which states that                     
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undeserved disadvantages induce a right in justice to some form of assistance                       
(Beauchamp, Childress, 2009, p.250), and their idea of a decent minimum (Ibid., p.259),                         
the capabilities approach therefore advocates for the existence of positive rights, and of                         
the moral obligations that derive from them. 
 
Two additional notions, which were introduced by Wolff and de-Shalit in                     
Disadvantage (2007), are of particular importance in the context of this dissertation:                       
fertile functionings and  corrosive disadvantages . Because capabilities are not hermetically                   
isolated from one another but, on the contrary, intricately interconnected and                     
interdependent, some might prove to be particularly fertile, promoting the                   
development and flourishing of others, while some circumstances might turn out to be                         
quite deleterious to a series of capabilities. A useful consequence of the incorporation of                           
fertile functionings and corrosive disadvantages is that it allows for a form of                         
hierarchisation and prioritisation in the management of scarce resources for the                     
policymaker: ‘just as politicians have reason to spend scarce resources on the most                         
fertile capabilities, expecting those to generate improvement in yet other areas, so they                         
have reason to focus their energies on removing what Wolff and de-Shalit call  corrosive                           
disadvantage , types of capability failure that lead to failure in other areas’ (Nussbaum,                         
2013, p.99). 
 
The main reason why the notions of capabilities, fertile functionings and                     
corrosive disadvantages provide particularly effective tools in order to address issues                     
related to the development of pre-emptive psychiatry is that, as mentioned previously,                       
they stimulate a more sophisticated understanding of specific vulnerabilities, beyond                   
the restricted scope of a purely biomedical vulnerability. The identification of corrosive                       
disadvantages, for example, leads to the incorporation of vulnerabilities related to                     
societal and environmental conditions that are also shown to be correlated to higher                         
risks in psychiatry. The capabilities approach is quite well suited to the analysis of such                             
larger issues: ‘often these will be failures connected to marginalization, stigma, and                       
other forms of group-based powerlessness, giving societies reason to adopt                   
group-based remedies, even though the end in view is always the full empowerment of                           
each individual’ (Nussbaum, 2013, p.100). I will expand on Rogers, Mackenzie and                       
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Dodds’ work on vulnerability theory in Chapter 5, but I can point out here that their                               
contributions are consonant with the capabilities approach and Wolff and de-Shalit’s                     
work on fertile functionings and corrosive disadvantages. 
 
The need for pre-onset early interventions, in medicine or other fields, is                       
therefore well accounted for by the capabilities approach. Inspired by Heckman’s work                       
on the topic, Nussbaum admits that ‘a great deal of human potential is being wasted by                               
the failure to intervene early both through programs designed to enhance the future                         
human being’s health  in utero and through programs after birth’ (Nussbaum, 2013,                       
p.194). 
 
The capabilities approach, as a mid-level political, liberal and pluralistic theory,                     
provides substantial advantages in the ethical evaluation of pre-emptive psychiatry,                   
mainly through its capacity to conceptualise and deal with vulnerabilities exceeding the                       
scope of biomedicine. Furthermore, at the heart of this approach is an intricate idea of                             
well-being, or quality of life, in line with the pluralistic one developed throughout this                           
dissertation. Indeed, the compatibility between principlism and the capabilities                 
approach arises in great part from their rich and complex conceptualisation of the idea                           
of well-being, both admitting the coexistence of multiple, legitimate ends.   
 
First and foremost, it is because the notion of development is so central in                           
Nussbaum’s approach that the idea of well-being, closely related to it, becomes itself                         
quite crucial: ‘the purpose of development is to create an enabling environment for                         
people to enjoy long, healthy, and creative lives’ (Mahbub ul Haq, as cited by Nussbaum,                             
2013). As a result, there are two concomitant axes developed in parallel to each other in                               
the capabilities approach: one aims to provide the means for a comparative assessment                         
of well-being (or quality of life), while the other delineates an account of basic social                             
justice (Nussbaum, 2013, p.18). One primordial characteristic of Nussbaum’s account of                     
well-being is its refusal to reduce the notion to one single value, despite emerging                           
challenges appearing with the inability to compare and aggregate clearly across                     
individuals or populations. The approach ‘takes  each person as an end , asking not just                           
about the total or average well-being but about opportunities available to each person.                         
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It is  focused on choice or freedom [...] The approach is  resolutely pluralist about value ’                             
(Nussbaum, 2013, p.18). A clear definition of quality of life is absent from Nussbaum’s                           
capability-based theory of justice, due to its decisive adhesion to political liberalism.                       
Despite their interconnectedness, the central capabilities remain distinctive, irreductible                 
and heterogeneous areas of freedom. All need to be secured and protected, regardless of                           
one another: ‘when capabilities have intrinsic value and importance (as do the ten on                           
my list), the situation produced when two of them collide is tragic: any course we select                               
involves doing wrong to someone. This situation of  tragic choice is not fully captured in                             
standard cost-benefit analysis’ (Nussbaum, 2013, p.36). And the flaws of such standard                       
cost-benefit analyses and Gross Domestic Product calculations (GDP) are carefully                   
outlined and stressed in Nussbaum’s argumentation - a necessary feature of her analysis                         
in order to legitimise the decision to opt for an adaptative, unspecific account of                           
well-being.   
 
At the centre of such recriminations is the allegation of oversimplification: ‘the                       
GDP approach aggregates across component parts of lives, suggesting that a single                       
number will tell us all we need to know about quality of life, when in reality it doesn’t                                   
give us good information’ (Nussbaum, 2013, p.49). Utilitarian approaches are not                     
spared; four different issues, more or less problematic depending on the account                       
selected, are identified. It is argued that, as a measure of quality of life, utilitarianism                             
aggregates across lives in the same way GDP calculations do; that it unjustifiably                         
aggregates across components of lives; that it fails to account for the malleability of                           
preferences and satisfactions; and, finally, that in defining satisfaction as a goal, it                         
greatly undervalues freedom (Nussbaum, 2013, pp.51-55).   
 
While some of the issues identified by Nussbaum are indeed quite problematic,                       
as was recognised in a previous section, I would like to argue here that her decision to                                 
focus on a form of welfare utilitarianism centred on preference satisfaction is somewhat                         
unwarranted. Preference satisfaction might actually be said to be the least sustainable                       
form of utilitarian value theory (Scarre, 1996, p.133), in great part for the reasons                           
highlighted above. A favoured approach would be the ideal, inclusive-end conception of                       
well-being I mentioned earlier: ‘an inclusive-end view of happiness singles out neither                       
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pleasure nor any other individual element as the whole of happiness, but sees happy                           
existence as a coherent construction out of a variety of complementary parts - a                           
construction on which the subject can look with satisfaction’ (Scarre, 1996, p.141). This                         
inclusive-end account of well-being seems more in line with Nussbaum’s own                     
conceptualisation, especially if one admits that a very similar type of political action                         
derives from it. The most efficient way to promote well-being would be to ‘create the                             
basic political, economic and educational conditions which permit [people’s] chosen                   
lifestyles to be realised. The most fruitful happiness-enhancing service which                   
utilitarians can render is generally to facilitate individuals’ own efforts to live the                         
lifestyle of their choice’ (Ibid., p.142). In recognising the partial incommensurability of                       
these diverse ends and, therefore, the difficulty in implementing comparative value                     
judgements, such an account might be said to be quite a weak version of utilitarianism -                               
or another form of consequentialism altogether. However, by admitting outright the                     
existence of such complications, this ideal, inclusive-ends account offers a convincing                     
understanding of well-being, in addition to being compatible with both the principlist                       
and the capabilities approaches. As conceded by Nussbaum herself, the capabilities                     
approach, being outcome-oriented, can be seen as a cousin of consequentialism, or even                         
as a form of political, non-welfarist consequentialism (Nussbaum, 2013, p.95): ‘in this                       
sense it is reasonable to classify the capabilities approach with approaches that focus on                           
promoting social welfare - understanding welfare, of course, in terms of capabilities,                       
not the satisfaction of preferences’ (Ibid., p.96). I believe that an outcome-oriented                       
approach like this one suits my purposes quite well. 
 
As applied as a topic like the development of pre-emptive psychiatry might be,                         
meta-ethical questions and other purely theoretical interrogations are unavoidable in                   
the ethical evaluation of these medical practices. If one wishes to understand the source,                           
the nature or limits of our moral justifications, one necessarily has to turn to highly                             
theoretical lines of enquiry. The topic of this dissertation would indeed gain a lot from                             
a deeper analysis of its implications as well as the assumptions it relies on. The idea of                                 
prevention itself, in medicine, in politics, or economics, etc., is particularly complex and                         
necessarily engages with deeply abstract notions, such as risk, or vulnerability. For                       
reasons of efficiency, though, the choice has been made, here, to strictly limit the scope                             
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of these interrogations to their practical consequences and implications. It is only                       
insofar as there are actual repercussions - in the treatment of at-risk individuals, in the                             
attitudes of the general population, on the duties of psychiatrists, etc. - that such                           
theoretical enquiries will be pursued.   
 
To conclude this more methodological section of my dissertation, I want to                       
stress once again the necessity to adopt a comprehensive, adaptable and explanatory                       
framework for the evaluation of pre-emptive psychiatry. With these constraints in                     
mind, mid-level approaches appear to offer the most coherent and pragmatic option,                       
offering clear normative (moral and political) guidance, while seeking to reach a form                         
of equilibrium between our beliefs and our principles.   
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Chapter 2 - Current State of Research in               
Pre-Emptive Psychiatry 
 
Before delving into the ethical inquiries that are the main object of this                         
dissertation, it is first indispensable to determine and explain what medical concepts,                       
research and practices are hereby under consideration. This chapter aims to establish a                         
clear account of what pre-emptive psychiatry currently consists in; what underlies and                       
justifies its development; and how it is evolving.   
 
The topic is surrounded by ongoing debates and disagreements, in both the                       
clinical field and the research community. Moreover, the data produced, the models                       
elaborated, and the treatments selected in research and practice are highly                     
heterogeneous. On account of this, the delineation of this account adopts a                       
wide-ranging approach. Several definitions and characteristics of the prodrome of                   10
mental disorders and of vulnerability traits will therefore be discussed, mainly with                       
regards to psychosis (for reasons of data availability). In a similar manner, a series of                             
instruments and criteria aiming to assess vulnerability traits and prodromal symptoms                     
will be considered. Regarding treatment, the efficacy of both pharmacotherapies and                     
psychotherapies will be considered, as well as the array of structures that have been                           
developed in answer to rising awareness of the potential of pre-onset early                       
interventions in psychiatry. The account of pre-emptive psychiatry thus elaborated                   
should be clear and comprehensive enough to support pertinent ethical reflections.   
 
For the sake of clarity and precision, this chapter is thematically organised,                       
following the process of pre-emptive psychiatry’s development. Therefore, the first part                     
examines how the existence of a prodromal phase was determined in the case of several                             
10 In psychiatry, as in medicine more generally, the prodrome of a disorder designates a phase                               
characterised by the presence of benign early symptoms, which are also precursors of a more serious                               
phase. 
 
60 
mental disorders, as well as the medical and economic relevance of this determination;                         
the second focuses on the characterisation of vulnerability traits and prodromal phases;                       
the third, on the various methods with which these can be clinically assessed; and lastly,                             
the fourth focuses on treatments envisaged in response to the need for pre-emptive                         
psychiatry. Given that most of these developments are fairly recent and that research is                           
accumulating rapidly, an effort has been made to rely primarily on sources published in                           
the last decade, so as to give as up-to-date an account as possible. 
 
I. HOPES ATTACHED TO PRE-EMPTIVE         
PSYCHIATRY 
While the increasing interest taken by researchers and clinicians alike in the                       
early phases of mental disorders really gained momentum in the past 15-20 years                         
(Fusar-Poli et al., 2012, p.220), the awareness that a series of early symptoms might                           
constitute the prodrome of psychosis is not particularly recent. Many hopes hinge                       11
upon the growing capacity to identify with relatively high predictive validity those                       
individuals who are at high risk of developing serious mental health issues, opening the                           
door for preventive or pre-emptive measures in the psychiatric field. 
 
1. Medical Interest in the Prodromal Phase of Mental                 
Disorders 
Sullivan, a psychiatrist, published as early as July 1927 his article on the onset                           
of schizophrenia in  The American Journal of Psychiatry (Sullivan, 1994). He explained                       
there that two factors preliminary to schizophrenic psychoses had been identified in                       
male patients: the experience of ‘subjectively difficult efforts’ and a ‘sex factor’ (the                         
inability to ‘achieve if only for a short time a definitely satisfying adjustment to a sex                               
object’) (Sullivan, 1994, p.135). In addition to this, ‘cultural distortions provided by the                         
11 I will focus almost exclusively on psychotic disorders in this chapter (and throughout this                             
dissertation), as they have been at the forefront of research efforts in pre-emptive psychiatry. 
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home’ were determined to be of prime importance in the onset of schizophrenia (Ibid.,                           
p.135). While the detection of vulnerability traits, risk factors and prodromal                     
symptoms has transformed considerably since then, Sullivan’s insistence on the                   
importance of a dynamic view rather than a static one when envisaging psychotic                         
disorders, so as to dedicate more efforts into the study of their prodrome, is in a quite                                 
similar vein to what is published on the topic nowadays.   
 
The most recent increase in focus on the prodromal phase of mental disorders                         
was, in part, motivated by the aggregation of retrospective accounts from schizophrenic                       
patients relating their growing difficulties in thinking, in feeling and in behaving                       
(Addington; Heinssen, 2012). A series of studies, a number of which were not primarily                           
aiming to inform the definition of a prodrome, provided researchers with data about                         
patients’ experiences and memories before the onset of a full-threshold mental disorder.                       
Their narratives were recorded, analysed, combined and compared in order to try and                         
reach a clearer consensus in the demonstration and the definition of psychosis’                       
prodrome, as is shown by Loebel et al. (1992, p.1184): 
 
First we asked patients and their family members when the                   
patient (or the family member) first experienced (or noticed)                 
behavioral changes which, in retrospect, appear to have been                 
related to the patient's becoming ill. Second, after explaining                 
psychosis in clear language, we asked when the patient (or the                     
family member) first experienced (or noticed) psychotic             
symptoms. 
 
Although the precision of such recollections is liable to questioning and might cast                         
doubt on the accuracy of the data thus collected, the frequency with which patients’                           
accounts mentioned specific symptoms across various populations allowed researchers                 
to reach conclusions concerning the existence of a prodromal phase for several mental                         
disorders. The retrospective study of the prodromal symptoms of schizophrenia headed                     
by Rofes, Bueno, Labad and Valero led to the discovery that several prodromal                         
symptoms were repeatedly reported in their sample of 689 schizophrenic patients:                     
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delusional ones, disorganized ones and neurotic ones ( 2003, p.35) . Up to 90% of                         
patients with schizophrenia have been shown to describe changes in drive, perception,                       
beliefs, attention, concentration, mood, affect and behaviour (Yung, McGorry, 1996,                   
p.353).   
 
As I will explain later, however, definitions of the prodrome have become                       
much more detailed and comprehensive with time, and they cannot be reduced to the                           
retrospective reports of patients who already suffer from a full-threshold mental                     
disorder. A large number of retrospective and prospective clinical studies focusing on                       
subthreshold symptoms, biomarkers and genetic markers has given rise to remarkably                     
thorough assessments of the prodrome. What is most noteworthy about these efforts,                       
though, are the reasons why the earlier phases of mental disorders have gathered                         
increasing attention since the 1990’s, and how pre-emptive psychiatry has recently                     
become an overarching issue.   
 
Underlying the development of pre-emptive psychiatry is the hope that it                     
might provide significantly better clinical and functional outcomes for patients, as                     
opposed to simply palliative approaches (McGorry et al., 2014, p.211). A significant link                         
between the Duration of Untreated Psychosis (DUP) and poorer prognoses has been                       
established on several occasions; and there is convincing evidence of a ‘modest                       
association between DUP and outcome, which supports the case for clinical trials that                         
examine the effect of reducing DUP’ (Marshall, 2005, p.975). Therefore, there is                       
considerable medical interest in being able to intervene as early as possible. According                         
to Singh, three emerging strands of evidence support the case for specialised Early                         
Intervention services: first, evidence that early trajectory and disability are strongly                     
predictive of long-term course and outcome, as it offers an early window of                         
opportunity during this period of neuronal and psychosocial plasticity; secondly, the                     
association between longer periods of untreated psychosis and poorer outcomes being                     
firmly established; and thirdly, evidence that even well-resourced community services                   
are not meeting the needs of young people in their first psychotic episode or who are at                                 
risk for psychosis (Singh, 2010, p.343). Developing Early Intervention services might                     
thus participate in ameliorating many people’s prognosis by reducing delays in                     
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treatment and addressing these people’s needs more specifically than general                   12
community health services; it would certainly explain the enthusiasm demonstrated by                     
pre-emptive psychiatry’s most fervent proponents. 
 
However, considering that the rest of this chapter is dedicated to explaining in                         
more detail what underlies and justifies the development of pre-emptive psychiatry                     
from a medical perspective, the consideration of its economic impact becomes a more                         
pressing question here. Indeed, in order to justify pursuing research on the prodrome                         
of mental disorders to such an extent, its relevance must be argued for in terms of both                                 
medical results and cost-effectiveness.   
 
2. Cost-Saving Measures 
Unfortunately, cost-effectiveness, cost-benefit and cost-utility studies           
specifically centred on pre-emptive psychiatry remain relatively rare to this day and, in                         
view of how recent the implementation of early intervention services is in most                         
countries, long-term economic impact can only be estimated with difficulty. Again,                     
most EIP services in the U.K. focus on young people who have already suffered from a                               
first episode of psychosis: their goal is to provide them with the best available                           
treatments, to support their recovery, and to prevent a relapse (Marwaha et al., 2016,                           
p.186). However, boundaries between pre-onset at-risk individuals and post                 
first-episode patients are not always clear-cut: criteria for an episode of psychosis can                         
vary greatly, between a one week duration of frank psychotic symptoms to a slower                           
functional decline (Ibid., p.186). Some of these centres have thus participated to clinical                         
studies on pre-onset as well as early detection and interventions, like the Teesside EIP                           
service which has provided ‘early intervention for young people aged 14-18 years at                         
high risk of or affected by psychotic illness’ (Tiffin, Hudson, 2007, p.212). This                         
exemplifies how pre-onset and early detection and interventions exist on what might                       
be called a gradual spectrum.   
 
12 I will come back on several occasions to the claim that specific very early and early                                 
intervention services are more effective than general care services. 
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The question of resources management is primordial in mental health                   
systems, for which funding is already overstrained; and doubts surrounding the                     
cost-effectiveness of very early and early interventions in psychiatry remain persistent.                     
Focused on the idea that ‘the experience of pioneer services in the USA and Australia                             
[had] convinced the UK Government to set aside millions of pounds to make dedicated                           
early intervention teams an integral part of standard mental health services across the                         
country’, Pelosi and Birchwood discussed about this in the article I mentioned earlier:                         
‘Is early intervention for psychosis a waste of valuable resources?’ (2003). While Pelosi                         
gave a clear ‘yes’ in answer to that question, Birchwood responded in favour of Early                             
Intervention for psychosis (EIP).   
 
In his virulent criticism of EIP services, Pelosi explains that early intervention                       
teams do not possess any special technical skills setting them apart from mainstream                         
services, merely describing in their writings ‘some basic aspects of good practice in the                           
management of psychotic disorders’; and that they waste resources on vulnerable                     
individuals who are not in need of psychiatric treatment (Pelosi, Birchwood, 2003,                       
p.196). Their inefficiency and, moreover, the danger they pose would reside in their                         
misleading health policy-makers, thus diverting resources to specialised teams and                   
‘making it even more difficult to provide decent care to people with severe and                           
enduring mental disorders’ (Ibid., p.196). It can be argued, following Pelosi, that EIP                         
services are too costly, especially in view of their relative inefficacy. 
 
In response, proponents of pre-emptive psychiatry highlight and insist on the                     
higher success rates, in terms of clinical and functional outcomes, of treating psychotic                         
symptoms earlier rather than after they have been present for some time, in association                           
with a decrease of secondary disabilities (Pelosi, Birchwood, 2003, p.196). A few studies                         
do provide detailed data and in-depth analyses of the cost-effectiveness of specific                       
services, including the UK-based Early Intervention services that were the object of                       
Pelosi and Birchwood’s debate. In a comparative study between Early Intervention                     
services for children and adolescents, and generic Child and Adolescents Mental Health                       
Services (CAMHS), using data from the National Health Service clinical reporting                     
systems for 2001-2008 and a time horizon of 6 months, the reduced length of hospital                             
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admissions for patients of Early Intervention services was shown to allow cost-savings                       
of £4814 per patient (McCrone et al., 2013, p.368). Several attempts to evaluate the                           
economic impact of EIP services do seem to point to their capacity to provide direct                             
healthcare savings over a period of 1 to 3 years, to both patients diagnosed with                             
psychosis and at-risk individuals (Ibid., p.369).   
 
The cost-effectiveness of early interventions depends in great part on the                     
overall cost of treatment. The use of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) for                       
individuals at risk for psychosis, for example, could be more cost-effective than routine                         
care because it is more likely to lower significantly the incidence of first-episode                         
psychosis (Ising et al., 2015, p.1435). The treatment costs incurred by very early and                           
early interventions through the use of psychotherapy and/or pharmacotherapy can be,                     
at first, considerably higher than those of routine care, although perhaps not to the                           
point of discrediting their overall cost-effectiveness. For instance, while early                   
intervention costs were indeed shown to be higher than the cost of a mainstream                           
needs-based type of intervention, it also incurred notably lower outpatient treatment                     
costs over the medium term (Phillips et al., 2009, p.33). A problem encountered in this                             
study and in others, though, is that no significant differences were established in the                           
total treatment costs between the two options in the long term – in this case, within                               
three separate time frames: treatment phase, short-term follow up and medium-term                     
follow up (Ibid., p.33). 
 
Granted, the cost-effectiveness of early interventions does not seem to be                     
easily sustained in the long term: it is mainly over the period during which the service                               
is offered that the effectiveness of early interventions appears strongest. A follow-up of                         
participants in the OPUS trial, for example, found that the clinical improvements made                         
by individuals two years after treatment by EIP services was not sustained up to five                             
years (Singh, 2010, p.344). One could argue, though, as McCrone does, that ‘even if the                             
benefits are not maintained, a short-term ‘gain’ (through reduced costs and/or                     
improved outcomes) is still worth aiming for unless by doing so, there are future                           
negative consequences’ (2013, p.372). Such negative consequences might include                 
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increasing stigma and discrimination, which could affect employment and education                   
possibilities, or use of services and social/recreational activities (Ibid., p.372).   
 
Nevertheless, it is hoped that wider economic benefits than purely direct ones                       
could be achieved through the use of pre-onset and early intervention services. These                         
could compensate potential negative consequences, particularly in terms of quality of                     
life and functional outcomes: although I intend to say more about this in Chapter 6,                             
early interventions for psychosis have been shown to result in higher rates of                         
vocational recovery than standard care (McCrone et al., 2010, p.381). 
 
Retrospective accounts from schizophrenic patients and the observation of                 
subthreshold symptoms have allowed researchers and clinicians to focus their attention                     
on the prodrome of mental disorders, and more particularly on the prodrome of                         
psychotic disorders. The magnitude of that attention, which has accrued considerably                     
since the late 1990’s, is justified by the potential medical and economic advantages of a                             
pre-emptive approach compared to a palliative one. Clinical and functional outcomes                     
have demonstrably been improved in subjects who followed early interventions in the                       
short and medium term, primarily thanks to significantly lower outpatient treatment                     
and hospitalisation costs. However, the long-term cost-effectiveness of early                 
interventions tends to become equivalent to that of mainstream care once active                       
treatment is discontinued. General consensus is needed on the assessment of prodromal                       
symptoms and vulnerability traits, as well as on the treatments offered to at-risk                         
patients. It is necessary if pre-emptive psychiatry is ever to become effective in terms of                             
costs and therapeutic outcomes. 
 
II. VULNERABILITY TRAITS AND PRODROMAL         
SYMPTOMS 
McGorry and Yung were among the very firsts to have taken an interest in the                             
definition of risk criteria for psychosis in the 1990’s. In their efforts to identify valid                             
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clinical features of the prodrome of psychosis, they first defined it as a period of                             
pre-psychotic disturbance, representing a deviation from a person's previous                 
experiences and behaviour (Yung, McGorry, 1996, p.353). But such changes in                     
cognition, affect and behaviour, which reportedly precede the onset of frank psychotic                       
symptoms, must be more precisely evaluated and assessed in order to be valuable in a                             
clinical or research setting – especially if they are to be used prospectively instead of                             
simply retrospectively.   
 
Before I outline various models of vulnerability and explain how pre-onset                     
early detection instruments may be used in clinical settings, it is indispensable for me to                             
establish a clear account of the various ways in which vulnerability traits and prodromal                           
symptoms have been characterised.   
 
Psychosis is a mental disorder defined by a loss of contact with reality: thought                           
processes and emotional responsiveness disintegrate, leading to false beliefs in the form                       
of delusions and hallucinations (Addington, Heinssen, 2012, p.171). Paranoia, bizarre                   
thinking, disorganised speech or thinking, social and occupational dysfunctions, are all                     
symptoms of schizophrenia - a particular type of psychosis. Psychosis is characterised                       
by its complex, multifactorial etiology: it is a multifaceted disorder, simultaneously                     
hereditary/genetic, neurobiological, cognitive, psychosocial, etc. The characterisation             
of its prodrome, which is no less complex than the disorder itself, has to account for                               
this variety of factors: ‘a plausible model of the onset of psychosis needs to draw not                               
only on neuroscience, but also on the insights of social psychiatry and cognitive                         
psychology’ (Broome et al., 2005a, p.23).   
 
1. Cognitive Risk Profiles and Psychosocial           
Functioning 
Young people at risk for psychosis are generally said to meet a certain profile:                           
they tend to be help-seeking adolescents or young adults presenting attenuated positive                       
psychotic symptoms (meaning an excess or a distortion of normal functions, such as                         
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delusions or hallucinations), and sometimes high levels of negative symptoms (which                     
are characterised by the diminution or the loss of normal functions, like emotional                         
withdrawal or difficulties in abstract thinking). Their subjective quality of life appears                       
to be substantially compromised (Broome, Fusar-Poli, Wuyts, 2013, p.783). They often                     
experience impairments in academic performance and occupational functioning, or                 
have difficulties with interpersonal relationships (Addington, Heinssen, 2012, p.173).                 
Many of them also suffer from comorbid diagnoses and, in particular, anxiety,                       
depression and substance use disorders (Broome, Fusar-Poli, Wuyts, 2013, p.783). The                     
vast array of these difficulties has led to the delineation of more precise cognitive and                             
psychosocial risk profiles. 
 
It appears that poor cognitive functioning is a common difficulty experienced                     
by at-risk individuals. Significant cognitive impairments have been consistently                 
demonstrated in at-risk individuals when compared to control groups (Addington,                   
Heinssen, 2012, p.174): ‘while results are mixed for many individual tasks, enough                       
converging evidence supports the assertion of relative impairments in verbal IQ, verbal                       
memory and fluency, and attention for individuals at risk for psychosis’. This shows                         
that there is an overall consensus about the existence of cognitive impairments in the                           
prodromal phase of psychotic disorders. However, there isn’t yet a way in which                         
individual cognitive tasks can be used more precisely in order to help predict                         
conversion on a more individual scale.   
 
Poor social cognition is the other form of cognitive difficulty from which                       
at-risk individuals tend to suffer. ‘Social cognition’ designates domains of cognitive                     
functions that one often utilises in socially relevant situations: that includes emotion                       
processing, social perception, theory of mind (or mental state attribution), and                     
attributional style/bias, as well as social metacognition (Green, Harvey, 2014, p.e4).                     
Several studies do indeed point to the existence of difficulties and perceived hostility                         
biases in the at-risk population. One tool that is used in order to measure social                             
cognition is the Ambiguous Intentions Hostility Questionnaire (AIHQ). A study led in                       
2010 showed that biased attribution style linked with paranoid symptoms may already                       
have evolved prior to the onset of frank psychotic symptoms (An et al., 2010, p.54).                             
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Therefore, impairments in social cognition begin in the prodromal phase of a psychotic                         
illness, remaining stable over time (Green et al., 2012, p.854), and poor social cognition                           
can be integrated into the assessment of prodromal symptoms and vulnerability traits.   
 
There isn’t yet much information on psychosocial vulnerability traits that                   
could specifically increase chances of developing a psychotic disorder, but their role in                         
the prodromal phase of various mental illnesses is rarely denied. Several researchers                       
and practitioners advocate for a better incorporation of psychosocial factors into the                       
elaboration of risk profiles, but the topic can be problematically leaden with issues of                           
xenophobia, racism, etc., since an urban upbringing, social isolation, and migration are                       
often designated as important social risk factors (Broome et al., 2005a, p.24). Certain                         
types of experience (bullying, victimisation, racism or alienation from mainstream                   
culture) can increase the probability of biased appraisals, and thus the risk of psychosis                           
(Ibid., p.29).   
 
Poor social functioning is quite commonly observed in at-risk individuals                   
(Addington, Heinssen, 2012, p.173). A scale has been elaborated in order to evaluate a                           
person’s psychosocial functioning: the Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF). It was                     
used in several of the studies aiming to provide a better understanding of the prodrome                             
of psychosis. Most of these studies point to significantly lower measures at baseline in                           
groups of young people who later transitioned to full-threshold psychosis (Yung et al.,                         
2003, p.27). However, the GAF is not an instrument specifically dedicated to the study                           
of the vulnerability traits and prodromal symptoms associated with psychosis: it is used                         
to measure general psychosocial functioning. Two new measures of global functioning                     
have therefore been developed precisely for what I will, for now, call the ‘clinical high                             
risk period' : the Global Functioning: Social (GFS), and the Global Functioning: Role                       13
(GFR) scales (Cornblatt et al., 2007, p. 688). The combination of these three measures                           
provides detailed information on psychosocial functioning in at-risk individuals, and                   
13 Several formulations can be used to refer to that ‘clinical high risk period’, like the At-Risk                                 
Mental State’ (ARMS), Clinical High Risk (CHR), Ultra-High Risk (UHR), etc. As specific sets of criteria                               
correspond to these formulations, I will avoid referring to them before the occasion arises to elaborate on                                 
each of them. 
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confirmed that they do indeed display impaired social and role functioning at baseline                         
(Ibid., p.688).   
 
A comprehensive characterisation of the prodrome of psychosis would thus                   
account for the possible ‘interaction between the biological and psychological in a                       
cascade of increasingly deviant development’ (Broome et al., 2005a, p.27), seeing as                       
both participate in making an individual more vulnerable.   
2. Biomarkers of Vulnerability 
Aside from cognitive and psychosocial vulnerability traits and prodromal                 
symptoms, researchers have started to focus on biomarkers as a possible characteristic                       
of being at risk for mental disorders, despite the fact that such biomarkers still have                             
little clinical use.   
 
Although the genetic/hereditary component of psychosis is globally               
acknowledged, its complexity (multiple genes are involved) and the fact that such                       
multi-genetic illnesses are not easily analysable through common genetic linkage                   
techniques have led to the conclusion that the search for a single, ideal and specific                             
biomarker was doomed to fail. The ‘complex, multidetermined nature of schizophrenia                     
and other psychoses makes it unlikely that any single biomarker will be both sensitive                           
and specific enough to unambiguously identify individuals who will later become                     
psychotic’ (Freedman et al., 2005, p.17).   
 
Interestingly, it seems that genetic risk is also much more widespread than had                         
been initially posited, and therefore a genetic analysis alone is not likely to allow for the                               
detection of at-risk individuals (Freedman et al., 2005, p.22). Nonetheless, genetic                     
research is not an unpromising impasse, as it does indicate higher risks than average.                           
The Edinburgh High Risk Study was based on a high-risk sample of 163 young adults                             
who had two relatives with schizophrenia, for example (Johnstone et al., 2005, p.18).                         
Some studies have also brought to light interesting data on pathophysiological                     
processes associated with the genetic transmission of schizophrenia (Freedman et al.,                     
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2005, p.17). Ultimately, finding a combination of biological processes – not all                       
necessarily genetic – which would be observable before the onset of psychosis could be                           
of tremendous help in the detection of at-risk individuals.   
 
A deeper understanding of the genetic and neural substrates of behaviour is                       
therefore considered essential for the next generation of pre-emptive interventions,                   
and so for a variety of reasons: biomarkers and endophenotypes might prove very                         
useful in identifying those who are most in need of prevention; they might have                           
implications for the treatment of some genetic and neural mechanisms; they might                       
indicate ways in which biological vulnerabilities moderate the effects of environmental                     
experience; and, in relation to this, they might also help identify situations in which                           
interactions between biology and environment account for significant variations in                   
outcomes and how neural systems, via epigenesis, programming, and neural plasticity                     
are sensitive to environmental moderation across one’s life span (Beauchaine, 2008,                     
p.745).   
 
Regarding neurocognitive markers, there is increasing evidence that               
neurocognitive deficits are found even in asymptomatic at-risk individuals (who were                     
identified because they have at least one first-degree relative diagnosed with psychosis)                       
(McGorry et al., 2014, p.213). There hasn’t yet been a large enough number of                           
longitudinal studies on the topic to draw definite conclusions, but the suggestions                       
according to which ‘neurocognitive impairment may reflect both neurodevelopmental                 
trait vulnerabilities and progressive illness-related deficits in major psychiatric illness’                   
(McGorry et al., 2014, p.214) are substantiated enough to merit further investigation.                       
Neuroimaging studies constitute one of the main axes of research in the attempt to                           
identify valid brain structural markers for early detection. At-risk individuals seem to                       
show a ‘steeper rate of cortical gray matter reduction compared with individuals                       
without symptomatic progression and with healthy control subjects’, for example                   
(Cannon, 2006, p.147).   
 
The study of changes and abnormalities in brain structure, both in at-risk                       
individuals and in patients diagnosed with a full-threshold psychotic disorder, is                     
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particularly complex. Nevertheless, in the search for reliable prognostic biomarkers,                   
multivariate machine learning methods do appear particularly promising. They have                   
demonstrated the ‘feasibility to predict illness onset in clinically defined at-risk                     
individuals using structural magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) data’ (Koutsouleris,                 
2012, p.1234). Interestingly, these biomarkers tend to point to the further                     
individualisation of risk: ‘findings suggest that the early prediction of psychosis may be                         
reliably enhanced using neuroanatomical pattern recognition operating at the                 
single-subject level’ (Ibid., p.1234). However, it seems that such findings might not yet                         
be replicated in independent populations easily: further research is still necessary.                     
Additionally, there are strong doubts with regards to the capacity to distinguish                       
between markers of vulnerability, markers linked with the course of the disorder itself,                         
and markers that might appear as an effect of pharmacological treatments: ‘a key issue is                             
to clarify the role of antipsychotic medication in progressive brain changes’ (McGorry                       
et al., 2014, p.215). It is of prime importance to be able to detect whether individuals at                                 
risk for psychosis have specific qualitative and quantitative differences in brain                     
structure, compared either with controls or with patients who don’t have a psychotic                         
disorder. This could, as a result, help demonstrate that differential structural brain                       
changes become more prominent with time, and as syndromal specificity increases                     
(McGorry et al., 2014, p.215). 
 
Neuroendocrine markers appear to indicate an impaired ability to cope with                     
stress, biologically and psychologically speaking. They are thought to play a key role in                           
the development and maintenance of psychiatric disorders (McGorry et al., 2014,                     
p.216). 
 
Fatty acid markers are another area of interest for those who seek to identify                           
biomarkers of psychiatric vulnerability: evidence about the involvement of cell                   
membrane polyunsaturated fatty acids (PUFAs) in the pathophysiology of major mood                     
and psychotic disorders is mounting; and it seems that lipid metabolism could prove to                           
be particularly relevant in the earlier stages of mental illness (McGorry et al., 2014,                           
p.218): ‘A recent meta-analysis of 18 studies in schizophrenia examining the four most                         
frequently explored PUFAs (DHA, AA, docosapentaenoic acid, linoleic acid) concluded                   
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that decreased levels of DHA and AA were present in antipsychotic-naïve patients’                       
(Ibid. p.218).   
 
The research on biomarkers is still inconclusive, but the data it has brought to                           
the fore in different areas may offer new predictive criteria for major mental disorders                           
in the near future. Additionally, these biomarkers could be included as characteristics of                         
psychiatric vulnerability that highlight pathophysiological processes in the development                 
of a disorder, as well as the impact of pharmacological treatments. As such, they might                             
provide very valuable help in differentiating between developmental stages of several                     
mental disorders. For example, recent data show that biomarkers differ in early and                         
late-stage bipolar disorder - a type of information that could be usefully integrated into                           
diagnostic models (Kapczinski et al., 2009, p.1366). Indeed, most diagnostic nosologies                     
still focus heavily on the emergence of positive symptoms, which tends to appear later                           
in the prodrome of mental disorders:   
 
Diagnosing schizophrenia or bipolar disorder with the             
emergence of psychosis may be analogous to diagnosing               
coronary artery disease by myocardial infarction. One of the                 
most hopeful approaches to reducing the morbidity and               
mortality of serious mental illness borrows a page from the                   
cardiology playbook. By developing biomarkers for early             
diagnosis, we may be able to preempt many of the most                     
disabling aspects of our most severe mental illnesses (Insel,                 
2009, p.130). 
 
Profiles of at-risk individuals have gradually been delineated, drawing from                   
data gathered across a very varied range of disciplines: cognitive sciences, psychology,                       
genetics, neuroimagery, etc. However, when it comes to clinical psychiatry, even                     
pre-onset early detection methods still rely on symptomatology more than anything                     
else (and, more particularly, on attenuated positive symptoms). Practitioners focus on                     
predictors such as recent experiences of subthreshold psychotic symptoms, long                   
duration of symptoms, high levels of depression or reduced attention, a recent                       
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significant decrease in functioning, often combined with a family history of mental                       
health troubles (Yung et al., 2004, p.131). Several instruments and labels have been                         
developed in order to bring an answer to the need for pre-emptive psychiatric                         
interventions. They are judged mainly based on their predictive validity. 
 
III. MODELS OF VULNERABILITY AND         
ASSESSMENTS OF RISK 
Prevention programmes, in principle, can follow three different               
approaches – a universal, a selective and/or an indicated one –                     
which reflect segments of the population as well as levels of                     
risk. A universal prevention that targets the general population                 
unspecifically as a whole is obviously not appropriate for a rare                     
disorder of yet unknown, but certainly multi-factorial aetiology.               
Furthermore, a selective prevention approach to schizophrenia             
aiming at a segment of the population which is clinically                   
healthy, but at a high risk for the disease (e.g., because of a                         
genetic liability) would result in too many false positive and                   
false negative cases. Therefore, an indicated prevention has               
currently the best prospects of success for schizophrenia,               
because it targets on persons who already show clinical signs                   
and are possibly in a prodromal state. Thus, when referring to                     
early detection and intervention projects, we focus on an                 
indicated approach in a help seeking population with signs and                   
symptoms associated with a relatively high risk of transition to                   
psychoses and schizophrenia (Klosterkötter et al., 2005, p.164). 
 
Several models of vulnerability have attempted to capture, in one way or                       
another, the early phase(s) of mental disorders that would be indicative of high risks of                             
transition: some have corresponded to the process outlined by Klosterkötter, while                     
 
75 
others are situated elsewhere on the spectrum of prevention. Here again, insisting on                         
the gradual evolution from pre-onset detection and interventions to early detection and                       
interventions can be useful. I believe attenuated syndromes and staging models to be of                           
particular interest, but I will also explore earlier models of vulnerability and risk.                         
Various instruments for the detection of vulnerability traits and prodromal symptoms                     
have also been elaborated to identify at-risk individuals for whom transition rates to                         
full-threshold psychosis are significantly higher than for the general population.   
1. The Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome 
The At-Risk Mental State (ARMS) was among the first denominations used                     
for the prodrome of psychotic disorders. It is closely related to two other notions: the                             
Ultra-High Risk (UHR) and the Clinical High Risk (CHR) states. All of them tend to                             
respond to similar criteria, and rely on the same diagnostic instruments. They aim to                           
identify at-risk individuals in a late prodromal phase - one or to years before the onset                               
of a full threshold disorder. 
 
They encompass three different subgroups: people suffering from attenuated                 
positive symptoms; those who have gone through brief intermittent psychotic states;                     
and persons who have a genetic and familial risk for psychotic illnesses coupled with a                             
recent and dramatic decline in functioning (Addington, Heinssen, 2012, p.271). I                     
believe the Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome to be in the same lineage as these                         
conceptualisations of psychiatric vulnerability (especially the first two subgroups just                   
mentioned), although with one significant development: the notion of risk is absent                       
from its appellation. It becomes, as such, a diagnosis in its own right rather than the                               
early phase of another disorder.   
 
The Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome (APS) is a DSM-5 diagnostic category                   
which attempts to capture the symptomatology of the prodromal phase of psychotic                       
disorders. The transition to full-threshold psychosis being uncertain at best, however, it                       
was decided that a label integrating the notion of risk was more anxiety-inducing than                           
helpful. The patients who might receive the APS diagnosis are seeking help: giving                         
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them a psychiatric diagnosis corresponding to their symptoms is argued to be                       
warranted, while informing them that it might lead to a full-threshold psychosis                       
disorder would be less so.   
 
The proposed criteria for the APS have been carefully defined. The patient has                         
to show characteristic symptoms - at least one of the following in attenuated form, but                             
of sufficient severity and/or frequency that it is not discounted or ignored: delusions;                         
hallucinations; disorganized speech (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p.783).               
These symptoms must have been present in the past month and must have occurred at                             
an average frequency of at least once per week in this past month. Also, they must have                                 
begun in or significantly worsened during the past year. Distress and disability are                         
among the most important criteria: the symptoms have to be sufficiently distressing                       
and disabling for the patient to seek help. Finally, the symptoms just mentioned must                           
not be better explained by any other DSM-5 diagnosis, including substance-related                     
disorders (Fusar-Poli, 2012, p.221). 
 
It is possible to notice that the criteria just described are mainly attenuated                         
expressions of positive psychotic-like symptoms. Conversion to full-threshold               
psychosis is generally based on increasing symptom severity, which would result in the                         
recognition and diagnosis - once such severity has reached a certain level - of actual                             
psychosis (Carpenter, 2009). Consequently, the Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome leaves                 
open the possibility of conversion to full-threshold psychosis without explicitly giving                     
the ‘at-risk’ label to those diagnosed with it. 
 
The APS diagnosis focuses specifically on the period of time immediately                     
preceding an ‘index’ episode of psychosis (Corcoran, First, Cornblatt, 2010): conversion                     
is not a certainty, but for those who will indeed be later diagnosed with a full-threshold                               
psychotic disorder, the time period between the apparition of the first prodromal                       
symptoms and the first serious psychotic episode rarely exceeds one or two years. This,                           
combined with the heavy insistence on the help-seeking criterion, excludes from                     
consideration any pre-symptomatic phase of the prodrome.   
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The presence of the APS in the latest version of the DSM has been quite                             
reduced: it has been relegated to its Appendix, and only briefly mentioned in the main                             
body at the end of ‘Other Specified Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other Psychotic                       
Disorder’, section 3: 298.8 (F28) (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p.122). This                     
means that it is still possible to code it as a diagnosis in the USA, however. 
 
2. Staging models 
Other diagnostic models are suggested; not necessarily in opposition to                   
attenuated syndromes like the APS, but as complementary to them: staging models                       
account for the evolution of a disorder from an at-risk (but asymptomatic) state to the                             
later phases of a chronic illness.   
 
Staging models in psychiatry originated from the idea that traditional                   
diagnostic categories were failing, especially in terms of clinical utility. The primary                       
goal of a diagnosis must be to assist clinicians in improving their selection or                           
sequencing of treatments, and to enable them to make more accurate prognostic                       
statements in keeping with newer concepts and knowledge (Hickie, Scott, McGorry,                     
2013, p.461). Another criticism levelled at traditional diagnostic categories in psychiatry                     
is their tendency to presuppose that independent causal pathways exist for each clinical                         
phenotype – ‘an assumption that is not supported by contemporary family, genetic,                       
neurobiological or risk factor research’ (Hickie, Scott, McGorry, 2013, p.461).   
 
McGorry and colleagues proposed a staging model for major mental illnesses                     
(including psychosis) that is, interestingly, nonspecific for the earlier stages. It starts                       
with an ‘at-risk’ but asymptomatic state (stage 0); evolving to an initial stage of                           
undifferentiated general symptoms – such as mild anxiety, depressive and somatic                     
symptoms – followed by a worsening of these existing symptoms and the acquisition of                           
new ones, associated clinically with hints of greater syndromal specificity, and with                       
behavioural and functional decline (stage 1); then, further progression of illness may                       
result in the occurrence of a first episode of a full-threshold syndrome(s) (stage 2),                           
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which may in turn be followed by the development of persistent symptoms, frequent                         
relapses and ongoing impairment (stage 3), or even severe, unremitting illness (stage 4)                         
(McGorry et al., 2014, p.212).   
 
The idea underlying such a staging model is profoundly embedded in the basis                         
of pre-emptive psychiatry: remission and amelioration are possible at every stage,                     
though it is less likely with each advancing stage (McGorry et al., 2014, p.212). It is                               
indeed important to note that staging models are dynamic, not only in the sense that                             
they account for the evolution of a disorder through distinct stages, but also in the                             
sense that an individual’s mental health can worsen or improve. Movement is possible                         
across these stages in both directions, which is precisely why proponents of staging                         
models advocate for interventions adapted to each stage: their aim is not only to stop                             
progression to a further stage but, conjointly, to facilitate regression to an earlier stage                           
(McGorry, 2007, p.859). There are many different possible development courses for an                       
individual whose condition corresponds to the at-risk mental state, and specific and                       
direct progression to a full threshold psychotic disorder is only one of them: ‘several                           
different outcomes are possible in a population considered to be at risk, including                         
conversion to psychosis, symptomatic recovery, and stable presentation of prodromal                   
symptoms’ (Addington, Heinssen, 2012, p.278). In all cases, including with the APS                       
model, the hope is to encourage full symptomatic recovery, of course. However, staging                         
models might be more likely to account for various levels of improvement other than                           
total symptomatic recovery.   
 
‘Staging suggests that disorders emerge via a limited set of overlapping and                       
fluctuating symptom clusters (microphenotypes), some of which resolve, while others                   
progress and stabilise into clinical presentations (macrophenotypes) that ultimately                 
resemble more traditional diagnoses’ (Hickie, Scott, McGorry, 2013, p.461). Indeed, the                     
latest formulations of staging models tend to be ‘agnostic to traditional symptom-based                       
nosological boundaries’ (McGorry et al., 2014, p.219). The research on biomarkers,                     
notably, has cast doubts on the capacity of these ‘traditional nosologies’ to follow the                           
same biological boundaries of actual disease entities. This would result in a failure to                           
fulfil reliably the role of a clinical diagnosis: predicting outcome and helping the                         
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selection of specific interventions. Proponents of staging models therefore consider it                     
more useful to examine ‘specific neurobiological domains that cut across diagnoses’,                     
focusing on ‘cross-cutting dimensions rather than categorical distinctions’ (McGorry et                   
al., 2014, p.219):   
 
A staging approach would do well to distinguish               
pathophysiology from etiological factors. As in the rest of                 
medicine, disease staging based on clinical/biomarker measures             
may not necessarily map onto etiologically-based classifications.             
Genetic risk should also be interpreted agnostically, as it is                   
unlikely to provide diagnostic specificity, but may be useful as a                     
guide to disturbances in neurodevelopmental trajectories or             
aspects of neurobiological functioning. […] a useful point of                 
departure in staging across diagnoses might be a shift from the                     
broad, non-specific presentation to the evolution of more               
specific syndromal pictures. Such an evolution may not only                 
involve the emergence of new symptoms or the evolving                 
syndromal coherence of symptom clusters, but also the               
development (or lack thereof) of disability and functional and                 
social impacts (McGorry et al., 2014, p.219). 
 
Differentiating several stages from one another in the progression of disorders can                       
have a significant impact on the implementation of pre-onset early detection and                       
interventions in psychiatry: the key outcome would be formulated in terms of success                         
in preventing progression to more advanced stages or in facilitating regression to an                         
earlier stage (McGorry, 2007, p.859). So here again, I want to insist on the idea that,                               
within staging models, regression is possible at every stage, up to and including full                           
symptomatic recovery. As such, staging models require ‘an accurate understanding of                     
the broad social, biological, and personal risk and protective factors that influence                       
movement across stages’ (Ibid., p.859). In the future, then, psychopathology might be                       
more closely linked to the biological and psychological nature of disease processes                       
(Müller-Spahn, 2008, p.92). 
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 The research on the prodrome of mental disorders in general, and psychosis in                         
particular, has led to the elaboration of detailed instruments dedicated to the assessment                         
of clinical high risk. These instruments, in turn, are henceforth used in a research                           
capacity, but also in clinical settings, for the diagnosis and treatment of patients. 
   
3. Instruments for the Assessment of Psychiatric             
Vulnerability 
 
Following the example of McGorry and Yung, several research teams across                     
Australia, North America and Europe have conducted numerous studies in the past two                         
decades so as to ‘develop and test operational criteria for prospectively assessing                       
psychosis liability over time’ (Addington, Heinssen, 2012, p.171). The tools and                     
instruments thus elaborated aim to identify at-risk individuals in a reliable and accurate                         
manner. In order to fulfill that goal, they need to delineate precisely the characteristics                           
of prodromal symptoms and vulnerability traits, and to have high predictive validity.   
 
Currently, the series of instruments that has been elaborated to assess the                       
prodrome of psychosis is aimed towards the highest level of specificity possible. The                         
important proportion of false positives in the detection of at-risk individuals                     
constitutes the largest obstacle for the development of pre-emptive psychiatry, in terms                       
of medical results and economic effectiveness, but also for ethical reasons. The                       
difficulty resides in the fact that, should the criteria for the ‘at-risk’ label be applied to                               
the general population, they would see their predictive validity decreased considerably                     
(Broome et al., 2005a, p.25). If one can see psychosis as ‘a dimension extending well                             
into the general population’, then it is believed necessary to rely primarily on groups of                             
individuals already suspected of being in a pre-psychotic phase and specially referred in                         
clinical settings (Ibid., p.25). Predictive validity is thus the be-all and end-all of these                           
instruments - the measure that determines their success or their failure. 
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The Comprehensive Assessment of At-Risk Mental States (CAARMS) is an                   
interview and rating system developed by Yung, McGorry and colleagues in                     
Melbourne. Its aim is to assess psychosis criteria prospectively. It encompasses three                       
distinctive features of risk: attenuated positive symptoms, brief intermittent psychotic                   
states, and genetic/familial risk for psychotic illness coupled with recent and dramatic                       
decline in functioning (Yung, McGorry, 1996, p.353).   
 
It is a very detailed interview, allowing clinicians to collect a vast array of                           
information – primarily with regards to clinical symptomatology, but also integrating                     
data from characteristics specific to the prodromal phase of psychotic disorders. ‘The                       
CAARMS manual provides detailed definitions, questions, and anchor points for                   
eliciting and rating 27 symptoms across seven dimensions of psychopathology,                   
including positive symptoms, negative symptoms, deterioration of role functioning,                 
sleep disturbance, and impaired tolerance to normal stress’ (Addington, Heinssen, 2012,                     
p. 271). The CAARMS interview has subsequently been used in a very large number of                             
studies as the process through which at-risk, or ultra-high risk (UHR) individuals are                         
selected. Its efficacy, in terms of prediction, is generally recognised: ‘in early studies                         
using CAARMS criteria, the risk of developing a psychotic disorder increased from the                         
expected rate of approximately 10% in family high-risk groups to approximately 30% to                         
50% in clinical high-risk samples followed for one to two years’ (Addington, Heinssen,                         
2012, p. 271).   
 
The Structured Interview of Prodromal Symptoms (SIPS) is another                 
instrument frequently utilised in research. It was developed by the PRIME prodromal                       
research team, led by McGlashan and Miller at Yale University. It is often associated                           
with another tool elaborated by the same team: the Criteria of Prodromal Symptoms                         
(COPS) (Miller et al. 2003). Building upon Yung and McGorry’s conceptual framework,                       
the PRIME research team developed both instruments in order to evaluate the presence                         
and the severity of 19 different symptoms, across four domains of psychopathology                       
(Addington, Heinssen, 2012, p. 271). Its reliability has been demonstrated on several                       
occasions. The SIPS/COPS criteria have, for example, been used in a large multisite                         
study of psychosis risk states in North America, where they proved their excellent                         
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inter-rater reliability (a high degree of concordance between different raters), and their                       
acceptable predictive validity (Addington, Heinssen, 2012, p. 272). ‘This study, which                     
includes the largest sample of prospectively followed clinical high-risk (CHR) subjects                     
worldwide, found that approximately 25% of individuals who met COPS criteria                     
initially developed a psychotic illness within one year, and 35% within two years’ (Ibid.,                           
p.272).   
 
However, there is growing evidence that clinical pathways, distress, help                   
seeking, and persistence may have a significant impact on predictive validity (Broome,                       
Fusar-Poli, Wuyts, 2013, pp.784-785). If this is to be acknowledged adequately,                     
disorders can only be understood ‘in relation to their place within the wider society and                             
health system, rather than as free-standing nosological entities’ (Ibid., pp.785-786). 
   
The work on the prodromal phase, and the continuum of                   
psychosis, has forced psychiatry and mental health research to                 
think about a conception of psychotic disorder and of                 
schizophrenia that is less dependent on positive psychotic               
symptoms (Broome, Fusar-Poli, Wuyts, 2013, pp.784-785). 
 
Some, especially in Europe, have therefore criticised the strong focus on                     
attenuated positive psychotic symptoms of instruments like the CAARMS, SIPS and                     
COPS, and of diagnostic models like the ARMS or the CHR. Such criticisms are often                             
grounded in principles and concepts based on the continental European tradition of                       
phenomenological psychopathology (Broome, Fusar-Poli, Wuyts, 2013, p.786).             
Alternatives have therefore been proposed which are centred on ‘‘clinically significant                     
signs’ which can be very distinct from psychotic-like experiences and which may have                         
no direct relation with positive symptoms as such’ (Ibid., p.786). ‘Self awareness’ and                         
‘subjectivity’ can be disturbed on a structural level, and these disturbances have been                         
commonly associated with the development of schizophrenia: ‘expressions used by                   
European phenomenologists, such as “loss of vital contact with reality”, “global crisis of                         
common sense” or “loss of natural evidence”, and “loss of ego boundaries” refer to a                             
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defective attunement between the self and the outside world’ (Broome, Fusar-Poli,                     
Wuyts, 2013, p.787). 
 
The Bonn Scale for the Assessment of Basic Symptoms (BSABS) is thus a bit                           
different than the previous instruments, as it relies on the concept of basic symptoms. It                             
was developed by researchers in Germany, who decided to suggest an alternative                       
approach for identifying individuals at clinical risk for psychosis (Addington, Heinssen,                     
2012, p. 272). The basic symptoms designate an assortment of emerging problems that                         
are subjectively experienced by at-risk individuals. It was suggested that these may be                         
present throughout the development of schizophrenia, even from its earliest stages.                     
The reason why these phenomena are called ‘basic symptoms’ is because they are                         
‘understood as direct phenomenological consequences of the underlying pathogenesis                 
of the disorder’ (Broome, Fusar-Poli, Wuyts, 2013, p.786). Basic symptoms aim to                       
capture how ‘subtle anomalies of subjective experiences can herald a first episode of                         
psychosis long before attenuated positive symptoms are present’ (Broome, Fusar-Poli,                   
Wuyts, 2013, p.787). It became necessary to provide accurate accounts of these                       
problems – what Huber described in the 1960’s as subtle, often only self-perceivable                         
deficits (Klosterkötter et al., 2001, p.158). An important characteristic of basic                     
symptoms is thus their subjectivity: they are experienced and reported as ‘disturbances                       
or aberrations from ‘normal’ fluctuations in mental state known from the premorbid                       
phase by patients themselves’ (Schultze-Lutter, 2016, pp.31-32). 
 
The BSABS is built as a semi-structured interview. Basic symptoms are not                       
only reported by patients who suffer from a full-threshold psychotic disorder but also,                         
retrospectively, during the prodrome. They are ‘mild, often subclinical, but                   
troublesome self-experiences of diminished drive and affect; problems with thought,                   
speech, and perception; motor difficulties; and early vegetative symptoms’ (Addington,                   
Heinssen, 2012, p. 272). The BSABS was used in the Cologne Early Recognition (CER)                           
study, which was specifically aiming to determine whether basic symptoms, as                     
evaluated by the BSABS, could indeed predict the subsequent development of psychosis                       
(Klosterkötter et al., 2001, p.159). The results of the CER study concluded that among                           
the people identified as high risk, 49.4% developed schizophrenia during a 10-year                       
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follow-up period (Addington, Heinssen, 2012, p. 272). As it turned out, basic symptoms                         
were even able to predict a later diagnosis of schizophrenia with a probability of 70%: ‘a                               
notable difference between the BSABS and the Melbourne/COPS criteria is that basic                       
symptoms appear to identify individuals at an earlier stage of the psychosis prodrome                         
than is possible with the Melbourne/ COPS criteria’ (Addington, Heinssen, 2012,                     
p.272). Because of its excellent negative predictive ability, the BSABS and other                       
instruments used for the detection of basic symptoms could be used to identify at-risk                           
individuals in the general population (Klosterkötter, 2001, p.163). 
 
Lastly, the Schizophrenia Proneness Instrument for adults (SPI-A) builds upon                   
the BSABS and the CER study in its assessment of basic symptoms. Also commonly                           
used, it aims to identify subthreshold symptoms in the earliest phases of the prodrome                           
(Addington, Heinssen, 2012, p.272). The Schizophrenia Proneness Instrument for                 
Child and Youth (SPI-CY) has been adapted for younger individuals. Additionally,                     
another instrument also draws from the phenomenological psychopathology tradition:                 
the Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience (EASE) is, once again, a                   
semi-structured interview with a specific focus on disturbances in the structure of                       
self-awareness and consciousness (Broome, Fusar-Poli, Wuyts, 2013, p.788). It contains                   
five different domains: cognition and stream of consciousness; self-awareness and                   
presence; bodily experiences; demarcation/transitivism; existential reorientation (Ibid.,             
p.788). 
 
The predictive validity of these various instruments, combined or alone, has                     
been the object of numerous studies. The results of these studies were analysed in                           
Fusar-Poli’s meta-analysis: ‘Meta-analysis of transition outcomes in individuals at High                   
Clinical Risk’ (2012). It indicates that there was a consistent transition risk –                         
independent of the psychometric instruments used – of 18% after 6 months of                         
follow-up, 22% after 1 year, 29% after 2 years, and 36% after 3 years (Fusar-Poli, 2012,                               
p.220). 
 
It thus seems that clinical high risk is indeed rather highly predictive of a                           
transition to full-threshold psychosis within the first 3 years (especially when compared                       
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to the prevalence of psychotic disorders in the general population), and this risk                         
increases across this period. Twenty-seven studies, published between 1996 and 2011,                     
were integrated in that meta-analysis (Fusar-Poli, 2012, p.221). This seems to indicate                       
that the series of tools and instruments used to assess clinical high risk (CHR) is ‘reliable                               
across different centers worldwide, despite differences in the way patients were                     
ascertained and even though the criteria used were not identical’ (Ibid., p. 225).   
 
Interestingly, though perhaps unrelatedly, this study revealed, through its                 
analysis of the potentially confounding effect of publication year, a small but significant                         
decrease in the reported transition risks over time (Fusar-Poli, 2012, p.221). This is in                           
line with current suggestions, from a variety of sources, that transition risks to                         
psychosis in the CHR population do indeed seem to be decreasing. Different                       
explanations could account for this phenomenon. Mainly, though, the integration of                     
CHR groups in these studies often aims to test the efficacy of various early                           
interventions – interventions that have been shown to have an impact on transition                         
rates: ‘we found some support for this hypothesis in the fact that transition risks were                             
significantly lower in samples receiving active interventions (antipsychotic medication                 
or psychological therapy) compared with those that were not’ (Fusar-Poli, 2012, p.225). 
 
In conclusion, the ‘prodromal criteria based on the CAARMS, the COPS, and                       
the BSABS/SPI-A have been validated in a range of studies, and these three assessment                           
tools are the most widely used in current CHR research’ (Addington, Heinssen, 2012, p.                           
272). Before delving into the ethical implications of either model, it is now time to                             
consider the various forms of treatment available to at-risk individuals and the                       
structures devoted to their care.   
 
IV. PRE-ONSET EARLY INTERVENTIONS 
Two broad categories of pre-onset early interventions can be implemented in                     
psychiatry (although they are not the only possibilities): pharmacological treatments                   
and psychotherapies. Within each of these categories, a large array of possibilities is                         
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available. The efficacy, the benefits and the risks of these pre-onset early interventions                         
have been the subject of many research studies in the past dozen of years.   
 
1. Psychotherapies 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) is often a first choice when it comes to                         
testing the efficacy of psychotherapies in the prevention of a first psychotic episode.                         
According to Addington and Heinssen, CBT interventions fit very well within a                       
‘stress-vulnerability model’, and focus on coping strategies that may offer protection                     
against environmental stressors that are likely to precipitate conversion to psychosis                     
(2012, p. 281): 
 
It appears that CBT could be the model of psychological                   
intervention that holds the greatest promise for being effective                 
in (a) addressing the range of symptoms and concerns present                   
in the CHR period and (b) teaching potentially effective                 
strategies to protect against the impact of environmental               
stressors that may contribute to the emergence of psychosis                 
(Addington, Heinssen, 2012, p. 281).   
 
Not many studies have, to this day, focused on the effectiveness of CBT in                           
comparison to other types of psychotherapies. CBT interventions have been integrated                     
as a part of early intervention in numerous studies, but often in association with                           
pharmacological treatments. One study did, though: its purpose was to determine                     
whether Cognitive Behavioural Therapy was more effective in reducing the rates of                       
conversion when compared to supportive therapy (Addington et al., 2011, p.54). In                       14
14 The supportive therapy in question was an active psychological treatment aiming to assist                           
directly individuals to cope with current problems: ‘the therapy consisted of finding out how the previous                               
week had been. Any crises were dealt with, and advice was offered to help with any immediate problems.                                   
No active CBT techniques were taught or used. Psychoeducational information about psychosis and                         
managing stress was offered. There was a focus on listening, reflecting and empathizing, and                           
demonstrating uncritical acceptance and genuineness. The therapy was non-confrontational, supportive                   
and accepting’ (Addington et al., 2011, p.56). 
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addition to that, it aimed to evaluate whether those who received CBT had better                           
symptomatic recovery compared to those who received supportive therapy (Ibid., p.54).                     
The results of that study indicate that both groups improved in attenuated positive                         
symptoms, depression and anxiety and neither improved in social functioning and                     
negative symptoms. However, the improvement in attenuated positive symptoms was                   
more rapid for the CBT group. Interestingly, although there were no significant                       
differences in conversion rates between the two treatment groups, these conversion                     
rates were much lower than expected for a CHR group (Addington et al., 2011, p.54).                             
According to another study, Cognitive Behavioural Therapy not only significantly                   
reduced the likelihood of making progression to psychosis, it also significantly reduced                       
the likelihood of being prescribed antipsychotic medication and of meeting criteria for a                         
DSM IV diagnosis of a psychotic disorder (Morrison et al., 2004, p.291). 
 
Therefore, it seems that psychotherapies are quite effective in the                   
amelioration of positive symptoms in at-risk individuals. There is also strong evidence                       
for the capacity of psychological interventions to lower conversion rates towards                     
full-threshold psychotic disorders – or at least to delay a first episode.   
 
2. Pharmacotherapies 
Several clinical trials were designed to evaluate the efficacy of various                     
pharmacological interventions. One of the first studies to address the efficacy of                       
pre-onset early interventions during the pre-psychotic stage was carried out by                     
McGorry and colleagues in the PACE clinic of Melbourne (Addington, Heinssen, 2012,                       
p. 279). This randomised controlled trial compared two different early interventions in                       
59 CHR patients: a mainstream needs-based intervention, and a specific preventive                     
intervention that comprised low-dose risperidone therapy and Cognitive Behavioural                 
Therapy; treatment was provided for 6 months (McGorry et al., 2002, p.921). The                         
results indicated that more specific pharmacotherapy and psychotherapy reduced risks                   
of early transition to psychosis in young CHR individuals (McGorry et al., 2002, p.921).                           
One problem with the framework of this study, however, was that the relative                         
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contributions of psychotherapy and pharmacotherapy in lowering transition rates                 
could not be determined. Subsequent trials have reached comparable conclusions and,                     
‘taken together, results from the PACE and PRIME studies suggest that (a) the severity                           
of prodromal symptoms can be reduced with atypical antipsychotic medications, and                     
(b) it may be possible to delay the onset of the first psychotic episode by combining                               
pharmacologic and psychological therapies’ (Addington, Heinssen, 2012, p. 280).                 
However, the problematic side-effects of the use of antipsychotic medication, especially                     
in the case of young individuals who might never have come to be diagnosed with a                               
full-threshold psychotic disorder, impeded research led on this type of pharmacological                     
intervention.   
 
A promising avenue of research with regards to pharmacological very early                     
interventions in psychiatry was opened by a newfound focus on Omega 3/ ω-3. Given                           
that ω-3 polyunsaturated fatty acids (PUFAs) are generally beneficial to health and                       
without clinically relevant adverse effects, their preventive use in psychosis is said to                         
merit investigation (Amminger et al., 2010, p.146). In a recent controlled clinical trial                         
in which participants received either long-chain omega-3 (ω-3) polyunsaturated fatty                   
acids (PUFAs) or placebos, results suggested that ω-3 PUFAs could have positive effects                         
in a large range of psychiatric conditions, including schizophrenia, and that they may be                           
particularly effective in the onset phase of psychosis (Amminger et al., 2015).                       
Moreover, this investigation indicated that CHR patients with higher levels of ALA (a                         
parent fatty acid of the ω-3 family) may specifically benefit from ω-3 PUFA                         
supplementation, leading to the possibility of using them as a biomarker for                       
treatment-responsiveness (Amminger et al., 2015). Fatty acids could potentially be used                     
to inform prognostic evaluations and treatment decisions at the level of the individual.                         
A previous study, built in a similar manner, had demonstrated that the cumulative                         
conversion rates to psychotic disorder at 12 months were 4.9% (2 of 41) in the ω-3                               
group, and 27.5% (11 of 40) in the placebo group. The difference in risk of progression                               
to psychosis between treatment groups was over 22.6%, and therefore quite significant                       
(Amminger et al., 2010, p.149). Considering that ω-3 PUFAs have been shown to be                           
very safe, they ‘have the advantage of excellent tolerability, public acceptance, relatively                       
low costs, and benefits for general health’ (Amminger et al., 2010, p.152). 
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 In terms of pharmacological treatments for at-risk individuals, then, those                   
which are without clinically relevant adverse effects tend to be recommended over the                         
use of antipsychotics. Despite their potential effectiveness, the latter are still deemed                       
too problematic to be recommended in the case of at-risk individuals. 
 
3. Existing Structures 
 
The ‘explosion of interest’ towards Clinical High Risk for psychosis (CHR-P)                     
has been remarkable enough that ‘the specialist CHR-P provision is currently being                       
recognized as an important component of the clinical services for early psychosis                       
intervention (eg, NICE guidelines; NHS England Access and Waiting Time [AWT]                     
standard)’ (Fusar-Poli, 2017, p.4). Pre-onset early detection and interventions are                   
slowly becoming an important part of psychiatric care worldwide, whether they are                       
implemented in dedicated structures or part of a larger, more general system. 
 
The Personal Assessment and Crisis Evaluation (PACE) clinic, created in                   
Melbourne, Australia, in 1994, was one of the first of its type. It was originally a clinical                                 
research program that was specifically established to develop strategies for identifying                     
young people at high risk of developing a psychotic disorder within a short period                           
(Phillips et al., 2002). Since its creation, this program has participated in a series of                             
investigations on the biological and psychological processes which are thought to                     
underlie the development of psychosis. It was also used in the evaluation of potential                           
preventive interventions (Phillips et al., 2002).   
 
In a similar vein, the Department of Health for England has commissioned                         
the development of Early Intervention in Psychosis (EIP) services, destined to provide                       
access to care for 14- to 35-year-olds who are either at risk, or suffer from psychotic                               
symptoms (Tiffin, Hudson, 2007). Young people suspected of being affected by                     
prodromal or psychotic symptoms are initially referred to the team by generic Child                         
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and Adolescent Mental Health Services (CAMHS). Following this referral, an                   
assessment is conducted by an EIP care-coordinator. In order to be accepted in the                           
program, the following conditions need to be fulfilled: either there is evidence that the                           
young person has current psychotic symptoms, or they are deemed to be at high risk of                               
developing a psychotic illness in the near future. Following that, a range of                         
interventions are proposed in EIP services (Tiffin, Hudson, 2007).   
 
The young persons and their families first receive written and verbal                     
information relating to the ‘At-Risk Mental State’ as part of a psychoeducation process                         
that includes familial as well as individual therapy, supportive counselling, etc. For                       
some, it is then followed by a baseline medical evaluation, the role of which is to                               
consider whether a trial of low-dose antipsychotic is warranted or not and, if it is, to                               
provide information on risks and potential benefits (Tiffin, Hudson, 2007). Clinical                     
examinations are performed by a general practitioner (ECG, blood tests) in order to                         
decide the best treatment option: a Quetiapine trial or a Risperidone trial. Individuals                         
who remain symptom-free following intervention usually receive at least 6 months of                       
follow-up and, if they were prescribed antipsychotic treatment, they would still have to                         
receive regular appointments with a psychiatrist. As for those who continue to                       
experience psychotic-like symptoms, they are usually referred to more generic mental                     
health services once they have reached the age of 18 (Tiffin, Hudson, 2007). 
 
The Outreach And Support In South London program (OASIS) was created                     
for people suffering from prodromal symptoms who were referred by a large range of                           
community agencies. The program allowed them to be seen at their local primary care                           
physician practice (Broome et al., 2005b, p.375). Over the first 30 months of the                           
program, 180 clients were referred; and 58 (32.2%) met the criteria for an at-risk                           
mental state. The main goal of OASIS was to evaluate whether or not it was feasible to                                 
provide a clinical service for people with prodromal symptoms in a deprived inner city                           
area with a large ethnic minority population (Broome et al., 2005b, p.372). Clients of                           
the program were provided with an intervention package that included social support,                       
symptom monitoring plus Cognitive Behavioural Therapy, antidepressants and               
antipsychotic medication, depending on the presentation and the client’s preferences                   
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(Broome, et al., 2005b, p.375). A particular advantage of the OASIS program was that                           
clinical contact was established with the clients outside of traditional mental health                       
settings, and its staff was flexible about the timing of appointments. For these reasons,                           
OASIS managed to provide at-risk individuals who were from underprivileged areas of                       
the city with pre-emptive interventions (Broome et al., 2005b, p.375). 
 
These are just a few examples of the structures and services that have been put                             
in place specifically for pre-onset early detection and interventions in psychiatry. They                       
illustrate their progressive integration into psychiatric practices and the growing                   
recognition of their value in mental health care.   
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Chapter 3 - Re-Framing The Ethical           
Debate on Pre-Emptive Psychiatry 
 
The development of pre-emptive psychiatry has gathered momentum in the                   
past two decades - ever since Yung and McGorry published their research on the                           
prodrome of psychotic disorders in 1996, and attempted to define viable risk criteria                         
(Yung, McGorry, 1996; Addington, Heinssen, 2012). As researchers’ interest in                   
pre-onset early detection and interventions was piqued once more, the possibility of an                         
implementation in clinical settings slowly became a conceivable outcome.   
 
The culmination of these efforts was the proposal of a new diagnostic category                         
for the fifth version of the  Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of mental disorders , to be                             
published in 2013: the APS was envisaged as a fully-fledged diagnosis, but still                         
overlapped almost entirely with the Ultra-High Risk (UHR) group. As the likelihood of                         
seeing this diagnostic category be integrated into the  Manual grew stronger, detractors                       
of pre-emptive psychiatry voiced their concerns, and started to draw attention to the                         
potential impact this development could have on diagnosed patients, their families, and                       
society at large.   
 
The ethical debate that surrounded the development of pre-emptive psychiatry                   
has sometimes been quite virulent, as the APS represented, for many, the embodiment                         
of biomedical psychiatry’s most problematic excesses. Recurrent criticisms were                 
generally acknowledged by proponents of the APS, though their rhetoric turned                     
progressively more defensive as their work was carefully scrutinised. In the end, the                         
ethical issues that were highlighted with regards to the development of pre-emptive                       
psychiatry were considered significant enough to curb its progression. The APS was                       
relegated to the Appendix of the  Manual , deemed insufficiently backed by compelling                       
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evidence, but also set up for further research, thus leaving the door open for its                             
eventual full integration.   
 
Since then, the debate itself has evolved very little, circling around the same                         
few issues that led to the postponement of the APS being officially and widely                           
recognised as a valid diagnostic category. As such, these problems can often seem                         
irresolvable, leading both proponents and detractors of pre-emptive psychiatry to                   
remain adamantly fixated on their respective positions.   
 
In this chapter, I argue that this debate on the ethics of pre-emptive psychiatry                           
has missed an opportunity to discuss the development of pre-onset early detection and                         
interventions in a more constructive manner. It has done so in several ways, some of                             
them admittedly unavoidable, but others regrettably preventable.   
 
Biomedical psychiatry is not without its fervent detractors (it has not been                       
without them for quite some time, now), and the APS quickly became, in a manner of                               
speaking, its infamous ‘poster child’ - the concrete manifestation of its most salient                         
characteristics and/or flaws. One of the main features of this debate has thus been its                             
integration into a much wider discussion about psychiatry and mental health. The                       
issues addressed by proponents and detractors of pre-emptive psychiatry have often                     
been seen as a particular instantiation of more general and pervasive problems in                         
psychiatry. I consider that this larger framework has sometimes been too rigid for a                           
detailed evaluation of pre-emptive psychiatry specifically, consolidating newer concerns                 
into pre-existing arguments and blocking out pertinent lines of investigation.   
 
In a similar vein, the debate on the ethics of pre-emptive psychiatry was                         
quickly narrowed down to a few prevailing issues, such as overmedication,                     
overdiagnosis, stigmatisation and over-medicalisation. Those have occupied such a                 
dominant place in these discussions that they have sometimes eclipsed other relevant                       
considerations: for example, while consent and information have occasionally been                   
addressed in relation to stigmatisation, they have only rarely been analysed in the                         
context of a ‘right not to know’.   
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 Related to this, participants in this debate have adopted an overwhelmingly                     
consequentialist viewpoint: the repercussions of the development of pre-emptive                 
psychiatry have been centre-stage in these discussions, and cost-benefit analyses have                     
become the main method of negotiation between proponents and detractors of                     
pre-emptive psychiatry.   
 
This leads me to the last point I want to make in this chapter: it has too often                                   
been taken for granted that the APS was the primary model available for the                           
implementation of pre-onset early detection and interventions in psychiatry, leading to                     
many of the problems mentioned above. Various conceptualisations of psychiatric                   
vulnerability should, instead, be at the heart of this conversation. 
 
I. A RIGID FRAMEWORK 
If I argue that the ethical debate surrounding the development of pre-emptive                       
psychiatry is now in somewhat of a stalemate, it is because I consider that it has been                                 
crystallised around a series of specific issues and demands. If pre-onset early detection                         
and interventions are ever to become an integral part of psychiatric care, they now have                             
to respond satisfactorily to the specific challenges that have been laid out for them, first                             
among which is the predictive validity of the diagnostic models proposed by their                         
defenders. And if future research can base these models and practices on sufficient                         
evidence, cost-benefit analyses would favour a proactive approach more clearly than                     
they do now, making the development of pre-emptive psychiatry worth the ‘ethical                       
risks’ it involves. As a result, the ethical debate has taken the form of a yes/no question:                                 
is pre-emptive psychiatry worthwhile, or is it not? A formulation like this one,                         
however, cannot lead to the constructive conversation that needs to take place                       
regarding this topic. 
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1. The Larger Debate 
Psychiatry’s history with controversial practices and treatments is fraught with                   
nightmarish images of coerced patients, violence and mind-numbing drugs. Biomedical                   
psychiatry has been a frequent target for those who, in the line of Foucault, see in it the                                   
strong arm of an institutional and disciplinary power, demarcating the normal from the                         
abnormal so as better to control the latter. At the heart of these apprehensions is the                               
DSM in each of its successive editions, as it is the main ‘weapon’ at the disposal of that                                   
power - a standardising mogul. In that sense, wider and older problematics have always                           
run through the debate surrounding the development of pre-emptive psychiatry,                   
especially with the APS at its forefront.   
 
There is one thing I need to clarify, though: whether or not the issues raised by                               
the antipsychiatry movement and which I mention here are justified is not the main                           
focus of the coming section; what I aim to show is how these fairly rigid lines of                                 
thought could have impeded the development of a constructive conversation about                     
pre-emptive psychiatry. 
 
Some see the endeavour to define mental disorders as highly hazardous in and                         
of itself. Bingham and Banner, for example, attempt to show that fact-based definitions                         
of mental disorders relying on scientific theory and the idea of dysfunction (which is                           
the approach adopted by the DSM) remain mostly unsatisfactory (Bingham, Banner,                     
2014, p.537). They do so by focusing on the way in which homosexuality can be (or fail                                 
to be) excluded from proposed definitions, which thus becomes somewhat of a ‘litmus                         
test’. New definitions of mental disorders rely heavily on the notion of dysfunction,                         
which can supposedly be fact-based and demonstrated through the gathering of                     
biomedical and/or statistical information. However, they are, according to Bingham                   
and Banner, unable to account for situations in which mental or behavioural states                         
happen to be negatively valued, or even oppressed, in the individual’s societal context                         
(Bingham, Banner, 2014, p.537). Going back to their example, this would mean that a                           
homosexual person living in a particularly repressive community might indeed suffer                     
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from their sexual orientation in a way that deeply affects their functioning, therefore                         
leading to the potential inclusion of homosexuality as a mental disorder. In line with                           
this, many see any attempt at ‘adjudicating disorder from non-disorder’ as troubling and                         
leaving the door open to potential abuses: the implication that disorders can be                         
distinguished from non-disorders by the application of scientific-looking criteria is the                     
reiteration of a ‘false reassurance’ and ‘an impotent safeguard’ (Bingham, Banner, 2014,                       
p.541). Identifying the neural or genetic biomarkers that are associated with a set of                           
behaviours and/or symptoms cannot, by itself, distinguish what is pathological or                     
disordered from what isn’t (Ibid., p.538). Bingham and Banner conclude that there are                         
good reasons to shift focus away from the complexities of defining mental disorders,                         
and more towards the practice of psychiatry. The authors of the DSM-IV, like those of                             
the latest version, actually recognised this difficulty, admitting that no definition                     
adequately captures clear boundaries for the concept of mental disorder - at least not in                             
a way that could be applicable to a large variety of situations (Blumenthal-Barby, 2014,                           
p.533).   
 
However, while the ‘messiness’ of the concept of mental disorder is                     
undeniable, a thorough analysis of how it is defined and applied cannot be avoided in                             
discussions surrounding changes in nosology (Ibid., p.533). To extend the definition of                       
existing pathologies and disorders to the point of integrating what was previously seen                         
as normal behaviour is hardly justifiable without a thorough reflection on what                       
distinguishes disorder from non-disorder. On the contrary, this concern can be said to                         
be ‘vitally important’, thus leading back once again to a necessary reliance on the ideas                             
of disability, distress, and/or dysfunction (Carpenter, in Shrivastava et al., 2011, p.63).                       
As such, it is a very large part of the DSM-5 project that can potentially be questioned:                                 
if there is no viable justification behind the determination of what counts as a mental                             
disorder and what doesn’t, new attempts to create diagnostic categories are liable to                         
problematic attacks.   
 
In a similar vein, accusations of ‘disease-mongering’ have been abundant in                     
biomedical psychiatry. First and foremost, diagnostic categories like the APS are seen as                         
the epitome of a worrying tendency of biomedical psychiatry, which sees the definition                         
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of mental disorders being widened to the point of over-medicalisation and                     
overdiagnosis. Both over-medicalisation and overdiagnosis are phenomena that are                 
difficult to evaluate with precision: they are quite hard to quantify, hinging as they do                             
upon hypothetical development courses, and the assumption that a significant part of a                         
diagnosed population would not have gone on to be troubled by severe health                         
problems.   
 
Those who aim to discuss these tendencies do still attempt to quantify them                         
when possible, but they are mostly interested by their consequences, and by the causal                           
pathways by which they occur (Carter et al., 2016, p.705). Causal pathways, in                         
particular, can help indicate why over-medicalisation and overdiagnosis are often                   
unjustified, or responding to interests far removed from those of patients themselves.                       
Such pathways can include, as mentioned previously, the expansion of disease                     
definitions, the creation of ‘pre-diseases’, the increasing sensitivity of tests which are                       
themselves more frequent and intensive, the commercial interests of those who seek to                         
expand markets for treatments, and the increasing acceptance of risk reduction as an                         
indicator for the effectiveness of an intervention (Carter et al., 2016, pp.705-706). As a                           
result, behaviours and mental states which would have been perceived as nothing more                         
than slight eccentricities just a few years ago are now considered pathological; and they                           
might be under the careful scrutiny of the medical profession so as to be better treated                               
and ‘normalised’.   
 
Worries have been raised about an ‘epidemic of mental illness’, for example. In                         
a review of three recent and alarming publications on this topic ( The Emperor’s New                           
Drugs: Exploding the Antidepressant Myth , by Irving Kirsch;  Anatomy of an Epidemic: Magic                         
Bullets, Psychiatric Drugs, and the Astonishing Rise of Mental Illness in America , by Robert                           
Whitaker; and  Unhinged: The Trouble With Psychiatry—A Doctor’s Revelations About a                     
Profession in Crisis by Daniel Carlat), Angell asks: ‘are we simply expanding the criteria                           
for mental illness so that nearly everyone has one? And what about the drugs that are                               
now the mainstay of treatment?’ (Angell, 2011). In doing so, she gives voice to                           
widespread concerns that soon enough, everyone will meet established criteria for one                       
mental illness or another. In support of that view, she mentions a large survey                           
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sponsored by the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), conducted between 2001                       
and 2003, which discovered that 46 percent of a group of randomly selected adults did                             
meet criteria established by the American Psychiatric Association for having had at least                         
one mental illness at some time in their lives (Angell, 2011). What Angell’s piece also                             
illustrates is the strong association that is made between problems of                     
over-medicalisation and the use of pharmacological treatments in psychiatry. The idea                     
of a collusion between those responsible for the elaboration of diagnostic categories                       
and pharmaceutical companies is deeply anchored in the antipsychiatry movement. 
 
The motivations of those who work on clinical nosologies are challenged, in                       
this. The progressive widening of diagnostic categories, integrating a growing number                     
of individuals under their umbrella, is not without a suspicious beneficiary in the                         
pharmaceutical industry. This powerful player can hardly be said to be transparent, and                         
its considerable influence on how medicine is practised and advanced is increasingly                       
acknowledged - although the scope of its reach remains ambiguous. If this ‘epidemic of                           
mental illnesses’ is a moral crime, the motive would appear to be profit, and the culprits                               
would be those who conspire with business tycoons to ‘create new epidemics’, creating                         
a new need for their products.   
 
When Blumenthal-Barby explains that psychiatry has once again ‘broadened                 
its nosology to include human experiences not previously under its purview’, pointing                       
out that ‘a growing number of phenomena that were once clinically unremarkable are                         
now labelled as mental disorders and will likely be treated pharmacologically’                     
(Blumenthal-Barby, 2014, p.531), the spectre of these apprehensions is easily                   
discernible. The growing attention given to preventive medicine has not gone                     
unnoticed either: 
 
Minor increases in the risk of future illness are portrayed as an                       
ever increasing range of pre-conditions, including           
prehypertension, prediabetes, and pre-osteoporosis. The         
pattern is clear: opinion leaders linked to companies selling                 
solutions meet to revise and refine the definitions of conditions                   
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for which the latest treatments are then aggressively promoted,                 
and, inexorably the boundaries of potentially treatable illness               
are widened (Goldbeck-Wood, 2010, p. 700). 
 
The pharmaceutical industry has a lot to gain from the expansion of existing markets,                           
and its influence on the medical profession (and on society) through ‘financial ties with                           
professional and patient groups and [through the] funding of direct-to-consumer                   
advertising, research foundations, disease awareness campaigns, and medical education’                 
could be far-reaching (Moynihan, 2012).   
 
Medical professionals themselves would have little to lose in this kind of trade,                         
as they might also have considerable interests in ‘maximising the patient pool within                         
their specialty’ (Moynihan, 2012). Self-referrals by clinicians, or diagnostic and                   
therapeutic technologies in which they have a vested commercial interest, could also be                         
a driving motivation behind the widening of pre-existing diagnostic categories                   
(Moynihan, 2012).   
 
The publication of the DSM-5 was not spared these reflections, quite the                       
contrary: by embracing this decried tendency to expand the definitions of mental                       
disorders, and sometimes considerably so, it has been accused of unleashing multiple                       
new ‘false positive epidemics’ (Moynihan, 2011, p.1055). Accordingly, the APS has                     
often been seen as a particular instantiation of this wider problem. 
 
The development of pre-emptive psychiatry did not start in a landscape bare of                         
debate, and the questions and problematics that it prompts are generally not unique to                           
it. It is rather the continuation of trends and dynamics that have modelled biomedical                           
psychiatry as it is today, furthering its goals and amplifying pre-existing issues. Such                         
trends have been at the heart of many discussions over the years, and have been                             
thoroughly scrutinised. However, this rich background is not necessarily an advantage.                     
It can - and I argue that it does - turn ethical considerations regarding the development                               
of pre-emptive psychiatry into slightly ‘calcified’ lines of interrogation. The list of issues                         
associated with pre-onset early detection and interventions is mostly limited to a few                         
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predominant ones: over-medication (which is closely related to issues of                   
over-medicalisation and overdiagnosis), stigmatisation, and confidentiality. 
 
2. The Predominance of Particular Ethical Issues 
Publications which are focused on the ethics of pre-emptive psychiatry offer a                       
rather wide array of viewpoints and arguments, but most of them tend to focus heavily                             
on the same few issues. Rare are those which go beyond these clearly identified                           
problems. This subsection aims to outline what these recurrent concerns are, and how                         
they have been treated in the literature. 
 
Carpenter, who chaired the DSM-5 Psychosis Work Group, gave a                   
representative list of some these concerns. First of all, there is, as mentioned in the                             
previous subsection, the extension of the connotation of pathology to normal                     
behaviour, associated with a failure to distinguish adequately between disorder and                     
non-disorder. Secondly, the high rates of false positives could lead to unjustified clinical                         
care. Thirdly, the presence of attenuated psychotic symptoms may lead to an excessive                         
prescription of antipsychotic medication. And lastly, this would mean labelling young                     
people with a diagnosis that could generate harmful stigma (Shrivastava et al., 2011,                         
p.63). Confidentiality is another important concern in the development of pre-emptive                     
psychiatry.   
 
In order to avoid unnecessary repetitions, I am here going to approach the first                           
three issues mentioned by Carpenter as closely related to one another; and I will focus                             
more heavily on the potential overuse of antipsychotics, as it is the most compelling                           
and alarming problem. Indeed, it is one of the major reasons why pre-emptive                         
psychiatry is currently seen as more costly than beneficial for society. The authors of                           
the previous version of the DSM themselves have expressed their reservations                     
regarding the integration of the APS in the DSM-5, for this exact reason:   
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Some of the proposed new categories (eg, attenuated psychotic                 
symptoms, mood dysregulation) will further promote what is               
already an alarming overuse of antipsychotic medication in               
children—sometimes causing obesity, diabetes, cardiovascular         
complications, and possible reduced life expectancy (Frances,             
Widiger, 2012). 
 
They are certainly not alone in this, as the use of unnecessary medication has often                             
been categorised as a ‘major problem’ associated with high rates of false positives                         
(Shrivastava et al., 2011, p.61).   
 
Whereas patients who were indeed going to make the transition to                     
full-threshold psychosis might find the cost-benefit ratio of pharmacological                 
intervention favourable, the considerable percentage of those who would not have                     
done so might have a significantly different opinion on the matter. And a ‘considerable                           
percentage’ it certainly is: 60 to 80% of those diagnosed under the APS criteria are said                               
not to convert during the two-to-three years following their baseline diagnosis,                     
therefore wearing a label that could expose a disproportionate number of them to                         
unnecessary medications and stigma (Mittal et al., 2015, p.545). For Moynihan, such a                         
high rate of overdiagnosis would be an outrage, exposing these people to unwarranted                         
but permanent medical labels and lifelong treatments that would fail to benefit many of                           
them (Moynihan, 2012).   
 
If problems of over-medication are taken so seriously by all parties involved, it                         
is because antipsychotics are no light treatment; their side-effects can be considerable,                       
and their impact on a patient’s quality of life detrimental enough to proscribe their use                             
unless absolutely necessary. It has been underlined that these treatments can influence                       
young people’s ability to engage effectively in the developmental tasks of adolescence                       
and early adulthood, such as dating, finding a career and establishing a secure identity                           
(Bentall, Morrison, 2002, p.354). Olanzapine, which was used in the PRIME study in                         
the United States, is given as an example, as it is notorious for inducing sexual                             
dysfunction and weight gain (Ibid., p.354). Considering the age-range of patients who                       
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fall under the umbrella of the APS diagnosis (they are mostly adolescents and young                           
adults), these kinds of side effects are likely to be particularly nocuous.   
 
A second reason why the threat of over-medication is widely acknowledged is                       
the legitimate possibility of a widespread use of these pharmacological treatments in                       
general psychiatric services, despite recommendations to the contrary by proponents of                     
pre-emptive psychiatry:   
 
Despite evidence that some psychiatric patients fail to respond                 
to antipsychotic medication, and that some do better with                 
psychosocial support on its own, drug treatment is already                 
considered the first line intervention for patients who have                 
already developed a psychotic disorder, and it is rare to find                     
patients who have been offered an alternative. The use of these                     
drugs in the prevention of psychosis will increase the market                   
for antipsychotics dramatically, and is sure to be encouraged by                   
the pharmaceutical industry. In contrast we believe that               
prescribing antipsychotic medication in this way is unethical,               
and should be resisted (Bentall, Morrison, 2002, p.352). 
 
This goes against hopes that the official recognition of the new APS category would                           
educate clinicians about the ‘relative lack of utility of antipsychotic medications in this                         
population’, and may actually reduce inappropriate antipsychotic use among youth                   
(Tsuang et al., 2013, p.34).   
 
In response to this, some have insisted on the fact that the APS exists as a                               
syndrome in its own right, and not simply as the prodrome of psychotic disorders. It                             
would therefore shift the focus away from the predictive validity of the UHR criteria.                           
With the notion of risk removed from it, the APS is supposed to offer a better-fitting                               
diagnostic category for help-seeking patients whose symptoms have already been a                     
source of distress. The idea of dealing with high levels of false positives would then lose                               
its potency, as all diagnosed patients would not be at-risk, but simply ill, based on                             
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recognisable symptoms. Indeed, individuals who meet the APS criteria already suffer                     
from multiple mental and functional disturbances, and exhibit various psychological                   
and cognitive deficits along with morphological and functional cerebral changes                   
(Ruhrmann et al., 2010, p.23). It is even said that the majority of help-seeking at-risk                             
individuals fulfils DSM-IV's general criteria for mental disorders, and so can clearly be                         
considered ill: they are patients with a need for and a right to treatment (Ibid., p.23). I                                 
will come back to this line of argumentation in more detail in Chapter 6, but I would                                 
like to note here that this does not necessarily undermine apprehensions regarding the                         
overuse of antipsychotic medication, which might still be prescribed to patients who                       
would not benefit from them. 
 
Risks of undue stigmatisation are the second major issue that has been                       
discussed in this debate on the ethics of pre-emptive psychiatry. Psychiatric diagnoses                       
have often been associated with very negative connotations, and few more than                       
schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders. Indeed, these tend to evoke the most                       
negative stereotypes, emotional reactions, social distance and general pessimism across                   
all mental disorders (Mittal et al., 2015, pp.547-548).   
 
This issue becomes particularly complex in the case of the APS, especially in                         
cases where risks of progression towards full-threshold psychosis are fully disclosed: it                       
could attach a deeply discrediting label to diagnosed patients, reducing these persons                       
‘from whole and normal to tainted and discounted’ (Mittal et al., 2015, pp.547-548). On                           
a personal basis, it is the patient's very sense of self which is at stake (Corcoran, 2005).                                 
This kind of stigma can lead the people to whom it is attached to have lower                               
self-esteem, and to see their social circle drastically restricted or downright hostile.                       
Identified APS patients have been shown to anticipate rejection from friends, family                       
and coworkers, and can respond by withdrawing from those who could have provided                         
a beneficial support network, or even by concealing their condition and treatments                       
(Mittal et al., 2015, pp.547-548). The idea of being at serious risk for psychosis might                             
also affect a person's choices in terms of education, employment and other life plans, or                             
even the extent to which such plans and aspirations might be supported by loved ones                             
(Corcoran, 2005).   
 
104 
 The full extent of what stigma can do to at-risk individuals will be evaluated in                             
Chapters 5 and 6; but I can mention here that proponents of pre-emptive psychiatry                           
have highlighted, in response to those worries, the possibility to lower stigma by means                           
of providing education and information about being at-risk, in addition to normalising                       
responses from health professionals and support workers. In that sense, communicating                     
a diagnosis like the APS may be beneficial for both patients and their families, as this                               
can help lower anxiety about what were previously unexplained and distressing                     
phenomena. APS patients can be provided substantial relief by being given clear                       
explanations, and by having their experiences validated (Mittal et al., 2015, p.546).                       
Great comfort might be taken in the feeling of receiving a diagnosis that fits with one’s                               
condition: the APS is not yet very well known by community providers, and attenuated                           
psychotic symptoms can be quite diffuse, leading many patients and families to go                         
through a series of incorrect diagnoses beforehand (Mittal et al., 2015, p.546). Accurate                         
information about the syndrome and the risks associated with it might therefore be                         
helpful in removing confusion and lowering stigma. 
 
Lastly, confidentiality is a matter that is closely related to the stigma attached                         
to psychotic disorders, and breaches of confidentiality have been regularly mentioned as                       
a potentially dangerous repercussion of the APS. Some have pointed out that future                         
insurability, in particular, could be threatened by these types of attenuated diagnoses                       
(Corcoran et al., 2005, p.173). 
 
The choice not to delve too deeply into the issues I mention in this section is a                                 
deliberate one - this will come at a later point. What I want to highlight here is how                                   
preponderant they all are in this debate. Concerns that were raised about the effects of                             
receiving an ‘attenuated diagnosis’, or being labelled ‘at-risk’, were listed very early on -                           
even before the elaboration of the APS for the DSM-5. The development of                         
pre-emptive psychiatry clearly poses a series of specific problems, from individual                     
patients’ sense of identity and fear of stigma to the role of the pharmaceutical industry                             
in the wider context of psychiatric services, or even the blurred border between normal                           
and pathological variations in experience (Nelson, Yung, 2011). I do not dispute the                         
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relevance of these concerns, nor do I want to undermine how problematic they really                           
are. I am wary about the fact that they are sometimes presented as a comprehensive                             
array of the ethical considerations at play regarding pre-emptive psychiatry, implying                     
that if benefits/effectiveness/utility turned out to outweigh these kinds of costs, the                       
simple answer would be that the development of pre-emptive psychiatry is indeed a                         
worthwhile endeavour. This is a straightforward answer to an oversimplified problem. 
 
 3. Cost-Benefit and Cost-Effectiveness Analyses 
The fact that an overwhelming majority of the publications treating the ethics                       
of pre-emptive psychiatry adopts the format of a cost-benefit or a cost-effectiveness                       
analysis is not without repercussions on the shape taken by this debate over the years.                             
Mostly, by their very nature, cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses will                   
necessarily be formatted around one or several question(s) for which the answer must                         
be one of two: either benefits/effectiveness outweigh costs, or they do not - a ‘yes/no’                             
type of inquiry that can lead too easily to oversimplified responses, or even to                           
categorical dismissals.   
 
A resolutely consequentialist approach like this one makes sense in the context                       
of pre-emptive psychiatry. As in many areas of healthcare, where resources are limited                         
and must be distributed in an efficient way, cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses                       
provide a well-known method to evaluate the impact (both positive and negative) of a                           
measure, a policy, or a type of practice. For example, prevention specialists can refer to                             
a series of questions in order to determine if a screening programme will do more harm                               
than good, such as: Does the burden of disease warrant screening? Is there an effective                             
preventive intervention? Is there a good screening test? Will the programme reach                       
those who would benefit from it? Etc. (Warner, 2005, p.106). There does appear to be a                               
large consensus on the idea that benefits outweigh risks in many studies focused on the                             
treatment of first episode psychotic patients as soon as possible; in contrast, however,                         
there is ‘less consensus about pre-onset detection and intervention studies, the major                       
concerns being the false positive rate of case identification, the evidence of benefit, the                           
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side effects of treatment, the potential harm from being informed that one is at risk for                               
psychosis, the false negative rate of case identification, and the inclusion of adolescents’                         
(McGlashan, Miller, Woods, 2001, p.563). As such, the introduction of pre-onset early                       
detection and interventions in psychiatry can be appraised in view of their capacity to                           
bring something worthwhile to identified at-risk individuals and to society.   
 
Nonetheless, cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses can also restrict one’s                 
scope of ethical considerations by limiting the kinds of questions that can be raised and                             
the kinds of answers that can be brought forward. To illustrate this point, I would like                               
to cite what immediately follows the list of questions I outlined above from Warner’s                           
paper (‘Does the burden of disease warrant screening? Is there an effective preventive                         
intervention? Is there a good screening test? Will the programme reach those who                         
would benefit from it?):   
 
In the case of schizophrenia, the answer to the first question is                       
a resounding ‘Yes’, but to the remainder the answers are ‘No’                     
or, at best, ‘Doubtfully’. Looked at in this light, it does not                       
appear likely that pre-illness screening for schizophrenia is               
likely to be successful (Warner, 2005, p.106).   
 
Problems linked to the development of pre-emptive psychiatry are therefore                   
conceptualised as risks faced by at-risk individuals, diagnosed patients and society.                     
Titled ‘Valuing prodromal psychosis: What do we get and what is the price?’ (Drake,                           
Lewis, 2010), Drake and Lewis’ publication on the subject is rather telling of that                           
tendency.   
 
Once that is established, it remains to be seen how the cost-benefit or the                           
cost-effectiveness ratio can be calculated, and whether or not taking such risks ends up                           
being justifiable. In the case of pre-emptive psychiatry, it is the capacity to prevent or                             
delay serious episodes and/or symptoms that must be counterbalanced with the more                       
problematic consequences of the at-risk label or the APS diagnosis: ‘there must be room                           
for a trade-off between the harm brought about by screening and the harm brought                           
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about by failure to screen’ (Shickle, Chadwick, 1994, p.16). The advocates of                       
pre-emptive psychiatry and the APS must be able to demonstrate the                     
benefits/effectiveness of their models prior to the introduction of pre-onset early                     
detection and intervention measures, meaning that an improved prognosis following                   
the use of effective interventions will usually be the most important argument in favour                           
of pre-emptive psychiatry.   
 
In view of the severity of psychotic disorders and the considerable suffering                       
endured by patients and their families, proponents of pre-emptive psychiatry have an                       
advantage; any serious hope to delay or prevent disorders like these is an argument in                             
their favour. A lot hinges upon the predictive validity of the diagnostic models and                           
criteria proposed for early detection, as the analysis becomes less favourable towards                       
treatment when the ability to target accurately those at severe risk of illness diminishes,                           
and when the severity of likely side effects increases (Bentall, Morrison, 2002, p.353).   
 
This explains the disavowal of pharmacological interventions even on the part                     
of proponents of pre-emptive psychiatry: while some of these treatments have been                       
shown to delay slightly the onset of psychosis and to have therapeutic effects on                           
pre-psychotic symptoms (Addington, Heinssen, 2012, p.279), the level of evidence is                     
still deemed insufficient. On the other hand, their serious side-effects and associated                       
adherence problems are well-documented, in addition to the risk that antipsychotic                     
medication might actually raise the chance of transition to psychosis once treatment is                         
stopped (de Koning et al., 2009, p.440). It was concluded that antipsychotic medication                         
should not be part of standard clinical practice for patients who are in the UHR state,                               
when cognitive behavioural therapy and other forms of psychosocial support have                     
considerably fewer side effects (Ibid., p.440).   
 
An interesting byproduct of this widespread use of cost-benefit and                   
cost-effectiveness analyses is that they establish a framework for thinking about ethical                       
issues on a very collective level - much more so than on an individual one: ‘expressing                               
the benefit and/or harm component of overdiagnosis in population terms requires                     
thinking statistically or probabilistically’ (Carter et al., 2016, p.708). For example,                     
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although overdiagnosis does occur in individuals, it can rarely be observed on such a                           
small scale, at least not with certainty; it follows that, to be useful as a guide to policy                                   
and practice, the definition of overdiagnosis must be expressed at a population-level                       
(Carter et al., 2016, p.708). The same might be said of issues of overmedication, which                             
are mostly relevant in cases of false-positives. The goal, if issues of overdiagnosis were                           
shown to be far-reaching, might be to alter diagnostic practices in such a way that ‘cases                               
of overdiagnosis—the (largely unidentifiable) cases that would have aggregated to create                     
the population-level rate of overdiagnosis—do not occur’ (Ibid., p.708). The full                     
accounting of the risks of pre-onset early intervention should look broadly at the                         
potential impact it has on the lives of patients in order to prevent or minimise such                               
unintended negative consequences as stigma or discrimination (Corcoran et al., 2005).                     
However, in the case of pre-emptive psychiatry, the alteration of the diagnostic                       
practices in question might amount, purely and simply, to their cessation.   
 
Cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses are certainly not the only type of                       
ethical considerations that have been developed in the context of pre-emptive                     
psychiatry. Some have expressed more conceptual concerns about the expansion of                     
pre-onset early detection and interventions, such as the possible confusion between                     
‘construct validity’ and ‘conceptual validity’. This idea was briefly evoked earlier, when I                         
mentioned that identifying the neural or genetic biomarkers that are associated with a                         
set of behaviours and/or symptoms (thus meeting the criteria for having construct                       
validity) cannot, by itself, delineate what is pathological or disordered from what isn’t,                         
thus failing to meet the criteria for conceptual validity (Blumenthal-Barby, 2014,                     
p.532). Concerns related to the inability to distinguish between what constitutes a                       
mental disorder and what doesn’t can be more conceptual than consequence-based;                     
nonetheless, it is indeed the impact that these kinds of confusions may have on                           
diagnosed patients that tend to prompt such concerns, linking them back to                       
over-medication and overdiagnosis.   
 
Cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses are an undeniably useful tool at                   
the disposal of those who wish to evaluate the negative impact that pre-emptive                         
measures can have on at-risk individuals. They can help understand whether or not                         
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these consequences are acceptable, from an ethical standpoint, in view of the benefits                         
these measures could also bring about. Consequentialist approaches facilitate the                   
examination of a large variety of issues, and allow for the integration of many different                             
types of information. The problem I have with their preeminence is related to their                           
internal structure. In order for a clearer debate to take place on the ethics of                             
pre-emptive psychiatry, cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness studies must take for                 
granted certain variables. In this case, it is often the idea that the APS (and other                               
diagnostic categories related to it) are the only feasible option for the implementation                         
of pre-emptive psychiatry. 
 
II. RECOGNISING THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE           
DEBATE ON THE ETHICS OF PRE-EMPTIVE           
PSYCHIATRY 
The APS as such was not always so central in the debate surrounding the                           
ethics of pre-emptive psychiatry, for the simple reason that it was developed as a                           
precise diagnosis several years after pre-emptive psychiatry became a central                   
preoccupation for researchers. It came about while the DSM-5 Task Force started its                         
evaluation process, in view of a potential integration into the  Manual . Nevertheless, the                         
idea of an attenuated syndrome based on positive symptoms for the purposes of                         
secondary prevention has always been prevalent, both medically and ethically speaking.                     
Proponents of pre-emptive psychiatry themselves have focused heavily on the APS, in a                         
way that might sometimes have obscured the existence of competing or complementary                       
conceptualisations of vulnerability.   
 
1. The Overrepresentation of the APS 
To recapitulate, the At-Risk Mental State (ARMS) was the APS’ predecessor,                     
though not a diagnosis in its own right. Aiming to identify individuals in the prodrome                             
of psychotic disorders, it outlined three different categories of risk: first, persons who                         
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showed attenuated and positive symptoms (e.g., unusual thought content,                 
suspiciousness, perceptual disturbances); secondly, people going through brief,               
intermittent psychotic symptoms; thirdly, people whose functioning had steeply                 
declined and whose family had a history of schizophrenia (Corcoran, 2005). The three                         
groups together are estimated by empirical studies to have an approximately 40%                       
likelihood of developing psychosis by 12 months, and a 50% likelihood of developing                         
psychosis within the next 24 months (Yung et al., 1996; Miller et al., 2002). More                             
recently, the DSM-5 Psychotic Disorders Workgroup coined the term ‘Attenuated                   
Psychosis Syndrome’ (APS) to ‘characterize subthreshold positive symptoms that                 
co-occur with distress and/or disability’ (Jacobs et al., 2011, p.24). The criteria                       
established for the APS closely follow those which were established for the ARMS.  
 
This intense focus on the APS is far from unreasonable, considering that the                         
proposal for the APS to be included in the DSM-5 is what cemented, for many, the                               
possibility to see pre-emptive psychiatry become an integral part of psychiatric care.                       
Ethical conversations were only bolstered by this circumstance, and many of the issues                         
that occupy the spotlight in this debate are, as explained earlier in this chapter, closely                             
associated with the DSM itself, and with biomedical psychiatry in general. The APS                         
thus occupies an overwhelmingly dominant position in many discussions.   
 
In a detailed outline of the ways in which the implications of the development                           
of pre-emptive psychiatry must inform the parallel development of ‘ethically informed                     
policies and practices’, MacDonald and her colleagues mention ‘psychosis risk                   
syndromes’ (the plural form is rare enough to be noticed) (MacDonald et al., 2017).                           
However, they quickly go on to explain that, while these psychosis-risk syndromes are                         
not formally recognized by the medical community, or listed as a formal diagnosis in                           
the DSM-5, the APS is indeed listed under ‘Conditions for Further Study’ (Section III),                           
thus re-focusing almost immediately on one specific diagnostic model. The lack of                       
official recognition for the APS is depicted as problematic for those trying to use mental                             
health services, as well as for diagnosis and communication among health care                       
providers. The confusion extends even beyond this, as the DSM sets the standard of                           
 
111 
care for researchers, drug regulation, health insurance, pharmaceutical companies and                   
the legal system (Macdonald et al., 2017).   
 
Most of the publications evaluating the potential impact of pre-emptive                   
psychiatry are similarly based on the APS, or on similar syndromes. In their article                           
regarding competing ethical considerations surrounding the disclosure of the at-risk                   
status, Mittal et al. focus exclusively on the ‘attenuated psychosis syndrome (APS), a                         
label that involves subtle disturbances in thought, emotion, and behavior in adolescents                       
and young adults, while simultaneously denoting elevated risk for developing a serious                       
mental illness such as schizophrenia’ (Mittal et al., 2015, p.543). Or, for example, when                           
the integration of early detection and early intervention in more general care structures                         
was analysed in a paper from 2012, findings were entirely based on the APS, as                             
illustrated by this informative introductory sentence: ‘schizophrenia and related                 
disorders are often preceded by a period of attenuated psychosis-type symptoms,                     
referred to as the ‘Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome’’ (Jacobs et al., 2012). From then on,                           
the discussion turns, in an almost ‘textbook’ manner, to problems of over-medication as                         
they were outlined in the previous subsection: it appears that the practitioners who                         
were interrogated about the APS designated antipsychotic medications as the treatment                     
they selected more often than any other, in a finding consistent with those showing                           
that 25% of the participants meeting UHR criteria were receiving antipsychotic                     
medications at study intake (Jacobs et al., 2012). The authors then insist on the fact that                               
few trials have provided evidence for the efficacy of antipsychotic medications in the                         
treatment of attenuated symptoms, and that experts in the field have discouraged the                         
prescription of antipsychotics for these patients (Ibid.): ‘given the particular                   
vulnerability of young people to motor- and obesity-related side effects [...], prescribers                       
might be well-advised to take a conservative stance when considering antipsychotic                     
medications’ (Jacobs et al., 2012). The interest of this study lies in the information it                             
relates regarding how people who fit in the APS category are usually treated in care                             
structures other than Early Intervention services, by professionals who might not be                       
fully acquainted with the APS diagnosis itself. Indeed, the data it discloses bring                         
something very valuable to conversations on the ethics of pre-emptive psychiatry, as                       
they give substance to apprehensions regarding risks of overmedication. What they                     
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also do, though, is conscribe the implementation of early detection to one                       
conceptualisation of psychiatric vulnerability: the APS.   
 
Some have highlighted problems linked to the APS as a diagnostic model                       
meant to capture psychiatric vulnerability, although without really challenging its                   
predominant position in the ethical debate. For example, Drake and Lewis mentioned                       
that the syndrome encompasses only part of what constitutes a high risk phenotype: ‘as                           
the criteria acknowledge, it is clear from epidemiological research that there are many                         
who experience psychotic symptoms who do not meet these criteria’ (Drake, Lewis,                       
2010, pp.38-39). They go on to explain that there is ample evidence of a continuum of                               
experiences across the population, with conventionally defined psychoses marking the                   
greatest severity (Ibid., p.39), but it appears to be underlined as a characteristic of the                             
APS, not as a plausible alternative option. Others, like McGorry, imagined a different                         
version of the APS model before it was created, one which would specify the                           
characteristics of various stages of psychotic disorders in the DSM-5. It was believed                         
that it could provide a framework for the comparison of results from preventive efforts                           
across many different centers, and may ultimately have implications for other                     
psychiatric disorders (McGorry, 2007, p.860). While this appears to refer to the staging                         
models McGorry would keep working on for years, he also became a defender of the                             
APS once it was proposed (although he acknowledged its flaws, and the need for                           
further investigations).   
 
When alternative options to the APS are considered (mostly staging models                     
depicting degrees of severity and approaches more focused on basic symptoms), they                       
tend to be seen as part of the problem more than as a potential solution:   
 
Intuitively, the move to capture severity rather than a simple                   
dichotomous presence or absence of a disorder makes sense.                 
But there seems to be a conceptual unclarity, or at least                     
non-uniformity, about what it means to have a mild versus                   
moderate versus severe form of a mental disorder               
(Blumenthal-Barby, 2014, p.533).   
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 I consider that the existence of these different models should be acknowledged much                         
more than it has been in this debate, as they propose significantly different                         
conceptualisations of vulnerability. In doing so, they can have vastly divergent                     
implications for the implementation of pre-emptive psychiatry. A more precise                   
evaluation of these conceptualisations is therefore crucial, as they could affect the scope                         
of our responsibilities to identified at-risk individuals, and determine the way in which                         
we ought to respond to these vulnerabilities.   
 
2. The Need to Focus on Conceptualisations of               
Vulnerability 
One of the ways in which treating susceptibility is more                   
complicated than treating disease is that disease is relatively                 
well defined and susceptibility is not [...] Determining who is a                     
suitable candidate for intervention entails narrowing down             
what constitutes compelling vulnerability (Corcoran, 2005).   
 
Questions surrounding vulnerability, how it is defined and how we ought to                       
respond to it as a society, or as medical professionals, have been implicitly present all                             
throughout the debate on the ethics of pre-emptive psychiatry. Only rarely have they                         
been explicitly at the heart of these discussions, though - a place I think they should                               
occupy if we are to have a truly constructive conversation.   
 
It is crucial to understand that the entire purpose of pre-emptive psychiatry is                         
to provide a valid model of vulnerability. Similarly, it is important to acknowledge that                           
the APS is not necessarily standing on its own as a suggestion.   
 
In a way, this goes back to the issue of over-medicalisation, and the difficulty                           
to appreciate the difference between vulnerability and disease: ‘it is easy to envision a                           
situation wherein a suggestion of vulnerability might be mistaken for a quasi-diagnosis’                       
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(Corcoran, 2005). Not all models of vulnerability are equally compelling, and it would                         
be a mistake not to go to the trouble of distinguishing them. Corcoran explains this by                               
taking the example of the infant daughter of two parents with schizophrenia, who has a                             
50% chance of developing the disease herself - a statistical risk analogous to that of a                               
17-year-old boy who is currently experiencing attenuated psychotic symptoms                 
(Corcoran, 2005). The crux of the matter is that the teenager appears to be at                             
immediate risk, while the infant is not: ‘because schizophrenia is a disease with delayed                           
onset, there is an important difference between intervention that interrupts a                     
presumptive premorbid period, potentially a time of relative health and normalcy, and                       
intervention intended to address the imminent threat of disease’ (Corcoran, 2005).                     
These dual visions of early intervention are supported by different models of                       
vulnerability.   
 
Interestingly, interventions aiming to address ‘imminent threats of disease’,                 
mostly promoted by attenuated syndromes like the APS, and which might appear to be                           
the more ethical option thanks to the distress criterion, are not necessarily so: this is                             
what focusing on conceptualisations of vulnerability can help highlight. I do want to                         
insist on the fact that staging models are not in a frontal opposition with attenuated                             
syndromes, though: by definition, they attempt to capture degrees of severity, thus                       
integrating these syndromes within their own framework. What they do is provide a                         
more evolutionary conceptualisation of vulnerability: it was theorised that staging                   
models would help to avoid ‘imponderabilities associated with the predictive character                     
of a risk syndrome’, thereby defining a mild expression along the psychotic continuum,                         
marking a potentially increased, yet by no means obligatory, risk of progressing to                         
full-threshold psychosis (Ruhrmann et al., 2010, p.33).   
 
The possibility to present staging models as an alternative to the APS became                         
more visible once the latter was relegated to the Appendix of the  Manual . Nelson                           
published an article titled ‘Attenuated psychosis syndrome: don't jump the gun’ in 2014,                         
which presented a number of conceptual and practical issues that should be addressed                         
in deciding whether APS should be accepted as an official diagnosis in subsequent                         
editions of the DSM. It discussed the relationship between attenuated psychotic                     
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symptoms and other presenting non-psychotic disorders, as well as the difficulties of                       
operationalising the ‘attenuated’ concept in standard clinical practice (Nelson, 2014,                   
p.292). The key difference between the two conceptualisations of vulnerability (a                     
risk-state or a disorder) is that ‘a risk state calls for identification and prevention,                           
whereas a disorder state calls for diagnosis and treatment’ (Fusar-Poli et al., 2014,                         
p.165). The first option places the emphasis on the possibility of preventing the                         
development of psychosis rather than on clinical care (meaning active medical                     
treatment for current symptoms). The confusion surrounding the availability of these                     
different models helped fuel the ethical debate in a way that was not conducive to a                               
constructive conversation. It was only amplified by the fact that it mostly took place in                             
the process of revising the DSM, focusing excessively on the APS model.   
 
Staging models, by proposing a more comprehensive integration of                 
pluripotent risk, might lead to a redefinition of both the targets and the timing of                             
therapeutic interventions (Fusar-Poli et al., 2014, p.182). This demands an accurate                     
understanding of the broad social context in which psychiatric problems arise, of the                         
biological etiology of specific symptoms, of personal risk and protective factors that can                         
influence movement across stages; in other words, it demands a sufficiently thorough                       
concept of vulnerability. Investigating the relative potency of various risk and                     
vulnerability factors, and establishing whether they are malleable by current                   
interventions, would therefore become absolutely crucial  (McGorry, 2007, p.859): 
 
The burgeoning arena of gene-environment interactions is             
directly relevant; these environmental variables such as             
substance abuse, psychosocial stressors, cognitive style,           
medication adherence, and social isolation may interact with               
genetic and other biological risk factors at a particular time in                     
the pathogenesis of the illness. A clinical staging model, which                   
maps the relationship of biological change to stage of illness,                   
may help to validate or redefine clinical boundaries, distinguish                 
true pathophysiology from epiphenomena or sequelae, and             
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enable much existing data to be better understood (McGorry,                 
2007, p.859).   
 
This vision of vulnerability is perhaps more consistent with recent findings about the                         
low predictive value of early signs of risk as to which condition is about to develop (if                                 
any at all), and the ensuing need to account for nonspecific pluripotential risks (Koren,                           
2013, p.236). Demarcating in this way different stages in the progression of a disorder                           
can help create a new prevention-oriented framework in which ‘key outcomes are                       
prevention of progression to more advanced stages or regression to an earlier stage’                         
(McGorry, 2007, p.859). 
 
A more detailed analysis of the large impact these various models of                       
vulnerability can have on pre-onset early detection and interventions in psychiatry will                       
be developed in the last chapter of this dissertation. What I want to show here is how,                                 
by insisting on the importance of these conceptualisations, new avenues of reflection                       
can start to bear on the ethical debate that surrounds these new practices.   
 
For example, it can encourage discussions on positive or negative perceptions                     
of vulnerability. In Koren’s 2013 publication on pre-emptive psychiatry in the                     
post-DSM-5 publication era, he mentions that labels which place more emphasis on the                         
‘half full’ (e.g. endangered resilience) than on the ‘half empty’ (e.g. psychosis risk) part of                             
at-risk states are more likely to minimise unwanted risks of social stigma, and maximise                           
desired outcomes such as willingness to seek help, hope and treatment compliance                       
(Koren, 2013, p.236). A stronger focus on models of vulnerability could also encourage                         
the reformulation of the goal of early interventions as the preservation and stimulation                         
of intact (yet endangered) healthy functions, rather than as a cure for an emerging                           
disease (Ibid., p.236). Similarly, this kind of shift could help integrate a deeper reflection                           
on the implications of early detection for the family members of at-risk individuals,                         
considering the role of genetics in some vulnerability models, and its quasi-absence in                         
others (Cassetta, 2014). It could also shed light on the fact that, in becoming                           
over-medicalised, vulnerability could become a problem imputed to at-risk individuals                   
themselves, who would bear the responsibility of controlling and managing it, thus                       
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overlooking the role of larger issues and societal structures in the development of some                           
vulnerabilities (Blumenthal-Barby, 2014, p.532).   
 
Variations in conceptualisations of vulnerability can be compelling enough                 
that they might bring about a considerable reformulation of the ethical issues at play in                             
the development of pre-emptive psychiatry. If the debate is re-framed, the opposition                       
between proponents and detractors of pre-emptive psychiatry is abandoned in favour                     
of one between the preservation of resilience and the treatment of an existing                         
condition. This could, in turn, lead to vastly different types of conclusions. Before                         
delving into this ‘re-framing’ though, I feel it necessary to provide an overview of the                             
moral significance of vulnerability: if this concept is so central in the ethics of                           
pre-emptive psychiatry, it is because of its critical role in the definition and scope of our                               
moral responsibilities more generally. 
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Chapter 4 - The Centrality of           
Vulnerability 
 
To interpret the lack of focus on models of vulnerability in the ethical debate                           
surrounding the development of pre-emptive psychiatry as a problem, one needs to                       
show that considerable stakes hinge upon these models. This is not simply a matter of                             
pragmatic demonstration, correlating specific medical practices and interventions to                 
their more theoretical underpinnings (although this is indeed of great consequence and                       
will be initiated later on). Indeed, before one is to recognise the relevance of each                             
model’s implications in medical practice, the moral significance of vulnerability must be                       
acknowledged and analysed. It is the aim of this chapter to do so. 
 
Medical research on pre-emptive psychiatry is openly and heavily focused on                     
conceptualisations of vulnerability. As mentioned on previous occasions, the idea of                     
prevention/pre-emption itself is substantially interlinked with the identification of                 
both vulnerabilities and risks. In order to implement effective targeted interventions,                     
specific vulnerabilities and risks must be adequately detected . Providing the best                     15
model of the vulnerabilities that are constitutive of the prodrome of mental disorders                         
thus becomes absolutely crucial. Historically speaking, pre-onset early intervention                 
programs for psychosis soared when criteria facilitating the identification of at-risk                     
individuals were elaborated: UHR, CAARMS, SIPS, COPS, SPI-A, etc. (Häfner &                     
Maurer, 2006, p.130; Cornblatt & Auther, 2005, p.39).   
 
It does not follow from this, though, that ethical reflections on the                       
development of pre-emptive psychiatry should necessarily adopt a similar focus on                     
15 Such a claim is now generally recognised and has been made by different parties in many                                 
instances, though it is well summed-up by Addington and Heinssen when they affirm that ‘a                             
precondition for early intervention is the accurate detection of prodromal states, i.e., knowing who may                             
be at true risk of developing a psychotic illness’ (2012, p.270). 
 
119 
models of vulnerability. In fact, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, specific issues                         
which are seen to be direct consequences of pre-onset early detection and interventions                         
(stigmatisation of at-risk individuals, overdiagnosis, over-medicalisation and             
overmedication) drew on themselves most of the attention dedicated to the ethics of                         
pre-emptive psychiatry. Such concerns are indeed both central and legitimate; and the                       
debate surrounding recent medical developments has not been sterile, bringing to light                       
the problematic implications of an increased focus on prevention. It has also been                         
impactful, given that the concerns expressed by detractors of the Attenuated Psychosis                       
Syndrome were serious enough to dissuade the DSM-5 Task Force from integrating it                         
fully as an official diagnostic category.   
 
Nevertheless, the argument presented in the subsequent chapter maintains                 
that concentrating on the models of vulnerability suggested for pre-emptive psychiatry                     
provides a more pertinent ethical outlook on recent developments in the field. Indeed,                         
most of the issues already identified can be said to arise, in one way or another, from                                 
our conceptualisations of vulnerability and our moral responses to it. It is therefore                         
crucial to demonstrate that the moral significance of vulnerability is generally                     
recognised in moral philosophy (albeit in different forms); to provide a clear and                         
comprehensive account of vulnerability; and to delineate the kinds of responsibilities to                       
which it ought to give rise on the part of society, policy-makers, medical practitioners                           
and at-risk individuals themselves. This chapter and the next are both centred on these                           
objectives. 
 
I believe that moral theories cannot fail to address the notion of vulnerability                         
in one way or another, nor fail to acknowledge the necessity of a moral response to it.                                 
One of the main objectives of the upcoming chapter is thus to consider how several                             
high moral theories react to vulnerability - even those like libertarianism which are                         
rarely thought to react to it at all. However, the selection of these theories has not been                                 
random, and it serves further purposes. First of all, I intend to show that, despite their                               
divergent approaches to vulnerability, each of the theories I examine here brings out                         
important features of the mid-level account of vulnerability I will defend later on. If I                             
dedicate substantial subsections of this chapter to Held’s work on the concept of                         
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vulnerability within the ethics of care, to O’Neill’s more deontological perspective, or to                         
Goodin’s defence of a strong duty to protect the vulnerable, it is because each of these                               
has influenced the understanding of vulnerability (and of the moral responses we ought                         
to bring to it) that I find most convincing. Even those theories from which I moved                               
farthest have contributed to the delineation of this account, either by presenting                       
challenging perspectives, or by representing the pitfalls I believe most important to                       
avoid. For example, while I draw on many of Goodin’s compelling insights and on his                             
reasoning, I am in disagreement with one of the conclusions he draws from the                           
realisation (this one in alignment with mine) that we ought to recognise strong moral                           
responsibilities towards the people who are vulnerable to us: where he favours                       
protection, I seek to promote relational autonomy and resilience. Working on his                       
account and on several others thus allows me to lay down the foundations of a                             
particular understanding of vulnerability, and of the mid-level approaches I intend to                       
adopt in order to defend or dismiss specific normative responses to vulnerability. 
 
The choice made in this dissertation to rely primarily on mid-level moral                       
theories was justified by the idea that, if a common understanding of specific principles                           
could be reached between partisans of various high moral theories and the common                         
morality, providing practical and adaptable guidance to practitioners with regards to a                       
variety of issues would become immediately more straightforward. The success of                     
Beauchamp and Childress’ principlist approach in biomedical ethics (Schöne-Seifert,                 
2006, p.109), which follows a similar line of reasoning, certainly seems to indicate a                           
strong adherence to such methods from medical professionals and ethicists both.   
 
This common understanding of principles would necessitate, first and                 
foremost, a wide-ranging recognition of their moral value. In this specific instance,                       
what needs to be acknowledged is the demandingness of vulnerability on a moral plane:                           
cognisance of vulnerability, in oneself or in others, entails moral responsibilities.                     
Accordingly, the very first step, here, will be to demonstrate that, despite their often                           
incompatible theoretical commitments, all major high moral theories do recognise the                     
necessity of a moral response to vulnerability. Depending on the accounts of                       
vulnerability delineated within the framework of these theories, the response in itself                       
 
121 
may vary widely, both in scope and in method. However, the acknowledgement of the                           
moral demandingness of vulnerability is seen as sufficient to justify how central models                         
of vulnerability such as the APS or staging models should be in the ethical reflections                             
surrounding the development of pre-emptive psychiatry. Moreover, the depiction of                   
selected moral theories’ dealings with the concept of vulnerability will lay the grounds                         
for the mid-level account I defend in Chapter 5. 
 
This chapter is structured in a thematic way, outlining the array of moral                         
responses that various theories deem appropriate in our dealings with vulnerability. I                       
start with the ethics of care and feminist philosophy because of the role they played in                               
openly placing the notion of vulnerability at the heart of their normative framework . I                           16
follow with deontological theories in order to demonstrate that even those theories                       
which are thought to neglect more vulnerable individuals and populations do recognise                       
the moral significance of vulnerability. I finish with consequentialist theories and                     
Goodin’s work on vulnerability, as I consider his account of particular importance in                         
the rest of this dissertation. 
 
I. VULNERABILITY IN THE ETHICS OF CARE 
One theory in particular has made of the recognition of vulnerability a                       
cornerstone of its normative impetus . The ethics of care posit that ‘human beings are                           17
dependent for many years of their lives, that the moral claim of those dependent on us                               
for the care they need is pressing, and that there are highly important moral aspects in                               
developing the relations of caring that enable human beings to live and progress’ (Held,                           
16 I will not dedicate a subsection to virtue ethics, as I consider that the work of the most                                     
prominent virtue ethicist who focused on vulnerability, MacIntyre, is too closely in line with that                             
produced by care ethicists and feminist philosophers. His work will be mentioned in Chapter 5. 
17 Care ethicists do not always name vulnerability as a primordial concept, but sometimes opt                             
for closely related terms and notions: precariousness is, for example, particularly crucial throughout                         
Judith Butler’s bibliography ( Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence , 2004;  Frames of War:                             
When is life grievable? , 2010). Virginia Held is more likely to refer to ideas of dependence and caring                                   
relations ( The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global , 2006). Authors like Sara Ruddick ( Maternal                             
Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace , 1989), Annette Baier ( Moral Prejudices , 1995), and Ellen Feder ( Making                               
Sense of Intersex: Changing Ethical Perspectives in Biomedicine , 2014) are more likely to refer directly to                               
vulnerability.   
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2006, p.10). Often constructed in opposition to dominant moral theories, which are                       
seen to put illegitimate emphasis on qualities historically associated with masculinity                     
(rationality, impartiality and autonomy), the ethics of care aim to give to qualities of                           
compassion and love their rightful moral gravity. Emotional and caring responses to                       
vulnerability or suffering should not be devalued; on the contrary, according to care                         
ethicists, the role they play in moral deliberations should be recognised as highly                         
valuable (Gilligan, 1993, p.19).   
1. Caring Relationships as a Societal and Moral Ideal 
Originating from historically female experiences of caring within the private                   
sphere (caring for vulnerable relatives such as children, the elderly or the sick) or in a                               
professional context (such as nursing), the ethics of care have fully embraced the moral                           
importance of one’s partiality towards particular others. Nevertheless, to perceive the                     
ethics of care as somehow more suited to regulate private lives and relations (which had                             
indeed been mostly avoided by most philosophical thought until the rise of feminist                         
ethics), while more dominant moral theories (deontology or utilitarianism, particularly)                   
remain well-adapted for public life, would be a mistake. Reflections led by care ethicists                           
are not to be limited to particular relationships, far from it. Many of them advocate for                               
responses to one’s own and others’ vulnerability that extend past the private sphere to                           
actively transform how wider society organises itself and responds to its neighbours.   
 
The ethics of care addresses rather than neglects moral issues                   
arising in relations among the unequal and dependent,               
relations that are often laden with emotion and involuntary,                 
and then notices how often these attributes apply not only in                     
the household but in the wider society as well (Held, 2006,                     
p.13).   
 
Instead of upholding the just repartition of riches and the protection of individual                         
rights as the highest moral goods a society could aim for, care ethicists place more value                               
on the cultivation of caring relations and support networks; on  qualities like ‘trust,                         
 
123 
solidarity, mutual concern, and empathetic responsiveness’ (Held, 2006, p.15). The                   
traditional distinction between public and private holds no weight, here, as these                       
qualities should guide our own relationships as well as larger societal goals.   
 
In opposition to conceptualisations of morality which see moral                 
responsibilities as arising from negatively formulated constraints (in the protection of                     
individual rights), or from the equal and impartial consideration of everyone’s interests                       
(the maximisation of scarce resources), care ethicists defend the idea that it is from a                             
shared, universal vulnerability that moral responsibilities originate. The implications of                   
that shift drastically widen the scope of our moral reach, as vulnerable populations                         
worldwide become legitimate beneficiaries of caring behaviour and policies; care thus                     
becomes both a political and a moral ideal, advocating the meeting of needs for care as                               
‘the highest social goal’ (Tronto, 1993, p.175). 
 
Care ethicists conceive of a society whose moral ideals of justice, fairness and                         
impartiality supersede more clearly relational goods as a society that willfully blinds                       
itself to the uncomfortable realities of the human and animal conditions - namely, the                           
interdependence that inevitably binds people together from birth. Care ethicists explain                     
that the rational, self-sufficient and completely autonomous subject postulated by                   
dominant moral theories simply does not exist. Accordingly, deriving our moral                     
judgements from that unattainable ideal, all the while taking its existence in ourselves                         
and others for granted, becomes a particularly dangerous endeavour, as it tends to erase                           
and deny universal experiences of vulnerability and dependence. Unequal relationships                   
of dependence are ineluctable and, as such, should occupy a key position in our moral                             
realm.   
 
If one wants to condemn unequivocally relationships marked by dominating,                   
controlling, paternalistic or exploitative characteristics, whether they are so overtly or                     
insidiously, then it might appear delusive to aim (in an attempt condemned to fail) for                             
absolute equality between individuals. The ethics of care therefore advocate for a                       
theory of morality that places relationships at the centre of its normativity, before acts                           
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themselves or even character traits. It is a theory of morality that makes of the analysis,                               
the questioning and the betterment of relationships its first impetus: 
   
Although persons often may and should reshape their relations                 
with others—distancing themselves from some persons and             
groups and developing or strengthening ties with others—the               
autonomy sought within the ethics of care is a capacity to                     
reshape and cultivate new relations, not to ever more closely                   
resemble the unencumbered abstract rational self of liberal               
political and moral theories. Those motivated by the ethics of                   
care would seek to become more admirable relational persons                 
in better caring relations (Held, 2006, p.14). 
 
Responses to others’ vulnerability are therefore closely conjoined with the                   
acknowledgement of one’s own vulnerability: it is only because that condition is shared                         
universally that one can cultivate appropriate (trustworthy, solidary and empathetic)                   
relationships with others. 
 
2. Caring for the Vulnerable 
The ethics of care and more justice-centred moral theories have often been                       
pitted against each other. However, while they tend to prioritise the value of care over                             
that of justice, care ethicists do recognise the necessity to incorporate both of them for                             
the elaboration of an ethic genuinely protective of vulnerability. Indeed, caring                     
relationships can often be marked by unjust expectations or unfair access to resources                         
that would allow for the minimisation of specific, unjustified vulnerabilities. Care                     
ethicists themselves have sometimes been criticised (particularly by liberal feminists)                   
over their tendency to put too strong an emphasis on care and an insufficient one on                               
justice, seemingly  reinforcing the stereotypical image of women as self-abnegating,                   
selfless caretakers who subordinate their humanity to the needs of others (Nussbaum,                       
1999, p.13).   
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 Because the caring qualities historically displayed by women were cultivated                   
under patriarchal rules and societal organisations, the fear is that the ethics of care                           
might ‘deflect attention from the oppressive social structures in which [care] takes                       
place’ (Held, 2006, p.220). Mackinnon expressed such concerns eloquently in reference                     
to Gilligan’s famous identification of women’s  diferent voice : 
 
I say, give women equal power in social life. Let what we say                         
matter, then we will discourse on questions of morality. Take                   
your foot off our necks, then we will hear in what tongue                       
women speak. So long as sex equality is limited by sex                     
difference, whether you like it or don’t like it, whether you                     
value it or seek to negate it, whether you stake it out as grounds                           
for feminism or occupy it as the terrain of misogyny, women                     
will be born, degraded, and die (Mackinnon, 1987, p.45). 
 
Pointing to the necessity of promoting and prioritising justice and equality, which is at                           
the heart of the feminist movement, these critics view the endorsement of care as an                             
attitude that tends to encourage and reinforce the unjust assignment of caring work to                           
women (Held, 2006, p22).   
 
Beyond the scope of feminist thought, these remarks could also be applicable                       
to other vulnerable populations. A discourse that emphasises so strongly the                     
recognition and acceptation of caring, dependent relationships might leave aside crucial                     
appeals for equality and justice in the face of unjustifiably exploitative relationships (or                         
legitimate aspirations to a higher level of autonomy on the part of particularly                         
vulnerable people). If the interdependence that links all living beings together and the                         
existence of a shared vulnerability cannot be denied, there remain indeed some forms of                           
vulnerability that are wrongfully shouldered by disadvantaged individuals; and the                   
ethics of care need to guard themselves against the accusation of maintaining an unjust                           
status-quo. It is especially important in the case of pre-emptive psychiatry, given the                         
role that environmental, societal and familial adversities are said to play in the                         
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development of serious mental health issues. Caring for at-risk individuals may well be                         
of primordial importance, but if these adversities to which they owe many of their                           
vulnerabilities could be lessened, shouldn’t a normative moral framework encourage                   
this line of action just as much as it enables caring relationships? 
 
Additionally, though the significance of particular relationships is now more                   
readily recognised by various ethical theories - including more dominant ones which                       
were previously very reluctant to do so - the account given by care ethicists is still                               
opposed by a wide range of moral philosophies that strongly adhere to universalism.                         
O’Neill, whose work is in line with Kantian ethics, admits that emphasising the                         
importance of existing relationships ‘may be an understandable corrective or                   
supplement to positions that treat impartiality or justice as the whole of ethics’, but she                             
strongly disagrees with the idea that particularism, as embodied by the ethics of care,                           
can provide a convincing account of morality, especially since ‘it must exclude those to                           
whom we have either unwholesome attachments or commitments, or none at all’                       
(O’Neill, 1996, p.97).   
 
Care ethicists have therefore attempted to integrate both ideas of care and of                         
justice into their moral reflections, although they do insist on the predominance of care                           
as an essential value when justice can only appear, chronologically and functionally, as a                           
secondary claim. Bubeck illustrates this when she makes clear that she supports the                         
ethic of care as ‘a system of concepts, values, and ideas, arising from the practice of care                                 
as an organic part of this practice and responding to its material requirements, notably                           
the meeting of needs’ (Bubeck, 1995, p.11). The partiality asserted in the value of caring                             
is, in many instances, in direct conflict with the required impartiality of justice. The                           
argument put forward by some care ethicists, however, determines that caring tends to                         
be a more inclusive value (Held, 2006, p.72), and one which is also more effective in                               
promoting respect for others through large networks of relationships, compared to the                       
ideal of justice when it is detached from the realities of dependence and mutual support: 
 
Universal human rights (including the social and economic               
ones as well as the political and civil) should certainly be                     
 
127 
respected, but promoting care across continents may be a more                   
promising way to achieve this than mere rational recognition.                 
When needs are desperate, justice may be a lessened                 
requirement on shared responsibility for meeting needs,             
although this rarely excuses violations of rights (Held, 2006,                 
p.17).   
 
As such, while the value of justice is recognised within the ethics of care, impartial and                               
equitable responses to vulnerability are seen as secondary to caring ones. The rhetoric                         
of rights remains too individualistic for many care ethicists, heralding the view of the                           
rational, independent and autonomous subject and in denial of our inescapable                     
vulnerability.   
 
In conclusion, the ethics of care have made of the recognition of a shared,                           
universal vulnerability the core impulse that generates moral responsibilities. It is in                       
response to others’ dependence and susceptibleness that one should cultivate beneficent                     
relationships - relationships that avert degrading and exploitative connections between                   
individuals and within the political, social, and economic organisation of communities. 
 
As I intend to show in Chapter 5, I believe the responses to vulnerability                           
brought forward by care ethicists to be a bit too focused on protection and care, and too                                 
wary of the principle of respect for autonomy. These two issues are, I argue,                           
particularly problematic when dealing with the ethics of pre-emptive psychiatry.                   
Nevertheless, Held’s and other care ethicists’ contributions still play a large role in the                           
account of vulnerability I defend in this dissertation, as will become clear in the                           
following chapter. 
 
II. DEONTOLOGY 
Deontology, as the moral theory which provided the necessary socle for                     
universal human rights, might be said by some to be both quite adept at considering                             
 
128 
and protecting vulnerable people and also, at the same time, the least likely approach to                             
provide fully satisfactory responses to the existence of vulnerability.   
 
It is thanks to this notion of rights that deontology manages this particular                         
feat. Formulated simply (perhaps too simply, as will be shown further on),                       
deontologists elaborate, on the one hand, a strong account of individual or collective                         
rights, and of the obligations that correspond to these rights. They ensure in this way                             
that everyone is guaranteed the freedom to exercise their agency and will as they see fit                               
(unless it encroaches unjustifiably on someone else’s liberty). On the other hand, the                         
foundational premises of this moral theory favour the establishment of                   
negatively-formulated duties, giving rise to human rights that can mostly be                     
encapsulated by the idea of non-interference.   
 
Defenders of welfare rights have been fighting for the recognition of positive                       
obligations within the deontological framework with more or less success, often having                       
to back down when facing libertarians’ more straightforward reasoning. O’Neill, despite                     
her defence of obligations of virtue, admits that a distinction between these different                         
kinds of rights is undeniable: 
 
Universal rights to goods and services, such as welfare rights,                   
are in fact unlike liberty rights. It is true that rights of both sorts                           
need institutional structures for their enforcement, but liberty               
rights do not need institutional structures to be claimable and                   
waivable. By contrast rights to goods and services can be                   
claimed or waived only if a system of assigning agents to                     
recipients has already been established, by which the               
counterpart obligations are ‘distributed’ (O’Neill, 1996, p.131). 
 
As a result, it is often alleged that ‘it takes more to justify an interference than to justify                                   
the withholding of goods or services’ (Foot, 2002, p.83).   
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Deontology, then, could be argued to provide too little assistance to                     
vulnerable individuals and vulnerable populations if it fails to recognise the legitimacy                       
of welfare rights, even though it does provide a solid protection to each against the                             
interference of others. What I want to defend, in this section, is the idea that                             
deontology can account for the ethical relevance of vulnerability, and recognises the                       
necessity to provide morally adequate responses to it in one way or another - be it from                                 
an unapologetic libertarian standpoint, or from the welfare-rights position. 
1. The Consideration of Vulnerability in Staunchly             
Libertarian Accounts 
Let’s start with the theory which is often perceived to be the least likely to                             
address the existence of vulnerability satisfactorily: non-consequentialist libertarianism.               
It is indeed rather uncommon to think of libertarians as ardent defenders of                         
disadvantaged and vulnerable people’s interests. On the contrary, their steadfast assault                     
on state interference and on welfare policies has had a tendency to make them the                             
champions of more affluent people worldwide - the advocates of unbridled capitalism                       
and private property rights.   
 
Nonetheless, the position I defend here is that libertarianism does provide                     
moral guidance that is specifically attuned to the recognition and management of                       
particular kinds of vulnerability. Furthermore, if implemented meticulously and                 
rigorously, it could actually allow for the legitimisation of compelling ways to protect                         
vulnerable individuals and groups, albeit in a narrower way than other moral theories.   
 
It might be said that any theory that grants universal rights, even if these are                             
exclusively negative in their formulation, necessarily provides protection against                 
specific harms and, as such, obviously does respond to vulnerability. Libertarianism, in                       
that sense, recognises the reality of a shared, universal vulnerability to others - of the                             
possibility to be wronged by them. A more relevant question then becomes: does                         
libertarianism provide an adequate way to respond to this vulnerability?   
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Several justifications have been given by proponents of rights-based theories                   
so as to ground indisputable rights. Granting an intrinsic dignity to all human beings -                             
from which natural, inalienable rights to life, liberty and property would derive - is the                             
way in which many deontologists have proceeded. Noggle calls it the ‘nature to                         
morality methodology’: it draws on premises about human nature or the nature of                         
persons (in this particular case, it is often the human capacity for rational thinking and                             
decision-making) to support conclusions about the nature and structure of morality                     
(Noggle, 2001, pp.531-532). As such, it can be argued that natural human rights derive                           
from what are seen to be some of the most basic human needs: ‘since men can think,                                 
feel, evaluate, and act only as individuals, it becomes vitally necessary for each man’s                           
survival and prosperity that he be free to learn, choose, develop his faculties, and act                             
upon his knowledge and values’ (Rothbard, 1978, p.33). 
 
According to van Duffel, property rights could actually be argued to be the                         
most essential category of rights in non-consequentialist libertarian accounts: ‘property                   
is the fundamental notion on which libertarians rely to distinguish between negative                       
and positive rights. Property is fundamental to libertarianism in that it defines the                         
boundaries that people must not cross’ (van Duffel, 2004, pp.356-357). The notion of                         
individual dominion over property is thus given a central role in van Duffel’s account of                             
non-consequentialist libertarian theories: it gives rise to liberty and autonomy rights by                       
allowing for the delineation of boundaries that cannot legitimately be crossed by others                         
without the owner’s consent (van Duffel, 2004, p.366). Here, the only morally                       
problematic form of vulnerability is then the risk of seeing one’s rightful property - be                             
it material or not - encroached by another.   
 
If van Duffel is not convinced by a libertarian account of human natural rights,                           
it is because ‘the idea that people are sovereign beings does not allow us to infer that                                 
they have an obligation to respect each other’s sovereignty’ (van Duffel, 2004, p.371).                         
The justification given of that account by non-consequentialist libertarians relies on the                       
idea that liberty rights remain the only kind of rights that can be matched by universal                               
obligations in a clear-cut manner, which would give them an edge over welfare rights                           
and other positive rights, for example: 
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 [Libertarians] point out that whereas liberty rights can be                 
matched by duties that all can discharge, any universal rights to                     
‘positive’ action, for example, rights to goods, services or                 
specifically to welfare, would demand corresponding           
obligations that cannot be discharged by all, if only because                   
agents are embodied, hence spatially and temporally dispersed,               
so not all of them can have the access to one another that                         
universal ‘positive’ intervention would demand (O’Neill, 1996,             
p.130). 
 
The level of consideration of, and protection from, vulnerability is not                     
insignificant in non-consequentialist libertarianism, however, even with a focus                 
restricted on the respect of negatively formulated rights. While negative rights are                       
deemed to be the only kind of universal human rights, and while welfare rights are                             
more than likely restricted to legal considerations rather than moral ones, few would                         
deny the necessity to implement institutional guards to ensure that such negative rights                         
are widely respected, and that transgressions are punished. The enforcement of                     
negative rights might actually have far-reaching implications, especially if one is to                       
interpret the obligation not to injure in a strict manner: 
 
If just lives and societies have to avoid systematic and gratuitous                     
injury as far as possible, they must identify and seek to meet                       
complex institutional demands that take account of actual               
capacities and capabilities for action of those involved and of                   
their counterpart vulnerabilities to injury. Injury can destroy or                 
damage bodies (including minds), bodily (including mental)             
functioning and so capacities and capabilities to (inter)act and                 
to respond (O’Neill, 1996, pp.167-168). 
 
It might even be argued that today’s most vulnerable populations would have more to                           
gain in seeing their negative rights not to be injured, exploited or oppressed strictly                           
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enforced against their persecutors, than if they were to receive welfare benefits. In                         
some instances, the latter might be more akin to a palliative measure while the former                             
would be a more direct intervention against a fundamentally unjust situation.                     
Populations suffering at the hands of militias who control mining practices and local                         
natural resources would, for example, see their vulnerability reduced more from the                       
condemnation of these paramilitary groups and the conglomerates who deal directly                     
with them, than from being sent basic necessities: ‘the rejection even of direct injury                           
will require institutions that limit and control the power that some have over others,                           
and hence also the vulnerability of those others’ (O’Neill, 1996, p.169). 
 
In the case of pre-emptive psychiatry, a normative framework so focused on                       
the enforcement of negative rights might prove to be particularly compelling. If it is                           
adequately recognised, a society’s moral obligation to ensure that no person is victim of                           
abuse, neglect, violence or of any other harm that impinges on their liberty (or its                             
regular development) could have a far-reaching impact on that society’s mental health.   
 
However, there are some limitations to the capacity of libertarianism to                     
account fully for particular kinds of human - negative - rights violations that should not                             
be understated. Additionally, these particular kinds of violation could be argued to be                         
amongst the most urgent and prevalent ones of this era. They are those which,                           
grounded in the privatisation and globalisation of commerce, security, healthcare, etc.                     
cannot be imputed directly to identifiable culprits - those which are systemic, ingrained,                         
and diffuse at the same time. Here, the failure of libertarianism lies in its incapacity to                               
recognise such harms as ‘genuine human rights claims’ (Ashford, 2006, p.218): ‘in this                         
kind of case, few or none of the agents who contribute to the causal chain can be                                 
singled out as responsible for the serious harm suffered by any particular victim and so                             
be identified as the perpetrator of any particular human right violation’ (Ashford, 2006,                         
p.218). In view of the role that experiences of discrimination and racism are said to play                               
in the development of mental health issues , this limitation could be very problematic                         18
indeed. 
18 I will come back to the role that experiences of discrimination and racism may have on the                                   
development of mental illnesses in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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 One could argue, additionally, that the protection of people’s autonomy and                     
agency can only be meaningful if one already lives in conditions that are sufficiently                           
prosperous. A person who is deprived of the most basic necessities might only see their                             
right to choose their own goals for themselves and their right not to be interfered with                               
as a sorry consolation prize but, more than that, as an unreachable daydream.                         
‘Irrelevant’ is the term used by Griffin to designate such rights: he illustrates his point                             
by calling attention to the carelessness of a ruler who, respectful of his people’s                           
autonomy and self-determination, institutes votes for important decisions despite the                   
fact that most are certainly too poor to make the necessary trip, or are illiterate and                               
unable to read the ballots (Griffin, 2000, p.42).   
 
Vulnerability, in that sense, is often defined as a condition which makes it                         
more likely that one will be unable (presently or in the future) to enjoy fully the                               
exercise of one’s freedom and autonomy . Thus, while one’s vulnerabilities might                     19
encompass a lot more than a lack of access to basic necessities, and therefore might be                               
satisfactorily addressed by the protection of one’s liberty, an account of deontology that                         
endorses the existence of welfare rights might prove to be a more convincing response                           
to vulnerability. 
 
2. Special Duties and Welfare Rights: Positive Moral               
Responsibilities in Regard to Vulnerabilities 
Plenty of philosophers have questioned the moral significance of the                   
distinction drawn by non-consequentialist libertarians between negative and positive                 
duties. Norcross, who is one of them, has formulated the issue around the notions of                             
actively harming (the immoral transgression of a negatively formulated constraint) and                     
simply allowing/failing to prevent (an acceptable refusal to go beyond one’s negative                       
19 Although Chapter 5 is focused on more complex conceptualisations and definitions of                         
vulnerability, a common feature of these various accounts is the difficulty to withstand the impact of                               
adverse events or situations to which vulnerable individuals or groups can be exposed. While ethicists of                               
care insist on the recognition of positive aspects of vulnerability, they do not deny the existence of this                                   
facet. 
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duties). For example, the difference between killing and letting die: is there really a                           
moral distinction so great between these two types of behaviour, which both lead to                           
identical situations, that one of them should be allowed, while the other strictly                         
forbidden? Depending on the answer to that question, the moral demandingness of                       
vulnerability is to be perceived as more or less stringent: ‘if there is no morally                             
significant difference between killing and letting die in particular, and between doing                       
and allowing in general, it is that much harder to justify our neglect of the                             
underprivileged, both in our own country and abroad’ (Norcross, 2009, p.95). 
 
Griffin defends a specific account of personhood related to human rights, in                       
which he interprets human rights as ‘protections of agency’. As such, he does take note                             
of dominant accounts of human rights, i.e. negatively formulated liberty rights, though                       
he attempts to widen their scope in order to incorporate a requirement of necessary                           
minimum material provisions - in other words, welfare rights of some degree and of a                             
definite range (Griffin, 2000, p.29): ‘whereas autonomy and liberty are  constituents of                       
personhood, minimum provision is only a necessary  condition of it’ (Griffin, 2000, p.31).   
 
As seen previously, the burden of providing clear guidance regarding the                     
relationship between claimants of rights and the corresponding bearers of obligations                     
tends to be borne more forthrightly and more simply by non-consequentialist                     
libertarians than by defenders of welfare rights. Indeed, negative obligations are                     
purported to be universal, and thus rightfully and evenly distributed. This cannot be                         
the case for the obligations that correspond to the exercise of welfare rights: two kinds                             
of problems would immediately be opposed to a conceptualisation of welfare rights as                         
being held against all others. These two issues have been formulated by Wellman as the                             
‘problem of scarce resources’ and the ‘problem of pointless duplication’ (Wellman,                     
1982, p.163). The problem of scarce resources arises from the moment when the                         
demands imposed on each vastly exceed available resources: these demands                   
subsequently cannot be recognised a genuine moral claims. As for the problem of                         
pointless duplication, it is aptly titled: ‘if every person, private organisation, and state                         
government acted simultaneously to sustain the life of any individual claimant, their                       
actions would largely duplicate one another’ (Wellman, 1982, p.163). Obligations                   
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corresponding to welfare rights must therefore be distributed to specific agents in order                         
to overcome these issues. Welfare rights could potentially be more convincing if they                         
were seen as  legal rights rather than  human ones, as the latter should, arguably, be                             
universally recognised.   
 
Griffin refuses to see these problems as conclusive, instead embracing fully the                       
complexity of our moral life and the necessity to incorporate very practical                       
considerations into our moral reasoning: commitments that are made to particular                     
persons, being in a position to help when others are not, etc. (Griffin, 2000, p.32). To                               
him, these elements actually provide rational ways to distribute the burdens of helping                         
in a just manner; and once these obligations are assigned to specific agents according to                             
such practical considerations, ‘the problems of scarce resources and of senseless                     
duplication no longer arise - that is, they are no greater than in fact we have them                                 
today’ (Griffin, 2000, p.32). Grounded in human nature as the necessary condition for                         
autonomy and liberty, the minimum provision of welfare would belong to the realm of                           
human rights before it does that of legal ones. A similar line of reasoning is followed by                                 
Griffin in response to accusations of indeterminacy (indeed, how would one be able to                           
define the ‘minimum’ provision necessary for the exercise of autonomy and liberty?).                       
‘Messy practical considerations’ are once again a decisive element in elaborating an                       
applicable definition for relevant contexts: ‘determinacy that comes only having                   
consulted prevailing circumstances is not indeterminacy’ (Griffin, 2000, p.35).   
 
Griffin is not isolated in these considerations: the arguments of the defenders                       
of welfare rights or other positive rights range from contemporary Kantian ethics to                         
contractarianism: ‘each destitute individual has a corresponding claim against each of                     
the affluent agents who are failing to do their fair share, and all such agents share                               
responsibility for violations of the welfare right’ (Ashford, 2006, p.222). Their accounts                       
are not too far removed from the one I believe to be the most applicable to the case of                                     
pre-emptive psychiatry, as will be shown in the next chapter of this dissertation. 
 
 
136 
3. O’Neill’s Account of Deontic Virtues 
One deontological account has been deemed of particular significance in this                     
attempt to understand better the moral significance of vulnerability in                   
non-consequentialist theories. O’Neill’s elaboration of a constructivist account of                 
practical reason and of moral obligations is an effort towards the reconciliation of                         
justice (which generates perfect negative duties) and virtue (which allows for the                       
inclusion of imperfect duties of beneficence), under the umbrella of inclusive                     
universalism.   
 
At the start of her book  Towards Justice and Virtue : a Constructive Account of                             
Practical Reasoning , O’Neill outlines the question that underlies her work on this topic:                         
‘if the foundations for an inclusively universalist conception of justice were available,                       
why should they not also serve to ground an inclusively universal account of the                           
virtues?’ (O’Neill, 1996, p.30). Indeed, O’Neill’s aim is, amongst others, to refute the                         
association often made between particularist visions of morality, and the idea of virtue -                           
an association which, according to her, unjustifiably dominates all current discussions                     
of virtue. O’Neill is firm in her aversion to particularism, especially when it is presented                             
as an account of morality that is sufficient to cover the full scope of our moral lives:                                 
‘actual norms and traditions, actual preferences, attachments, and commitments can                   
indeed guide action: but why should we conclude that they guide it virtuously?’ (O’Neill,                           
1996, p.36).   
 
Reluctant to consider theories which rely fundamentally on the ‘discovery’ of                     
existing ethical principles, O’Neill instead proposes to construct ethical principles based                     
on widely accepted and basic starting points. The account of practical reasoning that                         
she outlines aims to provide solid enough grounds for the launch of her project. In                             
answer to particularist criticisms of idealised accounts of ‘rationality, of mutual                     
disinterestedness, of impartiality, of autonomy, and of the person’ which are too often                         
assumed by fellow universalists without being sufficiently vindicated (O’Neill, 1996,                   
p.42), O’Neill delineates two essential criteria for her account of practical reasoning: in                         
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order for it to be ‘followable’ by all concerned, it must be both intelligible and                             20
action-guiding (O’Neill, 1996, p.57). She makes a point to construct reasoning ‘with all                         
possible solidity from  available  beginnings, using  available and  followable methods to                     
reach  attainable and  sustainable conclusions for relevant audiences’ (O’Neill, 1996, p.63).   
 
This is the first way in which O’Neill specifically, and openly, considers                       
vulnerability - not simply in the elaboration of the obligations to which it might give                             
rise, but also as a necessary component of the premises needed for a solid account of                               
practical reasoning. She follows Sen and Nussbaum’s distinction between individual                   
capacities and socially-informed capabilities and functionings: ‘here and hereafter I                   
follow Amartya Sen in distinguishing individual capacities (eg. traits of character,                     
talents, physical abilities) from socially effective capabilities, whose exercise relies on                     
effective institutional structures as well as individual capacities. I shall also generally                       
speak of absent capabilities as vulnerabilities’ (O’Neill, 1996, p.41). The next chapter                       
will highlight how much I believe such accounts of vulnerability and of related morally                           
appropriate responses to be highly pertinent in the case of pre-emptive psychiatry. 
 
After recognising how important it is to acknowledge moral agents’ potential                     
limitations and vulnerabilities in her account of practical reasoning, O’Neill makes a                       
point of defining the moral scope of our actions in such a way that even the most                                 
vulnerable or remote people are duly considered. Her defence of inclusive universality                       
is based on a short list of necessary assumptions for anyone’s actions. Asserting that                           
abstractions from culturally specific and locally intelligible act-descriptions can remain                   
intelligible to those from whose daily ‘thick’ descriptions it abstracts (O’Neill, 1996,                       
p.68), O’Neill outlines three assumptions which structure human activity, and therefore                     
allow for the definition of the moral scope of a decision or action: these are the                               
assumptions of  plurality ,  connection and  initude (O’Neill, 1996, pp.100-101). More                   
particularly, insisting on  initude is a way for O’Neill to highlight the existence of a                             
tendency to exaggerate others’ capacities and capabilities, leading to ‘corresponding                   
denials of their vulnerabilities’ (O’Neill, 1996, p.109). This might be interpreted as a                         
slight rebuke against libertarianism, which is often accused of doing just so: indeed,                         
20 I am borrowing O’Neill’s own formulation. 
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libertarianism could be said to be most suited to an idealised world in which all start                               
with equal capacities, capabilities, and opportunities. 
 
A major feature of O’Neill’s work in deontology is her primary focus on                         
obligations as opposed to rights, and on agents as opposed to recipients. While she                           
agrees with libertarians’ arguments regarding the preponderance of negatively                 
formulated rights over positive ones, this leads her not to recognise solely the former                           
(as they do), but to shift deontic focus from the idea of rights to that of obligations. If                                   
one were to accept that the scope of obligations exceeds greatly the scope of identifiable                             
right-owners, the possibility to defend positive obligations without corresponding                 
recipients would then become acceptable - which is exactly what O’Neill aims to do: 
 
Practical reasoning that assigns priority to rights and to                 
recipience rather than to obligation and to action is an                   
unnecessary and damaging, if distinctive, feature of             
contemporary writing on ethics. Its predominance in             
universalist writing is a major reason why justice and virtue                   
have come to be seen as competing rather than complementary                   
orientations to life. For once rights rather than obligations are                   
treated as the basic deontic category, both obligations which                 
lack corresponding rights unless institutions are built, and those                 
which lack corresponding rights altogether are quite simply               
hidden from view (O’Neill, 1996, p.140). 
 
In order to acknowledge the distinction between negatively formulated                 
obligations with corresponding negative rights, and positive obligations that lack                   
specific recipients - all without denying any of them their status as  moral obligations -                             
O’Neill adopts the traditional Kantian terms of  perfect obligations and  imperfect obligations                       
(O’Neill, 1996, p.145): ‘ Perfect obligations (if there are any) can hold only between                         
identifiable obligation-bearers and identifiable right-holders.  Imperfect obligations (if               
there are any) will belong to identifiable obligation-bearers, but there will be no                         
corresponding right-holders’ (O’Neill, 1996, p.147). Universal or selective prevention                 
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efforts might be justified by this kind of reasoning: a society could have an imperfect                             
obligation to implement preventive measures or make available an array of resources to                         
vulnerable individuals. 
 
The specification of O’Neill’s principles of action is based on the criteria of                         
universalisation, as with most deontic theories. In accordance with                 
non-consequentialist libertarian accounts, forbidding harm is a central requirement for                   
perfect duties. If one’s actions were to injure foreseeably the capacities and capabilities                         
of another, their universalisability would immediately become a moot point, thus                     
leading to the perfect duty not to injure (O’Neill, 1996, p.164). Here, similar points to                             
the ones laid out in the sub-section dedicated to libertarian accounts of negative duties                           
can be raised: a perfect duty not to injure offers an analogous level of consideration for                               
vulnerabilities to that of negatively formulated rights. Once again, the level of                       
consideration and protection at play are not insignificant if one is to interpret the                           
obligation not to injure in a strict manner. O’Neill’s insistence on outlining the ways in                             
which we are all becoming ‘more  deeply ,  variably and  selectively  vulnerable to the action                           
of the particular others and the particular institutions on whom we come to depend for                             
specific and often for unavoidable purposes’ is an illustration of this (O’Neill, 1996,                         
p.192). 
 
But O’Neill goes further, and follows a similar line of reasoning to Griffin’s                         
when she claims that ‘the most just system for given conditions will have to do better                               
than others in reliably sustaining capacities and capabilities for action, so limiting                       
vulnerabilities, in those conditions’ (O’Neill, 1996, p.170): 
 
Human vulnerabilities are not only  characteristic and  persistent               
(so to speak,  species vulnerabilities ), but  variable and  selective . Just                   
institutions can aim to avert and mitigate many of the injuries                     
to which characteristic and persistent vulnerabilities lay people               
open, but cannot generally avert or mitigate activity that                 
exploits individuals’ more variable and selective vulnerability             
(O’Neill, 1996, pp.191-192). 
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 The distinction she makes between direct injury and indirect injury also allows                       
her to include complex networks of causal chains in her reflections, in a way that might                               
be interpreted as a possible answer to Ashford’s criticisms against her account. As                         
mentioned earlier on, Ashford raised concerns over the case of multiplicative, negative                       
harms - or harms regarding which it would be very difficult to single out clearly                             
identifiable perpetrators. If the existence of such harms is to be recognised, then -                           
according to Ashford - O’Neill would have to admit that ‘the distinction between                         
perfect and imperfect duties does not map onto the distinction between negative and                         
positive duties’, and it would follow from a refusal to do so that ‘claims against many of                                 
the most prevalent and serious contemporary harms are not genuine human rights’                       
(Ashford, 2006, p.233).   
 
Multiplicative harms are indeed these harms which are the result of a                       
multitude of contributing causal factors, each brought about by a different agent and                         
which would not, on their own, lead to any significant harm. Ashford relies on the                             
example of a group of unwitting torturers to illustrate her point: if each torturer is only                               
responsible for inflicting a slightly biting sensation, unaware that it is replicated by                         
several others, while the combination of all these acts becomes excruciatingly painful to                         
their victim, would one be able to condemn any of these perpetrators? This shows, still                             
according to Ashford, that ‘it is not plausible to claim that serious harms can only count                               
as human rights violations if we can identify the perpetrators of these violations, that is,                             
the agent or agents specifically responsible for the serious harms particular victims have                         
suffered’ (Ashford, 2006, p.228). And, following this, if the identification of the agents                         
responsible for the coming-about of multiplicative harms is not constitutive of the                       
recognition of such harms as human rights violations, then O’Neill’s distinction                     
between perfect and imperfect duties becomes less relevant. Being deprived of a secure                         
access to basic necessities may constitute a human rights’ violation on the same level as                             
the violation of a negative right which is not imputable to any identifiable perpetrator                           
(Ashford, 2006, p.226).   
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However, one could argue that O’Neill’s account does consider a very wide                       
array of injuries, from specific, direct ones to indirect ones, including damage to the                           
social fabric or the natural world, in a way that does condemn the agents responsible                             
even for multiplicative harms:   
 
Injustice can also arise from injury that is inflicted indirectly                   
through damage to the social fabric or the natural world. Much                     
action that damages the social fabric does so by direct injury to                       
individuals: the effects of violence and hostility, of terror and                   
intimidation spread from individuals to the institutions and               
practices amid which those individuals live. However, other               
sorts of injury work indirectly by way of destroying or                   
damaging the social fabric, and in particular the trust which                   
connects and sustains lives, relationships and communities, or               
by way of destroying or damaging the natural and man-made                   
environments which are the material basis of lives and action                   
(O’Neill, 1996, p.174). 
 
If one were to grant Ashford’s point, though, it might still be possible to argue that,                               
while O’Neill fails to recognise some harms as human rights violations, she does                         
condemn the transgressions of each perpetrator without fail: the fact that she shifts                         
deontic focus from rights to obligations allows her to do so. Both perfect and imperfect                             
duties are required of all agents, even if imperfect ones cannot be claimed as a matter of                                 
right (O’Neill, 1996, p.190). In that sense, I argue that O’Neill’s account of deontic                           
obligations is one of the most successful attempts of non-consequentialist theories to                       
account for the existence of vulnerability, and to recognise the moral impetus to which                           
it gives rise. 
 
O’Neill’s account of deontic virtue as an imperfect obligation has led her to                         
respond to a recurrent criticism levelled against universalist accounts of justice from                       
particularists (communitarians, but also care ethicists) - a criticism that has already                       
been mentioned here on several occasions: the incapacity of these universalist theories                       
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to accommodate the interconnectedness, interdependence and vulnerability that link                 
people together.   
 
Universal duties of virtue, in O’Neill’s account, do allow for the consideration                       
of ‘the  speciic ways in which  speciic sorts of vulnerability are created and heightened by                             
speciic connections’ (O’Neill, 1996, p.193). As such, while she recognises the necessity                       
to reject ideals of autonomy, independence and rationality (in line with virtue ethicists                         
and care ethicists), O’Neill also discounts the idea that abstraction or universal                       
principles should therefore be set aside, or that they necessarily commit to such                         
idealised images of the autonomous agent. On the contrary, it is still based on the                             
criteria of universalisation that O’Neill discredits any principle which relies on                     
indifference or the neglect of others, leading to positive obligations in the form of                           
virtues towards at least  some others (O’Neill, 1996, p.193).   
 
Indeed, O’Neill once again rejoins Griffin’s practical considerations at this                   
point, claiming that, while indifference and neglect cannot be universalised and must                       
therefore be rejected in the form of a positive virtue of caring, it remains impossible to                               
construct a universal and perfect duty of care: ‘those who reject indifference must                         
rather take  some  care to sustain  some others in  some ways; they must seek to support                               
some others by sustaining at least  some of their capacities and capabilities, their plans                           
and their projects, where and how they can’ (O’Neill, 1996, p.195). Here again, direct                           
and indirect forms of action must be considered, in the sense that one can care directly                               
for specific individuals, or care indirectly for shared social worlds or for shared natural                           
and manmade environments (O’Neill, 1996, p.200). 
 
A particular chart of one’s obligations is thus drawn by O’Neill. It is one which                             
recognises perfect obligations of justice in the form of a universal rejection of injury, be                             
it direct or indirect (and thus accounting for more systemic ways in which such                           
obligations can be transgressed, including systematic or gratuitous deceit, incitement to                     
hatred, damage to natural or man-made environments, etc); and obligations of virtue in                         
the form of a rejection of indifference and neglect - once again directly and indirectly                             
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(thus accounting for duties of beneficence, love, care, support for social life and culture,                           
social reform etc.) (O’Neill, 1996, p.205).   
 
One can therefore say that deontic accounts of morality generally recognise the                       
moral significance of vulnerability, the importance of its adequate recognition and of                       
the responses it must engage. O’Neill’s own work, largely based on Kantian reasoning,                         
provides an in-depth analysis of the necessity to provide an adequate moral answer to                           
the existence of vulnerability. Even if one is to grant the libertarian idea that negatively                             
formulated rights are the only ones that can be solidly grounded in universal                         
obligations, current efforts to justify the existence of obligations of virtue - or even of                             
welfare rights - are a demonstration that simply abstaining from harming others is not                           
seen to be a sufficient response to the recognition of others’ vulnerability. 
 
III. CONSEQUENTIALISM 
In contrast with rights-based accounts of morality - especially when welfare                     
rights become an integral part of such accounts - consequentialist theories are rarely                         
seen as an effective or an adequate line of defence for the protection, or the promotion,                               
of vulnerable people’s capacity to deal with risk.   
 
This state of affairs is arguably due to a series of recurrent criticisms which are                             
often levelled against consequentialism, and which have had a tendency to stick to it                           
like glue: namely, the accusation of promoting the ‘tyranny of the majority’, and the                           
incapacity to ground basic rights for each individual securely enough. Indeed, one                       
might say that the principle of maximisation, by not recognising the separateness of                         
persons, does not lend itself to the consideration and the protection of individuals who                           
are particularly vulnerable to multiple others or to a system benefitting many to the                           
expense of some; and this claim will be considered more thoroughly later on. Similarly,                           
rights are not as strongly embedded in consequentialist theories (or, more specifically,                       
in utilitarianism) as they can be in other moral theories: mostly, they tend to remain a                               
useful mean to a maximising end.   
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 Nonetheless, at the core of consequentialist and utilitarian accounts remain                   
principles which are profoundly entrenched in the ideas of well-being and equal respect                         
for all, be it with regards to preference satisfaction, welfare or pleasure. It is therefore                             
argued in the upcoming subsection that protection from harm does occupy a                       21
preeminent place in consequentialist thinking - a quality that is made all the more                           
notable by Goodin’s substantive work on the notions of both vulnerability, and the                         
moral responsibilities that arise from it. Goodin’s contributions on the topic paved the                         
ground for subsequent works regarding vulnerability theory and, although his openly                     
consequentialist line of reasoning was later often discarded, it still highlighted                     
persuasively consequentialism’s capacity to recognise and react to the existence of                     
vulnerability. 
1. Consequentialism: Between Over-Demandingness       
and Impotence 
The philosophical debates that engage with consequentialism have been                 
particularly rich in whimsical and staggeringly tragic thought-experiments, full of                   
unstoppable trolleys and maimed innocent victims. Not that such exercises cannot                     
effectively emphasise the most salient points of relevant arguments and                   
counter-arguments but, in the case at hand, I believe it is more pertinent to focus on a                                 
more realistic (if slightly simplified) case.   
 
I will thus consider the array of consequentialist and utilitarian reactions to                       
vulnerability through the scope of one particular example: many companies now                     
outsource the production of their merchandise to countries in which labour forces are                         
considerably less costly, in great part because local labour codes are not as stringent or                             
21 ‘Protection from harm’ is a controversial formulation in this context: the scope of morally                             
adequate responses to the recognition of vulnerability spans wider than this rather limited perspective, or                             
even see it discounted as unforgivably paternalistic. Similarly, the definition of vulnerability might go                           
beyond simple exposition to harm, as will be seen later. Chapter 5 is dedicated to a more thorough                                   
analysis of the moral responsibilities that arise from the recognition of vulnerability in oneself and in                               
others. At this point, though, ‘protection from harm’ remains the most common and widely accepted                             
answer when confronting the existence of vulnerability. 
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demanding as those of most developed countries, affording their workers fewer                     
protections. This allows these companies to sell their products back in their home                         
countries in a way that directly reflects the inexpensiveness of their labour force. ‘Fast                           
fashion’  retailers or the technology industries, for example, as well as consumers, have                         22
greatly benefited from this globalised system. In contrast, those who manufacture these                       
products have often been subjected to exploitative working conditions. While, up until                       
a few years ago, companies and consumers alike could potentially claim genuine                       
ignorance of suppliers’ and subcontractors’ exploitative practices, a series of scandals                     
has since then dragged them to the fore. The fashion retailer Gap, for example, has                             
faced a succession of discrediting charges: in 1995, young female workers from El                         
Salvador, some of them underage and paid under 60 cents an hour, denounced ‘brutal                           
working conditions’ (Silverstein, 1995); in 2000, the BBC revealed in a documentary                       
that Gap was linked to a factory in Cambodia using child labour and breaking their own                               
anti-sweatshop rules (Kenyon, 2000); seven years later,  The Guardian exposed Gap’s                     
reliance on child labour once again, this time in New Delhi, India (McDougall, 2007); in                             
2010, at least 27 workers died in Bangladesh when their manufacturing plant, which                         
supplied clothing for Gap, burnt down, in great part due to poor fire safety (Hamaadi,                             
Taylor, 2010); two years after this, Al Jazeera unveiled in a documentary Gap’s                         
continuing problems with regards to both workers’ safety and child labour (Kamat,                       
2013). Despite the company’s publicised desire to avoid the use of unreliable                       
subcontractors, as well as the substantial improvements it made with regards to its                         
oversight and safety regulations, Gap (like many other companies outsourcing their                     
production) keeps being confronted to its own failures in this domain. At some point,                           
one might argue that, with each new disclosure, the right to claim ignorance and                           
blamelessness has been lost: the human cost of cheaply made products is all too blatant,                             
be it in terms of lives lost, physical afflictions and mental suffering. In such a case, the                                 
suffering of the few for the benefit of the many seems to be, if not openly accepted, at                                   
22 Fast fashion retailers aim to optimise the rapidity of their production chain, from design to                               
accessibility in stores: ‘fast fashion requires short development cycles, rapid prototyping, small batches                         
and variety so that customers are offered the latest designs in limited quantities that ensure a sort of                                   
exclusivity’ (Tokatli, 2008, p.23): their aim is a ‘highly responsive supply chain’ so that consumers have                               
access to lines of clothing at a lower price, which are also very frequently renewed. 
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least tolerated (be it through legislative deficiencies, lack of effective prevention, or                       
spending habits). 
 
Prima facie, one might think that a consequentialist - and,  a fortiori , a                         
utilitarian - would be hard pressed to provide strong moral protections to these                         
vulnerable workers. Indeed, if the accusations mentioned earlier (the tyranny of the                       
majority, and the incapacity to ground basic rights for each individual solidly enough)                         
were to be acknowledged as both warranted and genuinely threatening, the benefits                       
reaped from current business models might very well trump the harms caused by                         
severely exploitative practices. Although these accusations have rarely made any overt                     
mention of the idea of vulnerability specifically, the notion can be argued (as is the case                               
here) to have been implicitly present throughout the debates that have engaged with                         
them: its filigreed influence will be highlighted on several occasions. Having struggled                       
with such criticisms almost since its first developments, utilitarianism has developed                     23
an array of responses - and so the central question becomes: can utilitarianism respond                           
adequately to the existence and the recognition of vulnerability, or does it fail to                           
acknowledge its moral significance?   
 
The ‘separateness of persons’ charge has typically been a thorn in the side of                           
many utilitarians. Formulated by Vallentyne, it goes - very succinctly - as follows:   
 
[I]ndividuals have certain rights that may not be infringed                 
simply because the consequences are better. Unlike prudential               
rationality, morality involves many distinct centers of will               
(choice) or interests, and these cannot simply be lumped                 
together and traded off against each other. 
The basic problem with standard versions of core               
consequentialism is that they fail to recognize adequately the                 
normative separateness of persons (Vallentyne, 2006, p.29). 
23 Utilitarianism will be the main focus of this subsection: while other consequentialist                         
branches of moral philosophy have been confronted to similar issues (and have led to the development of                                 
pertinent lines of reflection in response to them), utilitarianism in particular remains central in this                             
demonstration.   
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 If seen through the scope of the example outlined above, the ‘separateness of persons’                           
charge appears to underline utilitarianism’s failure to recognise adequately the exploited                     
workers’ plight: even if global utility were to be maximised through current business                         
practices, these workers would not reap the benefits of this calculus in any significant                           
way. Their suffering would not be alleviated at all by a multitude of others’ interests or                               
preferences being satisfied. According to the proponents of this charge, utilitarianism                     
commits the unforgivable mistake of aggregating what is inherently self-contained and                     
distinct: peoples’ welfare - or their interests. Thus, not only unsuccessful in protecting                         
vulnerable persons so long as the maximisation of utility does not advocate it,                         
utilitarianism might actually amplify their vulnerability by sacrificing their vital                   
interests for the sake of utility. 
 
A response to this accusation has been developed by Scarre, and appeals to the                           
value of self-respect. The example selected here can be seen as particularly challenging,                         
in the sense that many people, nowadays, do consider this sacrifice of the crucial                           
interests of some for the sake of others’ benefit acceptable. In this sense, and since                             
‘self-respect is plausibly seen both as a necessary condition for happiness, and as a major                             
source of it’ (Scarre, 1996, p.156), the insistence on the potential (and deeply damaging)                           
loss of one’s self-respect when one causes great harm to others offers an interesting                           
perspective on this issue: 
 
If one fails to respect humanity in other persons, by refusing to                       
treat them as ends in themselves, one loses the basis for                     
respecting one’s own humanity and seeing oneself as an end.                   
One cannot disvalue other human beings without implicitly               
disvaluing oneself, making the growth of self-respect             
impossible (Scarre, 1996, p.158). 
 
This response provides a convincing line of defence against the accusation that                       
utilitarianism is susceptible to justify harmful actions, though it does not address the                         
question of vulnerability specifically. 
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 Norcross’ own response to this often reiterated criticism is also unequivocal:                     
‘the separateness of persons objection poses no special threat to consequentialism’                     
(Norcross, 2009, p.76). His reasoning points to what he considers a problematic                       
inconsistency. On the premise that the best attempts to formulate such deontic                       
constraints on aggregation must appeal to rights, there is no convincing way, according                         
to Norcross, to acknowledge the existence of rights that might trump overall utility, all                           
the while rejecting corresponding rights that would be in favour of promoting utility                         
(Norcross, 2009, p.89). The distinction between negative rights and positive rights is                       
indeed closely related to that between the doing and allowing distinction that Norcross                         
rejects: if one has a duty not to actively harm a worker who is in a situation of                                   
vulnerability, one therefore also has the duty to ensure that this worker is not                           
exploited, which is more likely to require positive action. Such distinctions are already -                           
as was seen in the previous subsection - at the heart of deontic reflections regarding                             
vulnerability, and are thus once again deemed crucial in the consequentialist case.                       
Going back to the example at hand, though, this also means that any consideration of                             
the exploited workers’ positive rights must be counterbalanced by the                   
acknowledgement that the rights of consumers to have access to affordable clothing, for                         
instance, might actually need to be prioritised for the sake of maximisation (here, the                           
more instrumental nature of rights in a consequentialist framework is made evident).   
 
Once again, it is not within the realm of this project to determine whether or                             
not Norcross is right in rejecting the distinction between doing and allowing, and thus                           
the separateness of persons charge; the primary aim, in this instance, is to demonstrate                           
that consequentialism in general - and utilitarianism more specifically - does address                       
the question of vulnerability within its moral framework.   
 
Norcross’ commitment to what Sen calls ‘outcome utilitarianism’ (Sen, 1979),                   
with its normative implications, appears to be an outright concession that the                       
separateness of persons, or the protection of ‘inalienable rights’, cannot (and must not)                         
impose limits on aggregation. One might think that this is equivalent to admitting that                           
the existence and the recognition of particular vulnerabilities are not to play any                         
 
149 
determinant role in utilitarian lines of thinking. Nonetheless, Norcross reaches a                     
conclusion that appears more in line with the utilitarian line of thinking developed by                           
Singer. Both are convinced that this means, on the contrary, that utilitarianism is                         
particularly ambitious with regards to our moral duties to vulnerable individuals and                       
populations, even supposing that this opens the door to the over-demandingness                     
charge that has often been the counterpart of the separateness of persons charge.   
 
Indeed, just as debates surrounding welfare rights in deontic morality have                     
shown, the acknowledgement that positive rights ought to be recognised just as                       
negative ones are has far-reaching implications for Norcross: it would make it                       
considerably harder to ‘justify our neglect of the underprivileged, both in our country                         
and abroad’ (Norcross, 2009, p.95). Wealthier consumers might then have the duty to                         
change their spending habits, or pressure fast-fashion retailers into better-controlled                   
dealings with their subcontractors. In this sense, Norcross and Singer’s demanding                     
account of our moral responsibilities towards vulnerable others can be interpreted as                       
the demonstration that consequentialism is indeed not completely unequipped to deal                     
with the moral demands that arise from the recognition of vulnerability.   
 
One reason why the trend towards allowing current business practices to                     
remain unchanged (which was outlined in the first brief consideration of the example at                           
hand) might be reversed in this way can be explained as follows: utilitarians claim to                             
have at their disposal a series of ways in which to condition the aggregative process so                               
as to account for the severity or the urgency of specific needs. Singer’s reference to the                               
point of marginal utility in his famous essay ‘Famine, Affluence and Morality’ offers one                           
rather clear-cut method through which one can aim to demonstrate that the obligations                         
that arise from great suffering are rather considerable themselves. Only the loss of                         
something which is of comparable moral importance to the needs of another person                         
could put an end to the moral obligations one has towards him or her (Singer, 1972,                               
p.231). This is where utilitarianism is argued to fall into the trap of                         
over-demandingness.   
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Many consider the point of marginal utility to be a psychologically unrealistic,                       
or even a morally objectionable end: by excluding the possibility of supererogatory                       
actions, utilitarianism supposedly transforms moral subjects into inhuman calculating                 
machines deprived of any moral autonomy. The accusation is harsh, but Singer’s                       
rigorist view is not so widely accepted, even amongst utilitarians, who often ‘allow that                           
there are limits to the amount of self-sacrifice which can legitimately be expected from                           
individual agents in the name of the general good’ (Scarre, 1996, p.182). Quite often, it                             
is actually through the idea of maximisation that Singer’s opponents attempt to inflect                         
his position, arguing in one way or another that giving individuals the opportunity to                           
pursue their own goals and to flourish is a better way to promote utility. Nonetheless,                             
Singer’s mention of the Bangladesh Liberation War refugees to illustrate his claim                       
offers a convincing substantiation for his argument: even a relatively small amount of                         
money donated could have far-reaching and rather straightforward consequences on                   
the lives of many.   
 
But, over-demandingness notwithstanding, the example selected here             
highlights the existence of a few further complications. If the aim is to apply Singer’s                             
argument to the case at hand, it would be possible to point out that - on an individual                                   
scale - most consumers are very probably in a position to sacrifice more of their income                               
than they usually do for the sake of a more respectful production process. However, as                             
Singer himself points out, one cannot count on concerted action in order to determine                           
the scope of one’s moral responsibilities: ideal repartitions of duty have no bearing on                           
situations in which people simply do not fulfill such obligations (Singer, 1972, p.233).                         
And, in the case of exploitative business models, the scope and impact of individual                           
action can be said to be severely limited: only through profound, systemic change could                           
one hope to see the situation of exploited workers changed for the better. If Singer’s                             
reasoning were to be strictly followed, it is possible to point out that, in this case also,                                 
donations could be much more immediately effective than a transformation of one’s                       
spending habits, or a commitment to activism so as to encourage stricter regulations                         
and checks. Would this really provide an adequate answer to exploited workers’                       
vulnerability, though?  
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Regarding actions and moral responsibilities on a wider scale - a scale which                         
could arguably be more suited in this situation - utilitarianism is said once again to be                               
ill-equipped to deal adequately with particularly vulnerable individuals and populations.                   
Rawls, in particular, in  A Theory of Justice , has endeavoured to demonstrate this, and                           
developed his renowned argument in favour of the maximin principle: just social and                         
institutional arrangements should be designed in such a way that the interests of the                           
least advantaged (or the worst-off) individuals are maximised (Rawls, 1973, p.328) .                     24
Rawls’ theory, which is more firmly anchored in political philosophy than in moral                         
philosophy, will not be analysed in much depth throughout this analysis, but it does                           
provide a pertinent counterpoint to utilitarian lines of reasoning on this larger scale.   
 
Some utilitarians, though, such as Harsanyi, readily defend utilitarianism’s                 
capacity to champion successfully welfare-centred approaches, and reject the maximin                   
principle as leading to serious paradoxes (Harsanyi, 1975, p.594). Indeed, Harsanyi                     
deems Rawls’ theory of justice (which is more assertive in its prioritisation of                         
vulnerable individuals and populations than utilitarianism) to be ‘extremely irrational’:                   
the matter is mostly one of probability calculation, in the sense that the maximin                           
principle is said to violate an important continuity requirement when it encourages                       
people in the original position to make their ‘behavior wholly dependent on some                         
highly unlikely unfavorable contingencies  regardless of how little probability you are                     
willing to assign to them ’ (Harsanyi, 1975, p.595). Harsanyi’s utilitarian sensibilities are                       
bothered by what he considers to be an unforgivable transgression of the egalitarian                         
requirement closely associated to utilitarianism: 
 
I feel it is important to resist the solutions [Rawls] proposes for                       
these problems. We should  resist any moral code which would                   
force us to discriminate against the legitimate needs and                 
interests of many individuals merely because they happen to be                   
24 Rawls’ work, despite its substantial focus on the ‘worst-off’ individuals, has been criticised on                             
many occasions by proponents of vulnerability theory and others (including Martha Nussbaum): the                         
severely disabled and other vulnerable people are said to be somewhat excluded from an idealised world                               
in which ‘all citizens are fully cooperating members of a society over a complete life’ (Rawls, as cited by                                     
Richardson, 2006, p.420).   
 
152 
rich, or at least not to be desperately poor; or because they are                         
exceptionally gifted, or at least are not mentally retarded; or                   
because they are healthy, or at least are not incurably sick, etc.                       
(Harsanyi, 1975, p.605). 
 
Utilitarianism thus appears to embrace its commitments to welfare,                 
consequentialism, aggregation and maximisation, be it on an individual scale or a larger                         
one. So how can one argue that utilitarianism responds to vulnerability specifically, and                         
that it recognises its moral significance? It is in the construction of utilitarian - and,                             
more generally, consequentialist - reasoning that one can start to see that vulnerability                         
does indeed play quite a meaningful moral role. A response to vulnerability can even be                             
argued to be inherent to and inbuilt in the structure of consequentialist theories.                         
Goodin is the first author to have made this reliance of consequentialism on the notion                             
of vulnerability explicit - it is even the cornerstone of his theory of moral responsibility. 
 
2. Goodin and the Protection of the Vulnerable 
Admittedly, vulnerability is the most fundamental concept in Goodin’s work,                   
and the consequentialist framework within which it is analysed might be said to be                           
relegated to somewhat of a backdrop. Nonetheless, I would like to argue that Goodin’s                           
primary claim - that vulnerability is what gives rise to moral duties - is entwined with                               
his utilitarian sensibilities in an indissociable manner.   
 
The idea is actually plainly stated on several occasions in his well-known                       
publication,  Protecting the Vulnerable : ‘Anyone starting from those premises will regard                     
the injunction to “protect the vulnerable” as just a special case of the injunction to                             
“maximize utility” (or “maximize distribution-weighted utility” or “maximize the                 
primary goods of the worst-off”)’ (Goodin, 1985, p.14). However, Goodin almost                     
systematically amends such statements by insisting on the compatibility of his                     
vulnerability theory to other moral approaches: ‘although the principle of protecting                     
the vulnerable is fundamentally consequentialistic in form, the sort of consequentialism                     
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it embodies is broadly consistent with all the standard sorts of nonconsequentialist                       
ethics’ (Goodin, 1985, p.114). As will be seen later on, this aspiration towards general                           
consensus is not without its drawbacks. 
 
How, then, are the ideas of utilitarianism and vulnerability so interdependent                     
in Goodin’s work? Utilitarians are primarily concerned with the consequences of their                       
actions and their fundamental aim is - as stated by Goodin - the maximisation of utility.                               
Very succinctly, it is the impact that one’s acts are expected to have on oneself and on                                 
others which determines whether a decision is the right one in a particular set of                             
circumstances, and ‘responsibility thus amounts to being held to account for the                       
consequences of your actions and choices’ (Goodin, 1985, p.113). If a person’s                       
interests/preference satisfaction/welfare are susceptible to be affected by one’s act, it is                       
indeed their vulnerability to oneself that gives rise to moral obligations: ‘analytically,                       
the notion of consequences seems central to the notions both of vulnerability and of                           
responsibility. Vulnerability amounts to one person's having the capacity to produce                     
consequences that matter to another’ (Ibid., p.114). Proceeding from this, Goodin then                       
follows standard lines of utilitarian thinking: in cases of conflict between duties, the                         
responsibility to ‘protect’ a vulnerable person can be overridden if overall utility is                         
maximised by the prioritisation of other moral responsibilities (Goodin, 1985, p.118);                     
and ‘lots of little vulnerabilities and responsibilities can combine to trump some larger                         
ones’ (Ibid., p.119).   
 
Within this utilitarian framework, the distinction between negative and                 
positive duties, or negative and positive rights, loses its pertinence: the line between                         
moral obligations and supererogatory acts is nothing if not blurred in most utilitarian                         
accounts, or even erased altogether in the more uncompromising ones. As such, an                         
individual can be vulnerable both to action and to passivity on the part of those who                               
can influence his or her interests/preference satisfaction/welfare: ‘the duty to protect                     
the vulnerable is a duty to prevent harm from occurring; it is equally compelling                           
whether it requires positive action or refraining from action’ (Goodin, 1985,                     
pp.110-111).   
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As such, if one is to consider vulnerability through the scope of a utilitarian                           
framework - as an integral part of utilitarian lines of reasoning, like Goodin’s - the                             
moral responsibilities that arise from it can quickly spread over a very wide range of                             
preventive actions and behaviours. However, the more precise identification of such                     
duties, and their breadth, heavily depends on how one defines the notoriously plastic                         
notions of interests, preference satisfaction, or welfare. In a bid to make his account of                             
vulnerability accommodating to a variety of moral theories other than utilitarianism,                     
however, Goodin appears reluctant to delve into a deeper analysis of the notion of                           
interests, and leaves it somewhat malleable. He argues that the principle of protecting                         
the vulnerable can retain specific content despite such definitional disparities, so long as                         
one focuses on the idea of ‘vital interests’, or ‘primary goods’: food, clothing, and shelter                             
(Goodin, p.1985, p.111). Protecting the vulnerable is thus, according to Goodin,                     
primarily a matter of ‘protecting those people whose vital interests are particularly                       
vulnerable to our actions and choices’ (Ibid., p.111).   
 
However, the supposedly more restrictive notion of ‘vital interests’ might not                     
be as helpful in the delineation and clarification of one’s responsibilities to vulnerable                         
others as Goodin suggests, in view of its own plasticity and intricacy: arguably, there is                             
no more easy consensus on the definition of ‘vital interests’ or needs than there is about                               
interests or welfare in general. If anything, Goodin’s own - rather Rawlsian -                         
tergiversations on the potential recognition of self-respect and civil liberties as equally                       
indispensable for the pursuit of any other particular end is a demonstration of that. I                             
would argue that Goodin’s account of the duty to protect the vulnerable, like any theory                             
of vulnerability, must rely upon a precise and structured understanding of vulnerable                       
people’s interests/preferences/welfare in order to provide pertinent moral guidance,                 
especially in the case of pre-emptive psychiatry. The forthcoming chapter will address                       
this in more detail, with a particular focus on Rogers, Mackenzie and Dodds’ work on                             
vulnerability, Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, as well as Beauchamp and                   
Childress’ principlist stance. Despite Goodin’s lack of commitment to a comprehensive                     
definition of the notion of interests, though, he does emphasise the necessity to                         
understand it as encompassing more than ‘narrowly material’ features (Goodin, 1985,                     
p.111): emotional needs and responsibilities are evoked frequently in his work.   
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 With this more limited notion of ‘vital interests’, Goodin still attempts to                       
outline a series of moral responsibilities that could be said to arise in response to                             
vulnerability. Before that, however, it is crucial to note that, within the utilitarian                         
structure outlined above, Goodin’s account is first and foremost a relational one: a                         
person or a group can only be vulnerable to another person or group. The origin of a                                 
risk to a person or a group (natural, social, individual, etc.) matters significantly less                           
than the capacity others have to curtail it: ‘one is always vulnerable to particular agents                             
with respect to particular sorts of threats’ (Goodin, 1985, p.112). The presence of one                           
or several agents capable of willingly influencing the course of a situation is seen by                             
Goodin as a necessary implication in situations of vulnerability. If no one has this kind                             
of power, vulnerability ceases to be an appropriate term, given that the absence of such                             
a relationship necessarily gives rise to more fatalistic outcomes: a person is not                         
vulnerable anymore, but condemned. This insistence on the relational aspect of                     
vulnerability has the merit of allowing for a rather clear-cut allocation of duties. By                           
focusing on moral agents’ ‘special ability to help’ even more than on vulnerable people’s                           
needs and interests (Goodin, 1985, p.35), Goodin’s theory allows for an intransigent                       
imposition of duties to both individuals and groups, thus sidestepping the issue met by                           
the holders of positive rights with no clearly-identified responsible ‘dischargers’ of                     
duties:   
 
Saying that “ A needs  X ” might imply that  A should get  X ; but it                           
says nothing about who should be instrumental in  A ’s getting  X .                     
Vulnerability, in contrast, is a relational notion: a full                 
specification will tell us who is vulnerable to whom with                   
respect to what (Goodin, 1985, p.118).   
 
This relational account does not deny the existence of what I will call, for now,                             
‘natural vulnerabilities’ such as those from which at-risk individuals may suffer if they                         25
are genetically predisposed to mental health issues. It highlights, however, the                     
25 These would correspond to the account of inherent vulnerabilities that I will outline in                             
Chapter 5. 
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relational aspects of even these kinds of vulnerabilities: it is because pre-onset early                         
interventions can be seriously envisaged and proved to be effective that at-risk                       
individuals’ vulnerabilities have become more relevant. If absolutely no course of action                       
could be taken to help at-risk individuals, their vulnerabilities would become, according                       
to Goodin, fateful features.   
 
Several considerations can then influence the more precise determination of                   
each agent’s responsibilities, according to Goodin. Two such considerations occupy a                     
preeminent place: on one side, the type and urgency of the vulnerable person(s)’s needs                           
and, on the other, the type and cost of the assistance the morally responsible agent is in                                 
a position to provide (Goodin, 1985, p.165). Goodin remains loyal to the utilitarian                         
assurance that no one’s interests/preferences/welfare matters more than any other’s:                   
geographical, chronological, or emotional distance only carry weight insofar as it can                       
have an impact on how one’s acts of help affect the vulnerable people in question. The                               
equal consideration of everyone’s interests is still at the heart of Goodin’s philosophy. If                           
flexibility is introduced in Goodin’s account, it is arguably in his acknowledgement that                         
geographical, chronological, or emotional distance is likely to diminish the effectiveness                     
of one’s help to distant others: 
 
On balance, persons relatively near to us in space and in time                       
probably  will be rather more vulnerable to us. [...] My analysis                     
would seem to allow (indeed, to require) us, in effect if not in                         
intention, to show  some bias toward our own “kind," however                   
defined (Goodin, 1985, p.121). 
 
As such, the obligations one has towards one’s children (to borrow Goodin’s own                         
example), despite the fact that others might be more suited to the job, have to do with                                 
nonmaterial vulnerabilities: even answers to material needs can become symbols of                     
affection and love (Goodin, 1985, p.83). Furthermore, this also allows Goodin to                       
account for cultural variances in the perception of vulnerability as well as in the moral                             
responses it should engender (Goodin, 1985, p.35), and to recognise the necessity of                         
some cultural boundaries. 
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 Nonetheless, while this might appear to belie the assurance of impartiality                     
characteristic of utilitarianism, Goodin’s account remains morally demanding with                 
regards to a variety of moral agents, both individual and institutional. Because                       
situations of vulnerability are oftentimes collective rather than individual, networks of                     
mutual accountability and the implementation of cooperative arrangements become a                   
precondition for the more general distribution and reception of aid. This explains                       
Goodin’s strong commitment in favour of the welfare state and international assistance                       
strategies: such schemes are an integral part of the acknowledgement that moral (as                         
well as social and political) responsibilities arise from vulnerability:   
 
This is, first and foremost, an argument in favor of the welfare                       
state. That institution is the principal mechanism through               
which we discharge our collective responsibilities to protect our                 
vulnerable compatriots (Goodin, 1985, p.145). 
 
Importantly here, causation is deemed irrelevant in the distribution of moral                     
responsibilities; power is the only thing that matters. Even if a vulnerable person is ‘to                             
blame’ for their situation, those who are in a position to provide necessary assistance                           
have the moral responsibility to do so, even supposing they are simply random and                           
innocent bystanders. Goodin makes a distinction between causal responsibility and                   
moral responsibility. The determination that one has an obligation to provide help to a                           
vulnerable person becomes entirely separate from the question of tort liability: ‘the                       
latter is a question of deciding who should effect a rescue; the former is a question of                                 
who should pay for it’ (Goodin, 1985, p.131). 
 
As will be seen later, however, this purely relational account of vulnerability                       
and all it implies might be too restrictive, both in terms of understanding and in terms                               
of assignment of responsibilities.   
 
It is now possible to go back to the example of exploited workers in the                             
fast-fashion industry in order to consider the concrete implications of Goodin’s                     
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vulnerability theory. The most salient point that can be made concerns the collective                         
vulnerability of these workers, both to corporations themselves and to worldwide                     
consumers. Once again, here, individual action remains considerably limited -                   
especially within a utilitarian framework: personal changes in habits have little impact                       
on the precarious situation in which exploited workers find themselves. It does not                         
provide them with any alternative means to earn sufficient resources to gain in                         
autonomy, nor does it lessen more directly their exposure to exploitative practices.   
 
In that sense, I wish to argue that Goodin’s account of our moral                         
responsibilities towards vulnerable people does support a strong incentive for collective                     
reaction: ‘although distant strangers may be largely invulnerable to each of us, they can                           
be highly vulnerable to  all of us’ (Goodin, 1985, p.138). Contrary to Singer, Goodin                           
embraces the idea of a conjugation of limited individual consequences as crucial if one                           
aims for significant and broad impact. Instead of pointing to this as an apology for                             
laziness and apathy (if others fail to ‘pull their weight’, why even bother trying to                             
improve a situation that is doomed to remain unchanged?), Goodin attempts to                       
highlight the stringency of the collective responsibility that we share. Where Singer                       
chooses to focus on the impact a single individual can have on others’ lives, Goodin                             
selects a radically cooperative approach and openly favours political and societal                     
responses to wide-ranging issues. In support of this view, Goodin insists on the                         
maximisation of relevant data and resources when efforts are pooled together.   
 
However, failure must still be considered as that of each individual comprising                       
the group (Goodin, 1985, p.138), as this underlines the importance of such collective                         
obligations: ‘saying that the responsibility is a collective one does not exempt                       
individuals from responsibility; it merely changes the character of their responsibilities’                     
(Goodin, 1985, p.163). This collaborative approach has several advantages. The first                     
one is that it will mostly favour political and institutional responses to collective                         
vulnerabilities, rather than simply individual acts of help, or even person-to-person aid                       
programmes. Such programmes - especially in the situation considered here - are often                         
accused of providing stopgap answers to issues that have wide-ranging economic, social                       
and political roots, thus doing nothing to address the wider context that engenders                         
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vulnerability in the first place. Exploited workers might very well benefit from being                         
provided with food or any other basic resources through charitable organisations, at                       
least in the short term, but such solutions are a simple bandaid at best, and actively                               
harmful at worst. For example, in the case at hand, it might be argued that it                               
discourages local governmental bodies from reinforcing workers’ rights and security, or                     
exploited workers from demanding better social protections. International trade                 
agreements, Non-Governmental Organisations’ vigilance, legal prosecutions and             
convictions as well as other institutional responses would provide more effective                     
solutions and address more directly the sources of widespread vulnerability. 
 
3. The Limits of Goodin’s Vulnerability Theory 
Despite the considerable advances made by Goodin with regards to the                       
consideration of vulnerability in moral philosophy, there remain a series of problematic                       
assumptions in his work. Some criticisms are levelled against Goodin more regularly                       
than others, but most of them have been iterated by care ethicists. 
 
The first problem I would like to focus on is the lack of challenge to the                               
preexisting distribution of moral responsibilities in Goodin’s account. While the                   
straightforwardness of Goodin’s reasoning for the allocation of duties is appealing in                       
many ways (the sheer existence of a distributive process is already a considerable                         
advantage), it also has problematic drawbacks. With a relational account of                     
vulnerability and the affirmation that those who have the capacity to produce                       
consequences that matter to another are those who bear moral responsibility towards                       
them, Goodin’s account relies (too) heavily on pre-existing relations of dependence. It                       
also leaves very little leeway to highlight the potentially unjust, or even coercive,                         
underpinnings of such relationships: some individuals and groups might find                   
themselves unfairly burdened with responsibilities to vulnerable others, while members                   
of society who have historically been unassociated with caretaking roles remain exempt                       
from many of these responsibilities.   
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For example, women, who are traditionally responsible for children’s and                   
vulnerable family members’ emotional and daily needs, have little ground to argue for a                           
more equitable repartition of responsibilities within Goodin’s framework: children and                   
vulnerable family members have become more vulnerable to them than to the male                         
adults of their families. Goodin himself openly endorses that reliance on pre-existing                       
relationships of dependence: 
 
Here I merely want to say that the existing allocation of                     
responsibilities, whatever its initial basis, should now be treated                 
as a “social fact.” [...] The main alternative to assigning                   
responsibility for protecting the vulnerable to those people to                 
whom they are vulnerable is - to employ a pun that is all too                           
often mistaken for an argument - to assign responsibility to                   
those who are responsible (Goodin, 1985, p.125). 
 
This particular objection is not meant to play a crucial role in this project (the main                               
actors are at-risk individuals, medical professionals, social workers and policymakers),                   
but it is still important to recognise the issue that it raises. It also remains pertinent, to                                 
some extent, in the sense that family members of at-risk individuals are more and more                             
involved in pre-emptive measures and in the control of environmental risk factors,                       
especially through psychoeducation sessions - pre-existing relations of dependence can                   
thus become a relevant factor in the determination and distribution of moral                       
responsibilities.   
 
A second, more problematic issue can now be raised; and it is somewhat                         
kindred to the first one: it, too, is an accusation of complacency with an unsatisfying                             
status-quo. Goodin is so focused on demonstrating that the existence of vulnerability                       
does give rise to undeniable moral responsibilities that little is done in his work to                             
diminish this vulnerability. In order to be fair, one must recognise that Goodin seems at                             
least quite aware of this potential shortcoming, as he himself mentions on several                         
occasions the necessity to promote vulnerable people’s autonomy and freedom from                     
dependence or exploitation. Nonetheless, this reflection is arguably not developed                   
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much further than as a passing consideration. While one might think that Goodin’s                         
inclination for collective and institutional responsibilities could provide an adequate                   
playing field for tackling dependencies or vulnerabilities that are ‘created, shaped, or                       
sustained, at least in part, by existing social arrangements’ (Goodin, 1985, p.191), he                         
actually spends little time challenging what some might consider to be highly unjust                         
forms of vulnerability. The main priority, for him, is the elaboration of a convincing                           
line of argumentation in favour of protecting the vulnerable; it is more about providing                           
incentives and reasons for preventive action than it is about questioning the                       
vulnerabilities in question themselves.   
 
So, Goodin does acknowledge the potentially crucial role that social                   
arrangements can play in the development of various vulnerabilities: 
 
All of this goes to show that any dependency or vulnerability is                       
arguably created, shaped, or sustained, at least in part, by                   
existing social arrangements. None is wholly natural. We can                 
go further still: some of the most important dependencies and                   
vulnerabilities seem to be almost wholly social in character                 
(Goodin, 1985, p.191). 
 
However, if institutional and political responses can easily be envisaged within the                       
framework of Goodin’s account, many forms of vulnerability might need to be analysed                         
and diminished in ways that cut across such rigid boundaries. Here, Goodin’s work                         
remains problematically limited. Exploitation is perceived to be at the core of our                         
‘moral objections to vulnerability and dependency relationships’ (Goodin, 1985, p.193),                   
and it is through mutuality that it can be counterbalanced. If all the parties involved in a                                 
situation are mutually dependent on each other, risks of exploitation supposedly                     
become diminished. But our control - societal or individual - over the development of                           
unjust dependencies and vulnerabilities is often too limited to challenge or prevent                       
them effectively. Many of them, thus, can be seen as ‘genuinely “natural,” inevitable and                           
immutable’ (Ibid., p.203). By readily accepting that some vulnerabilities are                   
unavoidable, the risk might be to create a strong impetus for the protection of the                             
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vulnerable but to neglect how unjustly both responsibilities and vulnerabilities are                     
distributed across a population. 
 
Lastly, a purely relational account of vulnerability might also lead to a certain                         
disregard for personal moral responsibilities. I will not dispute Goodin’s relational                     
account of vulnerability, but I do believe that it should integrate more clearly the idea                             
that vulnerable persons may also bear moral responsibilities in view of their own                         
vulnerabilities. It is, I argue, a shortcoming of Goodin’s account that it does not do so                               
more openly. Even if one grants Goodin’s point that causal responsibility cannot bear                         
much weight on the allocation of moral duties to protect and help, an argument can be                               
made that some forms of vulnerability are not fundamentally ‘bidirectional’: there are                       
preventive measures that can only be undertaken by the vulnerable persons themselves.                       
In the case of pre-emptive psychiatry, while the decisions and actions of policymakers                         
and medical professionals alike are of crucial importance, as is the support of a                           
community or family, at-risk individuals cannot be said to bear no moral                       
responsibilities at all towards the preservation of their own welfare. 
 
If one conclusion is to be drawn from the array of theories outlined in this                             
chapter, it is that conceptualisations of vulnerability engender very specific moral                     
responses. As varied as the ones I have just outlined in this chapter may seem, these                               
theories still contribute substantially to the account of vulnerability (and of the moral                         
responses we ought to bring to it) that I find most useful and applicable to pre-onset                               
early detection and interventions in psychiatry. This chapter has allowed me to                       
highlight the most relevant, convincing or problematic features of these lines of                       
argumentation, and it is now time to incorporate some of these elements into a                           
coherent account tailored to the particular case of pre-emptive psychiatry. While the                       
models of vulnerability proposed within the framework of pre-emptive psychiatry (be                     
it attenuated syndromes or staging models) may be constructed as purely medical, they                         
do have philosophical significance and implications.   
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Chapter 5 - Defining Vulnerability and           
Responding to It 
 
The claim that I outlined in the last chapter - that one has a moral                             
responsibility to answer to vulnerability - cannot be said to be overly ambitious: indeed,                           
it leaves the door open for a wide variety of interpretations and conceptualisations.                         
Vulnerability matters, morally speaking, but what it is exactly and how we should                         
respond to it remains woefully imprecise. The array of theories I evaluated in the last                             
chapter bring forth some of the most salient features of our moral responses to                           
vulnerability, and they will inform the account I defend here in a substantial manner. 
 
At this stage of my argument, vulnerability is often seen as a threat, very                           
simply put, and I have made no further commitment than this thin evaluation                         
(although it is both descriptive and normative). Nevertheless, as useful as an                       
open-ended conceptualisation of vulnerability can be in some circumstances, it is                     
inadequate in this particular case.   
 
I have established earlier that the ethical debate that arose with the                       
development of pre-emptive psychiatry, encased in a wider discussion regarding mental                     
health and biomedicine, has been focused almost exclusively on a few issues, thus                         
mostly disregarding the existence of different models of vulnerability. The reason why                       
these models should be acknowledged as crucial is because they offer sometimes vastly                         
different appreciations of what psychiatric vulnerability is, just like they can have vastly                         
different implications regarding the interventions made available to at-risk individuals.                   
In order to encourage a constructive conversation about the ethics of pre-emptive                       
psychiatry, I thus need clear and practical answers to the following questions: how can                           
vulnerability be defined? And how should we (collectively or individually) respond to                       
it? The answers to these questions must go beyond purely medical considerations and                         
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involve philosophical ones, as they will dictate what models and interventions are                       
ethically acceptable, when others are not. This chapter is dedicated to both these                         
questions, starting with the first one.   
 
The first thing I need to address, in this bid to outline a pertinent account of                               
vulnerability, is the aforementioned tension between vulnerability as a universally                   
shared condition, and vulnerability as an increased risk incurred by particular groups or                         
individuals. I refer to Rogers, Mackenzie and Dodds’ account of inherent, situational                       
and pathogenic vulnerabilities to bridge this gap satisfactorily. I also intend to clarify                         
what is at stake in the identification of vulnerabilities: should risks be formulated in                           
terms of interests, rights, preferences, welfare, or goods? As I explained earlier, the                         
methodology I selected for this purpose is best described as a ‘mid-level’ one. I called                             
upon ‘higher-level’ theories and principles to demonstrate the existence of a                     
wide-ranging agreement that vulnerability is never morally neutral. However, I intend                     
to renounce any form of top-to-bottom application of such theories in favour of                         
approaches compatible with a Rawlsian type of reflective equilibrium. I focus, in                       
particular, on the insights provided by the concepts of capabilities, fertile functionings                       
and corrosive disadvantages with regards to vulnerability which, I argue, are distinctly                       
well-suited to the task at hand. 
 
I. MULTIFACETED VULNERABILITIES 
Despite my earlier claim that the statement ‘vulnerability gives rise to moral                       
obligations’ cannot be said to be overly ambitious, I do have to acknowledge that some                             
might disagree with the underlying idea that vulnerability must therefore be something                       
negative. I touched upon these kinds of objections in the subsection dedicated to care                           
ethicists and their treatment of vulnerability. Depending on whether one focuses on                       
vulnerability as a universally-shared, animal condition, or on vulnerability as capturing                     
the increased risks incurred by a few, our responses to it will vary. The case of                               
pre-emptive psychiatry requires a definition of vulnerability that does integrate the                     
possibility to detect those who, among the general population, are more vulnerable to                         
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certain kinds of risks; however, neglecting universally-shared vulnerability might bring                   
forth its own share of problems. I propose an account of vulnerability that attempts to                             
address both these forms of vulnerability by concentrating on the interactions between                       
inherent and situational vulnerabilities, and on the necessity to avoid pathogenic                     
responses to them. Formulating vulnerability and risk in terms of threatened                     
capabilities will help me delineate what an adequate response to psychiatric                     
vulnerability can be.   
   
1. The Difficult Task of Defining Vulnerability 
If vulnerability is to be defined in contrast with its antonym ‘invulnerability’,                       
the fact that it is a condition shared by all living things becomes undeniable. We are all                                 
exposed to the possibility of dying or being deprived of what we need to survive.                             26
Going beyond mere survival to the idea of flourishing only expands the scope and the                             
nature of these needs. Human beings, in particular, as ‘complex, embodied, social,                       
affective, and intelligent beings’, have a very wide range of needs which must be met in                               
order to flourish, from basic needs for nourishment and shelter through to complex                         
social needs such as friendship and meaningful work (Rogers, Mackenzie, Dodds, 2012,                       
p.22). Human vulnerability arises from our embodiment; it is a disposition of                       
‘embodied, social, and relational beings for whom the meeting of needs and the                         
development of capabilities and autonomy involve complex interpersonal and social                   
interactions over time’ (Dodds, 2014, p.182).   
 
As outlined in Chapter 4, refusing to acknowledge this common condition can                       
lead some to postulate a (nonexistent) rational and completely autonomous subject.                     
Taking the existence of that ‘completely autonomous’ subject for granted, without ever                       
questioning how he or she might come to be, can have a dangerously deleterious effect                             
on our moral judgements, which would then be premised on an unattainable ideal.                         
Vulnerability, on the contrary, because it ‘expresses the condition of all life as able to be                               
26 I will refer to needs in relation to vulnerability for the time being - until I develop the                                     
account of capabilities that I think captures more adequately the stakes attached to psychiatric                           
vulnerability. 
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hurt, wounded and killed’, and because it ‘must be considered as a universal expression                           
of the human condition’, requires integrity to be recognised as a ‘basic principle for                           
respect for and protection of human and non-human life’ (Kemp, 2008, p.240).                       
Theorised in this way, the requirement to protect vulnerable persons could be said to                           
create a bridge between moral strangers in a pluralistic society, and to encourage more                           
respectful policymaking in modern welfare states (Kemp, 2008, p.240). As Kemp                     
remarks:   
 
The ethic of care for others is not simply a matter of protecting                         
those who are incapable of acting autonomously (the most                 
vulnerable forms of life). Rather, it is an ethic that builds on the                         
premise that we are all capable of being wounded by the                     
uncaring (and sometimes paternalistic) actions of others             
(Kemp, 2008, p.247).   
 
But insisting too much on the need to acknowledge the existence of a                         
universally-shared vulnerability is not without danger, as it can also slowly erode the                         
salience of particular vulnerabilities. If humans cannot escape their animal condition, if                       
vulnerability is so widespread as to be universal and our needs so wide-ranging that                           
interdependence is ineluctable, then our assumptions that moral agents are perfectly                     
autonomous will indeed be severely damaged. The other side of that coin, though, is                           
that our vulnerabilities and needs might cease to call for a distinct moral response.                           
Failing to recognise the existence of context-specific vulnerabilities can therefore                   
become problematic, normalising relations of dependence and generating apathy. 
   
There is a fine balance to be struck between failing to pay                       
adequate attention to the particular manifestations of universal               
dependencies and vulnerabilities and focusing on them so much                 
that some people are hived off into special categories that lend                     
themselves to social and political marginalisation (Leach Scully,               
2014, p.219). 
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What the development of pre-emptive psychiatry highlights is that we are not                       
all equal when facing risks of seeing our needs unmet: the whole aim of the endeavour                               
is indeed to provide an accurate, precise and highly predictive profile of at-risk                         
individuals in order to implement efficient preventive measures. Some of us appear to                         
be identifiably more vulnerable than others, no matter how universally-shared a                     
condition vulnerability really is. A satisfactory account of vulnerability must therefore                     
integrate the idea that some people are more likely to suffer from certain harms than                             
are others.   
 
Here again, though, a too exclusive focus on particular vulnerabilities or                     
vulnerable groups may eventually become harmful . Labelling people as vulnerable,                   27
combined with a somewhat dulled awareness that no one can actually boast about                         
invulnerability or perfect autonomy, can lead to specific forms of discrimination and                       
the stereotyping of whole groups as ‘incapable of caring for their own needs or of being                               
self-determining’ (Rogers, Mackenzie, Dodds, 2012, p.16). Such classification of whole                   
groups as vulnerable has been shown to lead to unwarranted and unjust paternalistic                         
responses.   
 
For example, the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences                   
recently revised its International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research, which                   
now includes a guideline entitled ‘Research Involving Vulnerable Persons’ (CIOMS,                   
2002). The individuals or groups designated as vulnerable in the guideline are identified                         
as follows: ‘vulnerable persons are those who are relatively (or absolutely) incapable of                         
protecting their own interests. More formally, they may have insufficient power,                     
intelligence, education, resources, strength, or other needed attributes to protect their                     
own interests’ (Macklin, 2003, p.474). It is possible to assess how double-edged such a                           
definition can be, as the need to provide effective protections for people who might be                             
exploited in the context of biomedical research wages war with the necessity to respect                           
their autonomy and to forgo overly paternalistic approaches.   
27 I will expand on pathogenic vulnerabilities in the next subsection; what I want to illustrate                               
here are cases in which harmful responses to vulnerability arise specifically because the experience of                             
vulnerability is entirely separated from that of less vulnerable, ‘autonomous’ agents. 
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 In the case of research subjects who live in developing countries and are                         
recruited by wealthy western pharmaceutical companies, concerns have been expressed                   
regarding the subjects’ educational level or lack of familiarity with modern scientific                       
concepts, their poverty or powerlessness, their lack of access to good healthcare, their                         
possibly mistaken belief that the purpose of research is to benefit them rather than to                             
gain new knowledge (Macklin, 2003, p.474). The CIOMS’ new guideline does not shy                         
away from identifying whole groups that have been ‘overused’ in biomedical research,                       
including the lowest socioeconomic classes, students in investigators’ classes, residents                   
of long-term care facilities, subordinate members of hierarchical institutions, or                   
prisoners (CIOMS, 2002). While it recognises that such groups should not be                       
categorically excluded from research protocols, it does identify as unjust and                     
exploitative their ‘overuse’ in biomedical research. In the past few years, though,                       
tensions between the will to provide effective protections to these vulnerable groups                       
and the duty to respect the autonomy of individual members of such groups were                           
brought to the fore. Guidelines like the CIOMS, which emphasise the need to avoid                           
harm to vulnerable groups, have sometimes participated in their further                   
marginalisation: they have resulted in their exclusion and discrimination at a time                       
when user involvement in both research and health service developments is                     
increasingly meaningful (Smith, 2008, p.248). It is possible, here, to recognise the need                         
to balance and specify duties and norms arising from Beauchamp and Childress’                       
principles of nonmaleficence, beneficence and respect for autonomy. 
 
For a significant amount of time, questions raised about the notion of                       
vulnerability have mostly focused on whether there was a need to add a particular                           
group under the umbrella of that label and, to a lesser degree, what form of special                               
protections these groups ought to receive (Levine et al., 2004, p.44). More recently,                         
though, problematic implications of this use of the concept of vulnerability have been                         
under scrutiny: it was said to stereotype whole categories of individuals, without                       
distinguishing between those in the group who might indeed require increased                     
protective measures, and those who do not: ‘particular concerns have been raised about                         
considering all poor people, all pregnant women, all members of ethnic or racial                         
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minorities, and all people with terminal illness as inherently vulnerable’ (Levine et al.,                         
2004, p.47).   
 
The tensions I just briefly outlined between a vision of vulnerability as a                         
universal, ontological condition of human life, and one more centred on the existence                         
of special vulnerabilities separating those able to give informed consent, to care for                         
their own needs or to self-determine from those who are not, illustrate the need for a                               
more comprehensive account of vulnerability. An attempt to reconcile these is thus                       
necessary. What this did show, though, is that the treatment of vulnerability is at a                             
crossroad between several of the principles of biomedical ethics outlined by Beauchamp                       
and Childress: beneficence in the drive to protect the vulnerable and nonmaleficence in                         
the duty not to harm or exploit them, as well as respect for autonomy in the rejection of                                   
paternalistic measures. 
   
2. Inherent, Situational and Pathogenic         
Vulnerabilities 
I consider the work of Rogers, Mackenzie and Dodds a particularly                     
appropriate framework for the case of pre-emptive psychiatry. The distinctions they                     
establish between inherent, situational and pathogenic sources of vulnerability allow                   
for a clearer and more articulate formulation of the issues raised by models of                           
psychiatric vulnerability, and accurately emphasise their most salient features.   
 
While the work that has been done in biomedical ethics regarding the concept                         
of vulnerability does highlight the existence of a tendency towards either normalising                       
apathy or proactive paternalism (depending on the perspective adopted), it fails to                       
provide enlightening and pragmatic guidance in many instances. Such is the case with                         
the growing capacity to detect individuals at risk for psychosis and other mental                         
disorders.   
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As I stated earlier, the development of pre-emptive psychiatry presupposes a                     
model of vulnerability that integrates fully the idea of particular vulnerabilities and/or                       
particularly vulnerable groups. Once granted, though, that point leaves open many                     
options for the definition and identification of these groups: are they vulnerable for                         
reasons related to who they are, by nature? Are the threats they face simply higher than                               
the norm? Can we - ought we - attempt to decrease their vulnerability, or rather                             
protect them from risks? The definition of vulnerability as the incapacity to protect                         
one’s own interests, which is commonly used in biomedical ethics, does little to bring                           
answers to these questions. I deem such answers essential, however, in the ethical                         
evaluation of models aiming to implement the pre-onset early detection of, and                       
pre-onset early interventions for, vulnerable individuals. Rogers, Mackenzie and                 
Dodds’ tripartite definition thus offers a compelling and fitting framework for the                       
delineation of various sources of vulnerability. 
 
Applying the insights of feminist philosophy and of the ethics of care about                         
how universally interdependent and exposed to harm we are as living beings, Rogers,                         
Mackenzie and Dodds consider sources of  inherent vulnerabilities to be ingrained in the                         
human condition. They are those vulnerabilities that arise from our ‘corporeality, our                       
neediness, our dependence on others, and our affective and social natures’ (Rogers,                       
Mackenzie, Dodds, 2012, p.24).   
 
Formulated in such a way (as opposed to notions of vulnerability that refer                         
more directly to the idea of universality), I argue that inherent vulnerabilities might be                           
better able to account for sometimes strong individual disparities in the level of risk                           
admittedly faced by all humans. Corporeality, for example, while it does indeed define                         
all living beings’ relationships to the world and to others, remains at the same time a                               
profoundly singular, embodied and finite experience which is dependent in great part                       
on individual material and physical features. It cannot simply be a universally-shared                       
condition; it must also be irreducibly individual, and thus influence each person’s                       
neediness, dependence, or affective and social nature in a particular manner. As such,                         
inherent vulnerabilities, differentiated from other possible sources of vulnerability,                 
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correspond strikingly well with what researchers and psychiatrists involved in                   
pre-onset early detection and interventions present as early  markers of risk.   
 
For example, epidemiological evidence on the at-risk status for psychotic                   
disorders points to several pathophysiological traits of vulnerability, from cognitive                   
markers and brain-structural markers to chronobiological, neuroendocrine and genetic                 
ones (McGorry, 2014). The search for valid biomarkers in pre-emptive psychiatry is                       
thus one illustration amongst others of the pertinence of drawing a distinction like this                           
one: models which integrate these biomarkers refer to a conceptualisation of                     
vulnerability that recognises not only the ways in which being vulnerable can  afect a                           
person’s life, but also the ways in which one  is inherently and particularly vulnerable.                           
Social and cognitive markers may be another representative example of vulnerabilities                     
that are at least partly inherent: attenuated delusions, or persecutory ideational content,                       
might be interpreted as signs of vulnerability that are in great part tied to our affective                               
and social natures. The development of personalised medicine and the progressive                     
individualisation of risk also rely implicitly on the idea of inherent vulnerabilities.   
 
On the other hand,  situational vulnerabilities - by which are meant                     
vulnerabilities that are context-specific - are generally caused, or exacerbated by ‘the                       
personal, social, political, economic, or environmental situation of a person or social                       
group’ (Rogers, Mackenzie, Dodds, 2012, p.12). The tensions outlined earlier between                     
universal and particular vulnerabilities are interestingly reproduced within the                 
‘situational’ category, seeing as, while everyone can be negatively affected by contextual                       
adversities, some people might be distinctly more susceptible to them. This account is                         
thus consistent with the terminology used by many mental health professionals, who                       
often present markers of inherent vulnerability as increased susceptibility, and                   
context-specific vulnerabilities as potential triggers/risk factors.   
 
The distinction between inherent and situational sources of vulnerability is                   
pertinent on its own in the case of pre-emptive psychiatry. But the possibility of                           
pathways between both kinds of vulnerability is markedly more so: ‘biologically                     
grounded vulnerabilities are intrinsically linked to and often exacerbated by                   
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vulnerabilities that arise from contextual factors, such as discrimination, poverty, and                     
dependency’ (Rogers, 2014, p.72). Rogers refers to Beauchamp and Childress’ principles                     
of beneficence and nonmaleficence in biomedical ethics to illustrate how complex this                       
network of influences can be, explaining that these principles are required in the first                           
place because humans are universally and inherently vulnerable to ill health, and                       
situationally vulnerable to the actions of healthcare providers. Situational factors like                     
poverty can ‘increase the likelihood of ill health and the need for health care, while a                               
lack of education or an imbalance in knowledge and skills between a doctor and a                             
patient may further exacerbate inherent biological vulnerability’ (Ibid., p.72). Rogers                   
also refers to ‘social vulnerability’, deeming it a useful term for the designation of                           
individuals and groups who suffer from deprivation related to the social determinants                       
of health, putting them at higher risk of poor health (Rogers, 2014, p.79). Not only do                               
those affected face increased risks of ill health, but also, by virtue of their social                             
vulnerability, they may be limited in their capacity to look after themselves and their                           
interests (Ibid., p.78).   
 
This influence of inherent vulnerabilities over situational ones is therefore                   
mirrored by the influence of situational vulnerabilities over inherent ones. Situational                     
vulnerabilities may indeed exacerbate or set off inherent vulnerabilities. For example, it                       
has been shown that the early exclusion of anxious solitary children may have a                           
significant influence on the subsequent ‘stability of anxious solitude they exhibit’                     
(Gazelle, Ladd, 2003, p.274). A hypothesis brought forward by the authors of that study                           
contends that ‘anxious solitary children who are not excluded by their peers may be able                             
to overcome their social fears because these fears have not been confirmed by their                           
social experiences, allowing these children to gradually learn that they do not have                         
cause to be fearful’ (Ibid., p.72). Conversely, those anxious solitary children who do                         
encounter that kind of peer exclusion likely experience the opposite: a confirmation,                       
and perhaps the intensification, of their social fears. (Gazelle, Ladd, 2003, p.274). In that                           
sense, character-traits like being shy, verbally inhibited and solitary, can contribute to                       
the risk of being mistreated by one’s peers at a young age, for the precise reason that                                 
these traits signal vulnerability as well as inspire peer dislike (Ibid., p.275).   
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With regards to the development of psychotic disorders, I can mention here                       
again the accumulation of evidence that a series of adversities, in childhood and later,                           
have been associated with psychosis in later life. Social deprivation, stigma, sexual                       
abuse, neglect and exposure to deviant parental communication, separation from                   
parents, urban upbringing and migration, etc. are all situational features in one’s life                         
that can both generate and exacerbate vulnerabilities. That there is a form of                         
interaction between the biological and the psychological ‘in a cascade of increasingly                       
deviant development’ (Broome et al., 2005a, p.24) is now generally recognised indeed;                       
and adopting Rogers, Mackenzie and Dodds’ terminology allows for a finer                     
understanding of what this can mean. Some of those psychological factors - a                         
propensity to view the world as hostile and dangerous, or a guarded and distrustful                           
attitude, for example (AMA, 2013, p.784) - might be typecast as inherent vulnerabilities                         
if their etiology points to neurocognitive features. On the other hand, having a solid                           
grasp of the impact that situational vulnerabilities can have on the development or the                           
aggravation of such inherent characteristics is crucial, especially when one’s aim is to                         
develop a reflection on the ethics of proposed responses to such vulnerabilities. Both                         
inherent and situational vulnerabilities must therefore give rise to both moral and                       
political responses; and this leads me to the third source of vulnerability identified by                           
Rogers Mackenzie and Dodds:  pathogenic vulnerabilities.   
 
As I mentioned earlier, labelling whole groups as vulnerable so as to support                         
the implementation of protective measures against exploitation or harm has been said                       
to encourage possibly stigmatising, stereotyping and paternalistic attitudes. Some                 
responses to the identification of vulnerabilities may indeed exacerbate them, or even                       
generate new ones. Rogers, Mackenzie and Dodds’ work insists heavily on the harm                         
that can be produced by such inadequate reactions to vulnerability - enough so that that                             
these pathogenic vulnerabilities are often presented separately from inherent or                   
situational ones.   
 
I feel it is necessary, however, to categorise more clearly such pathogenic                       
responses as a specific subset of situational vulnerabilities: despite how useful the                       
concept of pathogenic vulnerabilities may be - it is otherwise entirely applicable and                         
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pertinent to the case of pre-emptive psychiatry - leaving any doubts about the nature of                             
these vulnerabilities would not, I feel, help serve the purpose of preventing them.                         
Pathogenic vulnerabilities might arise from targeted responses to perceived preexisting                   
vulnerabilities (inherent or situational), but they remain wholly context-based, and                   
thus situational themselves.   
 
To illustrate my point, I wish to focus on the idea that integrating the notion                             
of risk into diagnostic models for psychiatric vulnerability, and informing patients of                       
that risk, might lead to ‘self-fulfilling prophecies’ (McGlashan, Miller, Woods, 2001,                     
p.568). Anxiety and stress are considered to be (either directly or indirectly through                         
depression, demoralisation, or self-stigmatising behaviours like withdrawal and               
isolation) important risk factors (Ibid., p.567; Pyle et al., 2015, p.133). Additionally, for                         
parents of children having an elevated risk of psychotic illness, these vulnerabilities                       
were shown to be ‘anxiety-provoking in a way that other medical conditions were not’                           
(Hercher, Bruenner, 2008, p.2359): their anxiety about the spectre of psychiatric disease                       
affected decision-making and planning for the future with regard to their affected child,                         
and ‘family members spoke of the burden of watchfulness and their concern about                         
whether they might either overreact to behavioral issues or misinterpret signs of                       
incipient mental illness’ (Ibid., p.2359). Openly labelling identified vulnerable                 
individuals for psychosis as ‘at-risk’ might thus be a representative manifestation of                       
what Rogers, Mackenzie and Dodds call a pathogenic response to vulnerability, as it                         
exacerbates these people’s vulnerabilities, or even generates new ones. The reasoning                     
behind the choice to remove the idea of risk from the APS, although not referring                             
directly to pathogenic vulnerabilities, follows nonetheless a very similar course: a label                       
like this one was seen to be more harmful than helpful for those concerned.   
 
To analyse more in depth what Rogers, Mackenzie and Dodds mean by                       
‘pathogenic vulnerabilities’, I want to refer to a case from English law and public policy                             
outlined by Dunn, Clare and Holland in 2008. This is closely related to the idea                             
mentioned earlier regarding harmful responses to vulnerability which occur specifically                   
because the experience of vulnerability is strictly separated from that of less vulnerable,                         
‘autonomous’ agents. Nevertheless, here, what justifies intervention is no longer tied to                       
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a specific decision, as the person might have been ‘judged explicitly as having the                           
mental capacity to make the decision in question autonomously’ (Dunn, Clare, Holland,                       
2008, p.236); the simple fact that that person is categorised as vulnerable appears                         
sufficient to justify the Court’s involvement.   
 
Dunn, Clare and Holland refer to the case of G, an adult who was deemed able                               
to decide autonomously whether or not to have contact with her father. However,                         
prior experience demonstrated that ‘contact with her father led to a significant                       
deterioration in G’s mental state, rendering her likely to lose the mental capacity to                           
make a range of decisions in the future, including the decision to have contact with her                               
father’ (Ibid., p.236). As a result, pre-emptive intervention to restrict contact between                       
daughter and father was justified so as to maintain her mental state, and maximise her                             
mental capacity to make decisions. We can see here that the framework within which                           
such a decision can be made is introduced as a protective one - and perhaps even as an                                   
overprotective one, if it is made despite G’s established capacity to make a decision                           
autonomously: it is supposed to safeguard the interests of the vulnerable, and it relies                           
heavily on ‘accounts of vulnerability that have constructed this individual as a                       
vulnerable subject facing a heightened risk of being unable to protect him/herself from                         
the malign influence of another person’ (Ibid., p.238). Here, the presence of inherent                         
vulnerabilities is seen as magnifying, in an almost automatic manner, risks that the                         
person in whom they have been identified will be unable to escape negative influences,                           
thus increasing situational vulnerabilities (Dunn, Clare, Holland, 2008, p.239).   
 
The authors pinpoint the root of what they deem to be an inappropriate                         
response in the remnants of a more universal vision of vulnerability (‘justifying                       
substitute decision-making on the basis of situational vulnerability could lead to                     
interventions that are potentially infinite in scope and application’ - Dunn, Clare,                       
Holland, 2008, p.241). This leads them to defend a better integration of the ‘subjective                           
experience of being vulnerable’ into our understanding of vulnerability, in addition to                       
more objective assessments of inherent and situational vulnerabilities. I do not disagree                       
with their conclusion (as I will shortly explain, I actually envision a very similar                           
resolution to this issue), but I believe that Rogers, Mackenzie and Dodds’ account of                           
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pathogenic vulnerabilities stimulates a better apprehension of the problems caused by                     
inadequate responses to vulnerability than a call for subjective narratives. G’s case                       
shows, despite the fact that the Court’s readiness to interfere on grounds of situational                           
vulnerability might be seen by some as  overzealous , that the problem of adaptive                         
preferences might not be inapplicable here. Formulating the issue in terms of                       
pathogenic vulnerabilities gives, it seems to me, stronger and more objective grounds                       
to evaluate the appropriateness of responses to vulnerability than the integration of                       
subjective accounts of being vulnerable. 
 
Nevertheless, I am in full alignment with Dunn, Clare and Holland when they                         
reach the conclusion that empowerment and resilience should be the first moral,                       
political and legal response to vulnerability, before selecting outright protective                   
measures:   
 
New legislation would need to recognise that exposure to risk is                     
a corollary of self-determination and that, prior to intervention,                 
every attempt should be made to support adults with                 
autonomous risk management regardless of the circumstances             
within which that risk manifests itself (Dunn, Clare, Holland,                 
2008, p.253).   
 
However, before I launch into a more detailed defence of this idea in Chapter 6, I need                                 
to lay the groundworks for this affirmation: vulnerability and risk, especially in the case                           
of pre-emptive psychiatry, are better understood in terms of threatened capabilities. 
 
II. VULNERABLE INDIVIDUALS’ CAPABILITIES AT         
RISK  
At this stage of my dissertation, I have been talking of vulnerability and risk in                             
a rather ‘fluctuating’ manner. In the previous subsection, I referred to human  needs ,                         
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either basic or more complex, in order to express the universality of vulnerability; in                           
the previous chapter, a person’s  interests were centre-stage. How should such needs and                         
interests be defined, though? Do they refer to people’s preferences, their rights, their                         
objectively-defined well-being or their quality of life?   
 
Depending on the perspective adopted to formulate the  stakes that                   
vulnerability and risk both raise - to formulate what is valued, what can be diminished,                             
lost or harmed - the responses brought to vulnerability might differ more or less                           
significantly. In this section, I aim to show that the capabilities approach fittingly                         
emphasises what at-risk individuals face, in terms of their own vulnerability and mental                         
health, but also with regards to the psychiatric pre-onset interventions made available                       
to them. 
 
1. A Fitting Approach 
Before I delve into the application of the capabilities approach to the case of                           
pre-emptive psychiatry, I need to make clear that it is, first and foremost, a political                             
doctrine: its primary aim is to guide public policy regarding distributive issues. I do not                             
intend to depart too much from this original goal, as the diagnostic models that I                             
evaluate do have an impact on how mental health care is provided and distributed on a                               
large scale. These models inform public-policies and the kinds of resources or                       
interventions which are made available to the public and to identified vulnerable                       
individuals.   
 
The capabilities approach does not recommend any comprehensive ethical                 
doctrine, and it isn’t built upon one (Nussbaum, 2011, p.93), which is why I classify it as                                 
a mid-level approach. In concordance with the methodology I outlined in Chapter 1,                         
Nussbaum relies on a form of reflective equilibrium: ‘like Rawls, I attempt to show that                             
the approach offers good basis for political principles in a pluralistic society, by                         
demonstrating that it could, over time, become the basis for an ‘overlapping consensus’                         
among holders of the main religious and secular views’ (Nussbaum, 2011, p.79).   
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 On account of the distinction that is slowly taking shape between protection                       
and empowerment as possible responses to vulnerability, I consider that the capabilities                       
approach is primarily competing with two other possibilities: a broadly egalitarian                     
resourcist approach, or a consequentialist one. Rather than analysing vulnerability and                     
risk, advantage or disadvantage in terms of resources or preference satisfaction,                     
capability theorists value ‘states of being’; they think of capability as a set of vectors of                               
functionings, reflecting the person's freedom to lead one type of life or another (Wolff,                           
de-Shalit, 2007, p.37). The main differences between the resourcist and the capabilities                       
approaches have often been said to hinge upon the recognition - or lack thereof - of                               
individual disparities between people, such as their physical and mental characteristics,                     
their social situation, their gender, etc. Resourcists appear not to take in consideration                         
these disparities into their distribution schemes, while capability theorists insist on                     
doing so (Pogge, 2010, p.23). Capability theorists ‘value the goods persons have access                         
to by reference to the specific needs and endowments of each particular person’, which                           
tends to make them more sensitive to personal heterogeneities (Pogge, 2010, pp.23-24).   
 
Nussbaum, on the other hand, while she also tends to situate what                       
distinguishes the capabilities approach from resourcist accounts in the idea of                     
heterogeneity, focuses on the good itself as much as on its recipients. By referring to the                               
Aristotelian notion of flourishing, Nussbaum rejects any account of the overall end of                         
political planning that posits some single homogeneous goal which would vary only in                         
quantity (Nussbaum, 2011, p.127): ‘what makes Aristotle of continuing centrality for                     
political thought is the way in which he coupled an understanding of choice and its                             
importance with an understanding of human vulnerability’ (Ibid., p.127). I would agree                       
with Pogge (2010, p.24), though, that these arguments excessively accentuate                   
differences between resourcists and capability theorists, and that both types of                     
heterogeneity could be integrated into a resourcist framework. Nevertheless, I do think                       
that the capabilities approach is more likely to highlight why empowerment should                       
prevail over more strictly protective responses to vulnerability.   
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As for its other rival, the capabilities approach is not actually in a frontal                           
opposition to consequentialism, although it does reject utilitarian definitions of the                     
good (whether it is as preference-satisfaction, as QALYs, or as welfare), as well as it                             
does the process of maximisation. The capability metric, which is objective, is argued to                           
be superior to a subjective metric like preference satisfaction or QALYs, as only an                           
objective metric can ‘satisfy the demand for a public criterion of justice for the basic                             
structure of society’ (Anderson, 2010, p.81). According to Anderson, an objective                     
metric focuses on ends rather than means, which would indicate that it is better suited                             
to handle discrimination against the disabled and is, once again, ‘properly sensitive to                         
individual variations in functioning that have democratic import’, especially regarding                   
the just delivery of public services in health and education (Ibid., p.81). By refusing                           
aggregative calculations and by favouring sufficientarian standards, the capability                 
metric may thus impose stronger obligations on the part of the state to respond to the                               
needs of the least advantaged. Welfare-based utilitarian accounts that rely on an                       
objective metric might be able to withstand these attacks much better than those that                           
are preference-based, but would then face their own sets of problems, amongst which                         
are notorious issues regarding dominant-end conceptions of happiness to which all                     
other goals are ‘radically subordinated’ (Scarre, 1996, p.139).   
 
Various forms of utilitarianism are thus at odds with the capabilities approach,                       
but they are much more so than consequentialism itself. Nussbaum even goes so far as                             
to consider the capabilities approach a ‘cousin of consequentialism’, or even ‘a form of                           
political, nonwelfarist consequentialism’ (Nussbaum, 2011, p.95). Her own approach is                   
indeed outcome-based, in the sense that the success of a decision or policy depends                           
entirely on its impact; and it is, as such, far removed from the ‘proceduralist views that                               
are often preferred by deontologists’ (Nussbaum, 2011, p.95). Parallels might even be                       
drawn between it and a more inclusive-end conception of happiness as presented by                         
Scarre: ‘the most fruitful happiness-enhancing service which utilitarians can render is                     
generally to facilitate individuals’ own efforts to live the lifestyle of their choice’ (Scarre,                           
1996, p.142). But such a conception might indeed very well represent ‘a considerable                         
move beyond conventional utilitarian positions’, thus fitting better under the umbrella                     
of consequentialism, rather than that of utilitarianism (Ibid., p.146). And where                     
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inclusive-ends conceptions of happiness might face trouble in specifying a ‘clear-cut                     
criterion for arriving at moral evaluations’ (Scarre, 1996, p.146), the capabilities                     
approach proposes the development and enhancement of central, substantial freedoms. 
 
If I elected to formulate risks and vulnerabilities in terms of threatened                       
capabilities, it is because the framework of which they are a part encompasses crucial                           
characteristics of psychiatric vulnerability. Furthermore, this allows me to address                   
many of the concerns which were expressed in the ethical debate surrounding                       
pre-emptive psychiatry in a more constructive manner. The notion of combined                     
capabilities, for example - these ‘substantial freedoms’, associated with actual                   
opportunities to choose and to act (Nussbaum, 2011, p.20) - provides a needed                         
normative counterbalance to the more descriptive accounts of inherent and situational                     
vulnerabilities. Basic capabilities (the innate faculties that make any later development                     
and training possible - Ibid., p.24) like speech, or emotional and social intelligence,                         
must be trained and developed in interaction with a beneficent and cooperative                       
environment in order to become internal capabilities. Based on this, inherent                     
vulnerabilities are those internal features which might hinder the development of a                       
person’s own abilities, while situational vulnerabilities designate a political, social,                   
familial and economic environment which restricts, rather than encourages, that                   
person’s actual freedom and opportunities. Identified vulnerabilities can signal specific                   
capability deficits and vice versa (Mackenzie, 2014, p.49). 
 
Nussbaum identifies ten central capabilities: life; bodily health; bodily                 
integrity; senses, imagination, and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other                   
species; play; control over one’s environment (Nussbaum, 2011, pp.33-34). Only a few                       
of those are not threatened, in one way or another, by the risk of developing a serious                                 
mental disorder such as psychosis or bipolar disorder: one might argue that a person’s                           
capability to have concern for other animals, for plants and the for environment at                           
large might remain undisturbed, but even bodily integrity might become insecure in                       
some instances.   
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People with psychotic disorders are, for example, more likely to be victims of                         
violence: in a 2004 study, one in six individuals with a psychotic disorder reported                           
being a victim of violence in the previous year (Chapple et al., 2004, p.836). It appears                               
that the odds of being a victim were greater for women, homeless persons, those with a                               
lifetime history of substance abuse, those who had been arrested in the previous 12                           
months, or those with poorer social and occupational function (Ibid., p.836). This is                         
without addressing risks of involuntary hospitalisations, which have been shown to                     
concern 72% of substance abusers and 31% of non-abusers in the two years following a                             
first psychotic episode (Opsal et al., 2011, p.198). Patients diagnosed after a first                         
psychotic episode also have an elevated suicide risk, as well as higher all-cause                         
mortality, which appear to be exacerbated by impulsive behavior such as self-harm,                       
having a family history of severe mental disorder or substance use (Björkenstam et al.,                           
2014, p.6). Up to 40% of individuals with psychotic disorders will attempt suicide                         
during their lifetime (Robinson et al., 2010, p.1). Even without delving into the clinical                           
symptoms of psychotic disorders themselves, it is possible to see how early symptoms                         
could pose a threat to several central capabilities, especially if they are distressing                         
enough for a person to seek medical help. Hallucinations, magical thinking, perceptual                       
aberrations, difficulties in concentrating or disorganised speech might have a                   
deleterious impact on senses, imagination, and thought, as well as on practical reason;                         
while delusions, distrust, hypervigilance, anxiety, social withdrawal and sleep                 
disturbances might negatively affect a person’s affiliations and emotions. The risks                     
faced by identified at-risk individuals are thus far-reaching, despite the fact that                       
transition rates are not excessively high - especially in view of Nussbaum’s assessment                         
that affiliation and practical reason are two capabilities which play a distinctive                       
architectonic role in organising and pervading other capabilities (Nussbaum, 2011,                   
p.39). 
 
By formulating risks and vulnerabilities in terms of threatened capabilities                   
rather than those of lacking resources or unsatisfied preferences, I can start to                         
determine better the types of responses that ought to be selected when dealing with                           
recognisable vulnerabilities. The persons who are yet to get above an acceptable                       
capability threshold, or those who must attempt to maintain that level when it is                           
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threatened, should receive support (Nussbaum, 2011, p.24). That support must not                     
simply aim to protect vulnerable persons, however; it should strive to provide the                         
opportunities necessary to develop one’s capabilities, as well as the environment in                       
which one has the ability to act on them. The capabilities approach offers a framework                             
in which pathogenic responses to vulnerability might hopefully be better identified and                       
avoided.   
 
There are, however, potentially problematic criticisms that have been raised                   
against the capabilities approach - mostly around the idea that it may lead to                           
guilt-inducing, oppressive and even discriminating practices. Because the capabilities                 
approach advocates ‘altering’ people by allocating resources sufficient to compensate for                     
deficits or promote fertile capabilities, it can actually turn out to be quite costly and                             
encourage oppressively judgmental practices (Slivers, Pickering Francis, 2005, p.54).                 
The negative impact of soft paternalism mentioned by Beauchamp and Childress can be                         
cited again, seeing a slide from stigmatising a certain type of behaviour to stigmatising                           
people who engage in that behaviour. Those who fall short of the capability thresholds                           
that have been set can also be (and feel) stigmatised; and they also have to ‘pay their                                 
share with hard work or pain for the acquisition’ of these capabilities (Ibid., p.54).                           
These criticisms are particularly relevant in the case of pre-onset early detection and                         
interventions in psychiatry, in view of the efforts at-risk individuals themselves might                       
be asked to invest in the preservation and promotion of their own capabilities. Even                           
early interventions based on psychotherapies such as CBT require a significant                     
involvement on the part of at-risk individuals, in addition to resources such as time. It                             
is crucial not to underestimate the pressure that might be put on at-risk individuals not                             
to make any choice that would go against their objectively-defined interests - in other                           
words, pressure for them to live risk-free, ‘aseptic’ lives.   
 
To illustrate this, I can mention employers who have been using ‘the “stick”                         
approach to wellness programs in the workplace’, and have produced some negative                       
feelings on the part of employees (Cavico, Mujtaba, 2013, p.112). These employers have                         
been categorised as being invasive, intrusive, and paternalistic; and ‘employees who are                       
obese, or smoke, or who are chronically diseased, or engage in unhealthy behaviours                         
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may feel penalized, even by an incentive-based program, and thus feel pain’ (Ibid.,                         
p.112). Moreover, employees might be reasonably concerned that their private and                     
personal health information could be made public and misused, resulting in                     
embarrassment or discrimination (Ibid., p.112). 
 
However, while I recognise the importance of these apprehensions, I believe                     
that the capabilities approach is able to set acceptable limits to the pressure that can be                               
put on at-risk individuals. Indeed, ‘people are free to have capabilities that meet the                           
standard for the species without exercising them’ (Slivers, Pickering Francis, 2005,                     
p.54). Capabilities must be understood as areas of substantial freedom: combined                     
capabilities encompass both the fluid and dynamic abilities residing inside a person, but                         
also the freedoms or opportunities created by a combination of personal abilities and a                           
certain political, social, and economic environment (Nussbaum, 2013, p.20). Again, the                     
capabilities approach is ‘ resolutely pluralist about value ’ and strongly adheres to political                       
liberalism (Nussbaum, 2013, p.18). Normatively-speaking, its goal is to ensure that                     
persons are able to live their lives in a way that fulfils the goals they have set for                                   
themselves - not to impose a certain set of functionings. It does not attempt to                             
determine what well-being objectively consists in, sometimes despite people’s own                   
preferences to the contrary; it adopts an inclusive-end view of well-being. I would                         
argue that the capabilities approach emphasises the importance of substantial freedoms                     
enough that the danger of seeing at-risk individuals discriminated or stigmatised for                       
making choices against their objectively-defined interests is sufficiently lessened. 
2. Applicable Guidance 
The capabilities approach offers a normative and complementary framework                 
to the account of vulnerability outlined by Rogers, Mackenzie and Dodds, and I believe                           
that it is the most suited approach to determine the kinds of responses we ought to                               
bring to vulnerability. A comprehensive and multilayered definition of vulnerability,                   
such as the one I outlined at the start of this chapter, must play a signalling role; it must                                     
become an appropriate indicator of the harms and risks that ‘may result from particular                           
capability deficits’ (Mackenzie, 2014, p.50). In turn, the capabilities approach provides                     
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the normative structure that highlights, substantiates and specifies ‘the obligation to                     
address those deficits in order to remediate vulnerability’ (Ibid., p.50): instead of                       
competing theories of justice, an ethics of vulnerability and capabilities theory should                       
be seen as mutually informative (Mackenzie, 2014, p.54). This is what prompts me to                           
defend one diagnostic model over another, just as I advocate for responses that favour                           
empowerment and resilience over those that are primarily protective. Before any                     
attempts to establish how harmful and pathogenic some of these responses can be,                         
though, I aim to show that focusing on capabilities does provide applicable guidance. 
 
Within the capabilities framework, the positive obligations of a democratic                   
state are to ensure that each citizen has a claim to a sufficient capability set - a set that                                     
enables a person to function as an equal to all others in society (Anderson, 2010, p. 83).                                 
Such a sufficientarian standard, with an established acceptable threshold, thus                   
delineates very specific obligations for a state like this one to provide any form of                             
necessary assistance to those citizens who are yet to reach the threshold, or who are                             
unable to convert their resources into actual functionings (Mackenzie, 2014, p.53). This                       
is why capability theory is seen to be so adept at accounting for individual variations in                               
ability and disability, as well as variations in vulnerability: the basic structure on which                           
it relies promotes policies and measures that must provide each citizen with ‘access to a                             
package of resources adjusted to that person’s individual ability to convert resources                       
into relevant functionings’, and be ‘sensitive to environmental factors and social norms                       
that also affect individuals’ conversion abilities’ (Anderson, 2010, p.87).   
 
Both inherent and situational vulnerabilities can therefore be said to be at the                         
heart of the capabilities framework: they are the main impetus for political and social                           
action. And, as long as those capabilities which are indispensable for the determination                         
of an acceptable threshold are clearly identified, the way in which one must evaluate                           
measures and decisions can be clearly established and specified. For a reason that might                           
appear obvious, though, the establishment of a threshold below which a person is                         
entitled to assistance is not directly relevant to the case of pre-emptive psychiatry.                         
There is a reason why most of the work that gave rise to the capabilities approach                               
pertains to developing nations (although I do agree with Nussbaum’s assertion that ‘all                         
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nations are developing nations’ - 2011, p.16): people who are below that threshold are                           
the primary recipients of political and social action. In the case that preoccupies me, just                             
like in many other instances, the problem with the sufficientarian standard is that it                           
fails to grasp the ideas of risk and uncertainty satisfactorily. At-risk individuals may                         
very well enjoy a capability set that is above the established threshold on all counts, but                               
their inherent and situational vulnerabilities threaten the sustainability of these                   
capabilities, both in time and in scope. It is for that reason that I believe Wolff and                                 
de-Shalit’s account of fertile functionings and corrosive disadvantages to be a crucial                       
contribution to the capabilities approach (despite their choice to speak in terms of                         
functionings rather than capabilities).   
 
I have already outlined some of the basic tenets of Wolff and de-Shalit’s                         
contribution to the capabilities approach in Chapter 1. My aim here is thus less to                             
explain their account than it is to directly apply it to the problem at hand. The ethical                                 
issues that arise from the development of pre-emptive psychiatry are more closely tied                         
to a form of powerlessness in front of corrosive disadvantages and the difficulty to                           
promote and maintain fertile functionings than they are to the necessity to ensure a                           
sufficient level of combined capabilities for all.   
 
I have explained why I believe that formulating psychiatric vulnerability in                     
terms of threatened capabilities is the most pertinent option, and that conviction is only                           
exacerbated by the idea that the most serious disadvantages occur when, for some                         
reason, several of them cluster together (Wolff, de-Shalit, 2007, pp.9-10). I will not list                           
again the series of adversities that appear to increase risks of serious mental health                           
problems in a person’s life; suffice to say that the idea of a cluster of disadvantages                               
corresponds to the concerns expressed by those who highlight a correlation between                       
the presence of inherent and situational vulnerabilities and a lack of access to care.                           
Persons who suffer from psychotic disorders and/or at-risk individuals might not be                       
part of the ‘worst-off’, at least as described by Wolff and de-Shalit, but they are indeed                               
concerned by the compounding effects of clustering disadvantages. Altogether, what                   
can be derived from their view of corrosive disadvantages and fertile functionings is a                           
precise and comprehensive policy proposal; and one which is fully pertinent with                       
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regards to pre-emptive psychiatry. Such a proposal determines that a society of equals is                           
a society in which ‘disadvantages do not cluster, a society where there is no clear answer                               
to the question of who is the worst off’ (Wolff, de-Shalit, 2007, p.10). It is precisely                               
because capabilities are far from isolated from one another, and because they form                         
networks of opportunities that interact and inform one another, that politicians can                       
have both more precise indications and more compelling reasons to dedicate scarce                       
resources on the improvement of the most fertile capabilities and the reduction or                         
elimination of corrosive disadvantages (Nussbaum, 2011, pp.98-99).   
 
One of the most salient features of Wolff and de-Shalit’s work is therefore                         
how they integrate the notion of risk - or, further than that, that of extreme and                               
pervasive risk and insecurity - into their conceptualisation of disadvantage. They do so                         
in a way that the capabilities approach on its own mostly fails to do, focused as it is on                                     
the necessity to bring people up to the established threshold in the first place. Here, the                               
full extent of how pervasive risk can really be, how it may slowly erode a person’s                               
seemingly stable and secure capabilities in an increasingly vicious cycle, becomes starkly                       
apparent. The qualifier selected to speak of this kind of amalgamating disadvantage,                       
‘corrosive’, was decidedly well chosen.   
 
In turn, formulating the risks faced by those in whom psychiatric                     
vulnerabilities have been detected in terms of threatened capabilities helps me highlight                       
the corrosive disadvantages to which they might be exposed, depending on the                       
response (or lack thereof) brought to their situation. It would be a mistake to think of                               
such risks as straightforward or relatively uniform (for example: that person may either                         
develop a serious mental disorder, or not). I have already explained why, even                         
expressed as such, a risk like this one may render a variety of capabilities insecure, and                               
so on multiple levels. But showing how interrelated these capabilities are, and how one                           
kind of risk may give rise to several others, illustrates how delicate it might be to react                                 
to vulnerability adequately (and ethically).   
 
Going back to concerns that the anxiety and stress caused by receiving the                         
‘at-risk’ label might lead to self-fulfilling prophecies, or cause depression,                   
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demoralisation, or self-stigmatising behaviours, it is possible to extrapolate this kind of                       
ripple effect outside of purely medical concerns. That a very stressed and anxious                         
person may see his or her emotional well-being, mental health and bodily health                         
threatened is clear (and in the case of at-risk individuals, such threats to mental health                             
take a more specific and severe connotation): ‘fear and anxiety is a common                         
consequence of the perception that one is at risk [...] bearing in mind that often risks do                                 
not lead to adverse consequences, whereas fear and anxiety can be omnipresent in                         
someone’s life’ (Wolff, de-Shalit, 2007, p.68). But this kind of poor health can have                           
adverse consequences of its own, given that when one’s capabilities and functionings                       
become insecure involuntarily, as is the case here, one might become forced to make                           
other capabilities and functionings insecure in order to secure the first ones (Wolff,                         
de-Shalit, 2007, p.72).   
 
For example, at-risk individuals may accept to take antipsychotic medications                   
with known adverse effects (antipsychotic medications are associated with an increased                     
likelihood of sedation, sexual dysfunction, postural hypotension, cardiac arrhythmia,                 
and sudden cardiac death - Young, Taylor, Lawrie, 2015, p.353), despite being aware                         
that predictive validity is generally around 30% in the two years following detection.                         
This is not to say, necessarily, that a decision like this one is either unjustified or                               
inefficient, but it does capture a significant aspect of disadvantage, which is that ‘very                           
often people are disadvantaged because they are exposed to risks which they would not                           
have taken had they had the option, or are forced to take risks that in one way or                                   
another are bigger than others are being exposed to or take’ (Wolff, de-Shalit, 2007,                           
p.66). This idea of being ‘forced’ to take risks, meaning that there would be no                             
reasonable alternative available (Ibid., p.67), is particularly interesting in the context                     
that concerns me. Indeed, as I will demonstrate in the last chapter of this dissertation,                             
both mental health professionals and identified at-risk individuals might be led to think                         
that preventive options are somewhat limited, depending on the diagnostic model                     
selected. The kinds of risks incurred by would-be patients, if a diagnosis like the APS                             
was to be the primary model for early detection, are certainly acknowledged and                         
well-known, by now. Nevertheless, using Wolff and de-Shalit’s framework to specify                     
them will allow me to distinguish those responses to vulnerability that might be more                           
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ethically acceptable from those that are decidedly less so, all the while shying away from                             
a simple rejection or approval of pre-emptive psychiatry as a whole.   
 
I also find O’Neill’s claim that ‘capabilities for injuring and oppressing’ should                       
be limited (O’Neill, 1995, p.149) very pertinent in this instance. The link between these                           
‘capabilities for injuring’ and the existence of disadvantage is not made explicit in Wolff                           
and de-Shalit’s work, but I would argue that it can be strong, especially if limiting those                               
capabilities which would damage or undercut others' is seen as the necessary                       
counterpart of limiting vulnerability (O’Neill, 1995, p.149). Here, securing capabilities                   
that empower vulnerable persons must also be strengthened. O’Neill’s contribution                   
highlights the necessity not to think of declustering corrosive disadvantages while                     
promoting fertile functionings solely in terms of adequate policies and responsive                     
distributive measures, but also in terms of our own behaviours and relationships, both                         
on an individual and on a collective level.   
 
As I intend to demonstrate in the last chapter of this dissertation, the fact that                             
diagnostic models can have a certain influence on mental health professionals’ attitudes                       
and reflexes towards identified at-risk individuals matters considerably: these models                   
may promote empowerment over treatment, or inversely. This also ties in with                       
Nussbaum’s insistence that it is crucial to acknowledge and understand the role of                         
emotions in the realisation - or the loss - of capabilities: if we can understand how                               
‘malleable these emotional tendencies are’, it might provide precious guidance in the                       
design of interventions (in the family, in schools and in other social settings) that                           
channel them in a direction that supports the development of central capabilities                       
(Nussbaum, 2011, p.181). 
 
This all leads me to the conclusion of this section: concentrating on the                         
necessity to secure capabilities and fertile functionings, and the parallel necessity to                       
reduce corrosive disadvantages and vulnerabilities, must lead to ‘a view in which both                         
empowerment and liberty can be taken seriously’ (O’Neill, 1995, p.144). Vulnerability                     
might not have been explicitly or precisely defined in Beauchamp and Childress’                       
principlist approach to biomedical medical ethics (Rogers, 2014, p.71), but it is now                         
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possible to identify which of these principles must be the central focus of an adequate                             
response to vulnerability, especially in the case of pre-emptive psychiatry: a balance                       
must be found between autonomy and beneficence. In the coming section, I intend to                           
explore various responses to vulnerability, from protection to the promotion of                     
autonomy, and I will defend the need to favour the latter over the former.   
 
III. MORAL RESPONSIBILITIES ARISING FROM         
VULNERABILITY 
I outlined, in Chapter 4, the various ways in which moral theories recognise                         
and respond to vulnerability. My own purpose was to highlight that these diverse                         
normative frameworks can at least find some common ground in their                     
acknowledgement that vulnerability is morally significant. Of the array of approaches I                       
presented there, I think that Goodin’s consequentialist defence for the protection of the                         
vulnerable stands out as the most comprehensive argument, as it is focusing explicitly                         
on moral obligations that arise from vulnerability itself. It is also one of the most                             
influential arguments in the literature surrounding vulnerability theory: Goodin’s work                   
laid the foundation of subsequent contributions in this domain, pointing out the                       
necessity to pay more attention to this notion. In selecting to interpret vulnerabilities as                           
threatened capabilities, though, I steer away from the delineation of purely protective                       
moral obligations towards vulnerable persons, which I believe can often become                     
pathogenic, and ascribe priority to more empowering measures.   
 
1. Pathogenic Responses to Vulnerability 
The account that Goodin develops regarding morally appropriate responses to                   
vulnerability focuses heavily on our obligations to protect the interests of the                       
vulnerable whenever it is in our power to do so. While he is undoubtedly aware that                               
dealing with the sources of vulnerability should be encouraged, his main priority is                         
quite clearly to advocate for a collective acknowledgement that this duty of protection                         
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exists and should be fulfilled. The welfare state is both his intended target audience, and                             
what he defends. What I find striking in Goodin’s work, along with other philosophers                           
who work on vulnerability, is that obligations to protect are plainly favoured over                         
other kinds of obligation that could arise from the recognition of vulnerability -                         
especially obligations to ‘foster resilience and autonomy in those who would otherwise                       
be vulnerable’ (Dodds, 2014, p.189).   
 
Goodin, I believe, leads in  Protecting the Vulnerable a battle against those who                         
would attempt to deny altogether the existence of any kind of positive moral obligation                           
towards the vulnerable. I have touched upon their rhetoric in Chapter 4 when                         
depicting the libertarian emphasis on negative rights and duties over contractual                     
positive ones, for example (Goodin himself specifically addresses voluntarist accounts                   
of duties). In front of such denial, his utmost priority is to introduce a convincing first                               
response: the larger debate in which his argument is framed asks whether we are                           
morally bound to respond to vulnerability at all, and his answer must be a resounding                             
‘yes’ in order to trump his challengers. More precise evaluations of the kinds of                           
responses we ought to bring to vulnerability go too far beyond that, already rooted in                             
the premise that a response is indeed necessary. I do think this context weighed on                             
Goodin’s choice to favour protection over empowerment and resilience, but I agree                       
with Goodin’s detractors when they point out that his consequentialist approach                     
potentially opens the door to overly protective, pathogenic responses to vulnerability                     
(Mackenzie, Rogers, Dodds, 2014, p.16).   
 
If the first impulse one must have when confronted with vulnerability is to                         
protect, it might be said that one fails to question the presence of vulnerability in the                               
first place, thus grounding it in fact. According to Kittay, Goodin’s emphasis on the                           
‘fact’ of a dependent’s vulnerability to another person ‘overlooks questions concerning                     
the justice or moral worth of the relationship that makes one person dependent on                           
another’ (Dodds, 2014, p.194). Goodin’s account does little to facilitate awareness of the                         
ways in which policy discourses on vulnerability and protection can oftentimes single                       
out certain social groups as especially vulnerable, and be used to ‘justify objectionably                         
paternalistic and sometimes coercive forms of intervention’ (Mackenzie, 2014, p.37).                   
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More than that, it may fail to appreciate fully the necessary distinction between                         
inherent and situational vulnerabilities, therefore becoming more likely to increase                   
pathogenic responses. I have established earlier that situational vulnerabilities are                   
‘primarily the result not of unavoidable biological processes but of interpersonal and                       
social relationships or economic, legal, and political structures’ (Mackenzie, 2014, p.38),                     
but to focus solely on the duty to protect is to assume that vulnerability is mostly an                                 
unfortunate but inescapable, uncomplicated condition.   
 
That medical practices can easily embolden and lend themselves to                   
paternalistic attitudes is nothing new: many of the debates that agitate bioethicists focus                         
on the need to find an adequate balance between respect for autonomy and duties of                             
beneficence. Cases surrounding informed consent or cessation of treatment are                   
emblematic of this, but the turn taken by this inclination in the case of public health is                                 
revealing of some of the most notable ethical issues of pre-emptive psychiatry. One                         
might argue that the whole purpose of public health measures is to ‘impose structures                           
on individuals and communities in the name of collective welfare’ (Bayer, Fairchild,                       
2004, p.475) - by nature a very paternalistic endeavour. Preserving or promoting the                         
autonomy of individuals might thus very well be meaningless - or even contraindicated                         
- when one’s aim requires ‘the subordination of the individual for the common good’                           
(Ibid., p.474). Those who work for the prevention and limitation of epidemics and                         
pandemics may require access to personal health-related information, for example, or                     
insist on travel restrictions, vaccination, examinations, etc. in the name of the public                         
interest.   
 
When it comes to the development of pre-emptive psychiatry, however, such                     
encroachments on personal autonomy might appear considerably less justifiable: the                   
impact of mental health disorders is much more circumscribed to the persons who                         
suffer from them, and their close relatives. The way in which public interest might                           
come to be weighed against personal autonomy has thus less to do with concerns of                             
wide-scale and spreading health issues than with the idea of avoidable costs to society.                           
While improved long-term prognoses remain the primary motivation of those who                     
support the development of pre-onset early detection and interventions in the medical                       
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community, the reduced costs associated with a decrease in hospitalisations and                     
long-term treatments are still a large part of their line of argumentation. Knowing the                           
kinds of wide-scale benefits that can be brought about by the development of                         
pre-emptive measures in psychiatry, both in terms of health outcomes and of                       
resource-management, could it be said that there exists a duty to seek help and adhere                             
to treatment? That, in order to spare themselves and their loved ones future ordeals as                             
well as spare society long-term costs, at-risk individuals should abide by the preventive                         
measures recommended to them? In other words, do they have a duty to accept the                             
protection that is offered to them? Depending on the kinds of early interventions                         
eventually selected, a duty like this one could have far-reaching implications - especially                         
in view of the account of corrosive disadvantages disclosed earlier: 
 
Interventions that target specific groups identified as vulnerable               
and subject them to restrictions or forms of surveillance not                   
applied to the rest of the community [...] and that are primarily                       
focused on reducing perceived risks to society rather than                 
concerned with fostering autonomy count as objectionably             
paternalistic (Mackenzie, 2014, p.47). 
 
Purely protective responses to vulnerability - and, beyond that, protective responses                     
that one might be duty-bound to accept - are more likely than others to become                             
pathogenic, first by failing to question the  fact of that vulnerability, and secondly by                           
pressuring vulnerable people into accepting potentially corrosive relations of                 
dependence or risking further capabilities. Inadequate conceptualisations of psychiatric                 
vulnerability and of the ways we ought to respond to it can lead to harmful healthcare                               
practices: in the absence of accessible, non-stigmatising and empowering pre-onset                   
early interventions, many at-risk individuals may become, in their own eyes and in the                           
eyes of everyone else, patients suffering from an identifiable illness. They may then                         
become more hesitant or unable to pursue their education or to secure regular                         
employment, suffer from social isolation, etc.   
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Understanding vulnerabilities as threatened capabilities emphasises the             
existence of duties to empower vulnerable people. The existence of universal and                       
inescapable vulnerability cannot be denied, just like the fact that some individuals or                         
groups are more vulnerable than others should not be ignored, but to respond through                           
protective measures alone can give rise to new, pathogenic forms of vulnerability.                       
However, giving such prominence to the idea of autonomy in the context of                         
vulnerability might appear somewhat antithetical to many: after all, isn’t vulnerability                     
in great part relational - a form of necessary dependence on others? Wouldn’t care and                             
protection be the marks of morally acceptable relations of dependence, rather than a                         
push towards an eventually unreachable autonomy? In the next subsection, I argue for                         
the compatibility of my account of vulnerability as threatened capabilities with that of                         
relational autonomy. 
 
2. Against a Frontal Opposition Between Autonomy             
and Vulnerability 
If autonomy were to be defined as freedom from influence and control, or as a                             
form of independence, at-risk individuals might very well be said to be inescapably                         
impressionable and dependent on others, exposed as they are both to internal and                         
external influences. Their vulnerabilities would compel them to rely on others’ support                       
and protection, on their care, so as to be able to live fulfilling, if not truly self-ruling,                                 
lives. 
 
I have brought up such accounts of the ideally autonomous and rational agent                         
on a few occasions already: they assert that the decisions and actions of persons who are                               
unable to exert a certain amount of control over the influences that their circumstances,                           
their socialisation and other people might exert on them can never be genuinely their                           
own in the manner that autonomy requires (Benson, 1991, p.385). The idea behind this                           
is that ‘unchosen membership in a community represents a threat to personal                       
autonomy’ (Cristman, Anderson, 2005, p.128).   
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A handful of examples can be used to illustrate how uncontrolled influences                       
might be said to rob one of the ability to decide and act in a truly autonomous fashion.                                   
The construction of gender-based norms and their internalisation is a frequent one.                       
However, in order to stay closer to the topic that concerns me, I prefer to focus on the                                   
impact that perceived discrimination can have on one’s life and mental health. For                         
instance, there are many reports in the United Kingdom and The Netherlands of high                           
rates of psychotic disorders and psychotic symptoms in populations of African and                       
Caribbean origin - populations who are likely subjects of racial discrimination - leading                         
to claims that the association between ethnic group and psychosis is compounded by                         
racial discrimination (Janssen et al., 2003, p.71). The findings of one study suggest that                           
perceived discrimination can predict incident delusional ideation, which might be                   
explained by the influence that chronic experiences of discrimination may have on                       
attributions of daily events , thus ‘facilitating an understandably paranoid attributional                   28
style’ (Janssen et al., 2003, pp.73-74).   
 
It appears that elevated rates of psychoses among Black and Minority Ethnic                       
(BME) groups are unlikely to be entirely confounded by socio-economic status. In the                         
UK, Pakistani and Bangladeshi women are concerned by elevated rates in the same way                           
that Black African and Black Caribbean men are: ‘After controlling for current                       
socio-economic status, schizophrenia was ubiquitously raised in these groups: between                   
two- and threefold that of the White British group’ (Kirkbride et al., 2008, p.23). It was                               
suggested that migratory or post-migratory experiences present a set of risk factors that                         
may explain these raised rates of psychoses among BME groups (Ibid., p.23). In addition                           
to that, though, an association between perceived discrimination and increased                   
incidence of schizophrenia among immigrants has been the focus of several research                       
projects. Another study carried out in The Hague established that the incidence of                         
psychotic disorders varied across ethnic minority groups by degree of perceived                     
discrimination; the data presented suggested that ‘belonging to an ethnic minority                     
group perceiving a high degree of discrimination is a risk factor for psychotic disorders,                           
rather than immigration per se’ (Veling et al., 2007, p.765). Stigmatisation and                       
28 Attribution designates, in psychology, the process through which a person explains the                         
causes of behaviours and events. 
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discrimination are linked to poor mental health, physical illness and academic                     
underachievement, and so not only ‘in individuals who perceive direct interpersonal                     
discrimination, but also in those who experience that their group is discriminated                       
against and stigmatized’ (Ibid., p.765). Experiences of interpersonal discrimination,                 
including verbal abuse or physical assault, have been shown to have an impact on the                             
likelihood of developing psychosis; but the need to determine more definitively                     
whether it is experiences of racism that influence mental health, or if symptoms of                           
depression or psychosis predispose an individual towards increased perception (or                   
experiences) of racism (Karlsen et al. 2005, p.1801) is particularly relevant here.   
 
Whatever the answer, however, an at-risk individual’s thought processes                 
might be said to be heavily influenced by the experience and internalisation of                         
discrimination. Standard accounts of autonomy consider this kind of ‘socially                   
perpetrated deception’ as a threat to autonomy (Benson, 1991, p. 397). Even if this is                             
only the case when the deception ‘blocks critical reflection entirely or insulates it from                           
motivating action’, it is easy to see how paranoid attributional styles, for example,                         
might warp one’s reflective capacities: there are ways in which ‘deception systematically                       
misdirects the substance of reflection by limiting an agent's ability to assess her actions                           
rationally’ (Benson, 1991, pp.397-398). I find troubling the conclusion one might draw                       
from such an account of autonomy - that at-risk individuals and persons who suffer                           
from serious mental health problems might simply be categorised as non-autonomous                     
because less able (or unable) to regulate their actions through critical reflection on their                           
motives.   
 
I intend to defend the claim that any account of personal autonomy that is                           
construed on such an idea of independence from influence and control is problematic.                         
The normative implications of autonomy-as-independence, as seen, for example, in                   
negative-rights-based libertarian accounts, might culminate in a view of justice that                     
allows individuals to develop their personally selected pursuits with little interference                     
from others (Cristman, Anderson, 2005, p.128). The main purpose of public                     
institutions would therefore be to reduce any kinds of restrictions on such pursuits,                         
letting individuals become autonomous by gaining independence from everyone and                   
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everything else. Nevertheless, I do not intend to launch myself into an elaborate                         
criticism of libertarian political philosophy. In order to dismiss interpretations of                     
autonomy which see it as a form of free will, unrestricted and uninfluenced, I intend to                               
rely on a more direct process, and follow Meyers in saying that these interpretations of                             
autonomy will be unintelligible unless such a free agent can be found (Meyers, 1989,                           
p.42). 
 
I believe that one of the main accomplishments of feminist philosophy is its                         
success in undermining this vision of the independent, autonomous and free-willed                     
agent. The relationships that link us to each other, to our environment and to our                             
communities are marked by an ineluctable interdependence. From birth to death, we                       
count on the presence and the care of others to flourish, to learn and to thrive.                               
Self-determination and, even more than that, rational thinking itself, certainly do not                       
appear out of thin air: both are complex skills that can only be acquired through time                               
and practice, and ‘from within a network of relationships that tie us to each other’                             
(MacIntyre, 1999, p.5).   
 
More traditional accounts of autonomy may also integrate the idea of a slow                         
transition into rationality and self-determination, but where they postulate a move                     
away from others and their influence, feminist philosophy attempted to show how                       
rationality and self-determination can only come to be  through relations with others.                       
One’s self can only make such a transition through one’s history of contact, care and                             
exchange with particular others ‘whose presence or absence, intervention or lack of                       
intervention, are of crucial importance in determining how far the transition is                       
successfully completed’ (MacIntyre, 1999, p.73). These relationships are necessary for                   
the provision of the most basic necessities that make autonomy achievable in the first                           
place (access to food and shelter in one’s early life, care, education, etc.), but also for the                                 
development of those many faculties that allow a person to think of himself or herself                             
as able to determine his- or herself:   
 
Autonomous people are not vouchsafed a glimpse of their inner                   
selves that other people are denied. Rather, they possess and                   
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exercise skills that maintain a fluid interaction between their                 
traits, their feelings, their beliefs, their values, their extended                 
plans, their current possibilities for realizing these plans, and                 
their conduct (Meyers, 1989, p.55). 
 
In this case, autonomy ceases to be a circumstance (that of independence and freedom                           
from interference and influence) and becomes instead a learned competency - a skill, in                           
and of itself. And that skill can only be cultivated through one’s relationships to others:                             
this account is thus of  relational autonomy .   
 
In the framework I am attempting to delineate so as to allow for a more                             
constructive conversation regarding the ethics of pre-onset early detection and                   
interventions in psychiatry, the difference between persons who are particularly                   
vulnerable and those who are less so depends on the capabilities they have at their                             
disposal. There ceases to be a necessary discrepancy between being vulnerable and                       
being autonomous; on the contrary, the acknowledgement of a shared - if unequal -                           
vulnerability becomes clearer, as we are all ‘much more vulnerable and needy than the                           
liberal model has traditionally represented [us] as being’ (Cristman, Anderson, 2005,                     
p.129). ‘Relational approaches thus uphold the value of individual autonomy while                     
eschewing the individualism associated with some liberal and especially libertarian                   
conceptions of autonomy’ (Mackenzie, 2014, p.42).   
 
When it comes to responding adequately to the identification of                   
vulnerabilities, therefore, the duty to empower more vulnerable individuals and to                     
support the development and the preservation of their capabilities would supersede the                       
moral obligation to protect them. Vulnerability, ceasing to be a condition that                       
thoroughly separates those marked by it from those who are not (and, perhaps, ceasing                           
also to be a pathology), becomes quite entwined with the notion of autonomy. Rather                           
than irremediably incompatible opposites which would see autonomy increase as                   
vulnerability lessens (and vice versa), the acquisition of autonomous capabilities is                     
founded on the experience of vulnerability and interdependence: ‘the highest form of                       
autonomy, then, does not consist in the vindication of vulnerability, but in the                         
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mediation of both notions in the social order’ (Hettema, 2014, p.496). More traditional                         
models of autonomy tend to see it as something developed separately from others and                           
their influence, and even sometimes against these others’ claims, but relational accounts                       
understand the ways in which we depend on one another through networks of familial,                           
social and institutional interdependencies as providing the cognitive and practical                   
conditions of possibility for self-determination (Leach Scully, 2014, p.212): 
 
It is an impressive accomplishment that, on the path from                   
helpless infancy to mature autonomy, we come to be able to                     
trust our own feelings and intuitions, to stand up for what we                       
believe in, and to consider our projects and accomplishments                 
worthwhile. [...] the shift to a more social account gets its                     
normative point – namely, that one’s autonomy is vulnerable to                   
disruptions in one’s relationship to others (Cristman,             
Anderson, 2005, pp.129-130) 
 
Therefore, since the relational theorists with whom I side understand                   
autonomy as a ‘socially constituted capacity, in the twin senses that its development and                           
exercise require extensive social scaffolding and support and that its development and                       
exercise can be thwarted by exploitative or oppressive interpersonal relationships and                     
by repressive or unjust social and political institutions’ (Mackenzie, Rogers, Dodds,                     
2014, p.17), my account of the ethics of pre-emptive psychiatry is premised on the idea                             
that both vulnerability and autonomy must be understood together. 
 
What I intend to do, now, is explore in more detail how a relational account                             
like the one I just developed can integrate the many ways in which one’s environment                             
(one’s family, community, society, etc.) may either enable or inhibit one’s ability to                         
behave as an autonomous agent and to flourish as a capable and resilient person. I have                               
already explored, at points, how at-risk individuals may be more likely to see their                           
capabilities threatened through a complex combination of inherent vulnerabilities and                   
situational ones, all potentially exacerbated or accompanied by pathogenic                 
vulnerabilities. Their capacity for self-determination can be equally imperiled. For                   
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example, neuroticism, which encompasses traits like irritability, anger, sadness, anxiety,                   
worry, hostility, self-consciousness, excessive negative emotional responses,             
self-criticism, sensitivity to the criticism of others, and feelings of personal inadequacy                       
(Lahey, 2009, p.241), has been said to increase risks of developing psychotic symptoms                         
(Krabbendam, 2002, p.1). Several of these traits are, however, central in the                       
progression of autonomy-related capabilities. Encouraging the development of certain                 
attitudes toward oneself, such as self-trust and self-respect, is necessary if one is to                           
become able to make ‘life-guiding decisions’: the very idea of self-determination must                       
be internalised (Leach Scully, 2014, p.212), and the process is a slow-going one.   
 
These psychological traits - self-trust, self-respect, and self-esteem - are now                     
widely recognised to be ‘crucially important to one's autonomy, to personal integrity,                       
and more generally to the real possibility of formulating and pursuing one’s conception                         
of the good life’ (Anderson, 2014, p.141). Such psychological qualities are thus                       
foundational, in the sense that their impact trickles down to many areas of an                           
individual’s mental, familial and social life: ‘self-respect is better understood as                     
comprising all those aspects of cognition, valuation, affect, expectation, motivation,                   
action, reaction, and interaction’ (Dillon, 1997, p.228). Low self-esteem, self-trust or                     
self-respect are particularly insidious and corrosive disadvantages. Individuals need                 
strong inner resources to resist their message, without which it will be hard for them to                               
think of themselves as free and equal persons (Cristman, Anderson, 2005, pp.132). In                         
this sense, their autonomy can be harmed by damaging, stigmatising and pathogenic                       
relationships to others (in this case, to caretakers and healthcare professionals in                       
particular), just as autonomy can be promoted and thrive within a network of                         
empowering relationships. The ‘practical relation-to-self’, to quote Cristman and                 
Anderson, that psychiatric vulnerability may threaten is an essential component of                     
autonomy; and relational accounts recognise that the development and maintenance of                     
that practical relation-to-self necessitates proactive and collective action. 
 
Those people who have a healthy dose of confidence and respect for                       
themselves possess something that is integral to living a satisfying and meaningful life,                         
while those whose self-respect is damaged or fragile are ‘thereby condemned to live                         
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constricted, deformed, frustrating lives, cut off from possibilities for self-realization,                   
self-fulfillment, and happiness’ (Dillon, 1997, p.226). A judgement like this one can                       
seem dire, especially if one is inherently and situationally more likely to see their sense                             
of self damaged or warped with time, as might be the case for at-risk individuals.                             
Having a better and more comprehensive understanding of the conditions which might                       
either favour or undermine one’s autonomy-related traits and capabilities should                   
therefore be a priority.   
 
Encouragingly, there seem to be promising prospects for this (Anderson, 2014,                     
p.143), but they necessitate, first, an acknowledgement that the psychological factors                     
that appear to play such a significant role in an individual’s capability set and mental                             
health are not solely a  personal problem depending on that individual’s  personal                       
responsibility. I strongly agree with Dillon’s statement that the source of some damage                         
to self-respect is an implicit interpretive framework of self-perception which is not                       
solely a private phenomenon, but is a feature of the historical and sociopolitical                         
situatedness of individuals (Dillon, 1997, p.243) - in other words, of situational and                         
pathogenic vulnerabilities. The whole point of the account of inherent, situational and                       
pathogenic vulnerabilities that I have outlined, and its integration within the                     
capabilities framework, has been to underline as emphatically as possible the existence                       
of a  collective moral responsibility to promote at-risk individuals’ capacities for                     
resilience, without over-medicalising their condition.   
 
There are ways in which a person’s autonomy can be diminished and impeded,                         
especially through damage to the social relations that should support it (Cristman,                       
Anderson, 2005, p.127). What this means is that some ‘forms and degrees of                         
vulnerability are antithetical to autonomy’ (Anderson, 2014, p.135). Whether these are                     
inherent, situational or pathogenic, pre-emptive practices (including both pre-onset                 
early detection and pre-onset early interventions) must aim, first and foremost, to                       
protect the relational autonomy of the at-risk individuals they concern: ‘carefully                     
designed and responsive social and legal institutions aimed at reducing (everyone’s)                     
situational vulnerability or supporting the development of resilience may reduce some                     
forms of dependency, in particular those that risk pathogenic vulnerability [...] On a                         
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relational approach to autonomy vulnerability is not to be contrasted with                     
invulnerability but with resilience’ (Dodds, 2014, pp.197-198).   
 
More specifically, given the impact that corrosive disadvantages can have on                     
young, vulnerable at-risk individuals, what needs to be encouraged are personal,                     
familial, social and therapeutic relationships that recognise and understand the sources                     
of their vulnerabilities and the need to preserve and promote their autonomy and                         
resilience. Psychotic disorders have a genetic component (Seidman et al., 2006, p.507),                       
meaning that many at-risk individuals grow up with at least one parent suffering from                           
severe mental health problems, in an environment that might compound their own                       
inherent vulnerabilities. The pre-emptive measures which should be prioritised ought                   
to integrate various sources of stress in at-risk individuals’ family lives, for example,                         
and aim to make accessible information, education and support so as to form the kinds                             
of relationships needed to promote resilience. The difficulty of balancing the                     
vulnerabilities of parents with mental health problems and the vulnerabilities of their                       
children has been highlighted by Cousin and Mullin: supporting these parents can                       
sometimes conflict with the realisation that their children’s needs are not being met                         
(Mullin, 2014, p.276). Several kinds of measures can be envisaged in order to provide                           
helpful, non-pathogenic support and to supplement at-risk individuals’ and their                   
parent’s capabilities and autonomy: psychoeducation, facilitated access to outdoors                 
activities or academic support are a few examples amongst others. The next chapter                         
will explore these possibilities in more detail.   
 
I defend the idea that respecting and fostering autonomy must be absolutely                       
central to the normative obligations arising from vulnerability. Being better able to                       
identify and understand psychiatric vulnerabilities should not lead to considering them                     
as a pathology in and of themselves, creating a strong separation between vulnerable                         
individuals and non-vulnerable ones. At-risk individuals should be acknowledged as                   
more inherently and situationally vulnerable than others may be, but it should also be                           
recognised that these vulnerabilities affect everyone. Otherwise, those discourses of                   
vulnerability that focus on protection first and foremost may ‘open the door to                         
objectionably paternalistic and coercive forms of intervention’ (Mackenzie, 2014, p.33).                   
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On the contrary, at-risk individuals are more in need of targeted forms of assistance                           
which would preserve their capabilities and allow the conversion of their resources into                         
functionings. Recognising that vulnerabilities primarily threaten one’s capabilities               
therefore ought to encourage, whenever possible, interventions designed to mitigate                   
them and enhance resilience. 
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Chapter 6 - Defending Staging Models 
 
I argued in Chapter 3 that the ethical debate that has surrounded the                         
development of pre-emptive psychiatry ‘missed the mark’, in a sense, in that it mostly                           
missed an opportunity to focus on what underlies many of the issues under                         
consideration, and that it was not constructive enough. The claim is not insignificant,                         
nor is it particularly charitable, but I would argue that it is justified: I believe that                               
articulating this debate around conceptualisations of vulnerability is much more                   
compelling. Doubtlessly, stigma, discrimination, overdiagnosis, disadvantage, anxiety,             
over-medicalisation and overmedication are crucial concerns when considering               
pre-onset early detection and interventions in psychiatry. Nevertheless, to focus                   
directly on these worrying (potential) repercussions of a generalised implementation of                     
pre-emptive measures fails to acknowledge that these measures are not a homogeneous                       
or a universally agreed-upon form of psychiatric care. On the contrary, several                       
diagnostic models, early detection instruments, and forms of pre-onset early                   
intervention have been proposed throughout the past twenty years. And, while some                       
people might put forward the idea that the proponents of pre-emptive psychiatry do                         
seem to work in a cohesive manner - if not necessarily in close collaboration - towards                               
a concerted outcome, I want to point to the moral significance of such divergences.   
 
This appearance of a united front might have more to do with the necessity to                             
counter a perceived lack of scientific, medical and ethical credibility than with actual                         
concurrence. At the end of a collection of essays aiming to outline the ‘state of the art’                                 
and future perspectives of early detection and early intervention in psychosis, its                       
editors, Riecher-Rössler and McGorry, conclude that the relegation of the Attenuated                     
Psychosis Syndrome to the Appendix of the DSM-5 - with an encouragement for                         
further research - still leaves the door open for an official (and visibly much hoped for)                               
introduction of this diagnostic category into the next  Manual : 
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Some are still questioning the validity of the ‘attenuated                 
psychosis syndrome’ [...] The DSM-5 working group therefore               
only integrated it into the appendix of the DSM-5 as a                     
condition for further study. Nevertheless it still states, ‘...that                 
secondary prevention of full psychosis may offer substantial               
life-course benefits. It seems likely that psychiatry will move in                   
this direction with a number of disorders in the future'                   
(Riecher-Rössler; McGorry, 2016b, p.186). 
 
To anyone who reads this collection of papers attentively, this allusion to the APS as                             
the embodiment of pre-emptive psychiatry’s future might seem somewhat surprising -                     
perhaps even strikingly unambitious. Indeed, if one thing can be said to emerge in                           
particular relief from this precise outline of the current state of pre-emptive psychiatry                         
and its future perspectives, it is the idea that many hopes hinge upon further                           
discoveries in neuroimaging, genetics or neurocognition, and not solely upon clinical                     
symptomatology. It appears as though a series of somewhat conflicting notions have                       
therefore been underlying recent developments in this field, each drawing it towards                       
different forms of implementation.   
 
In that sense, the APS model on its own can sometimes appear quite limited,                           
especially in view of the opportunities opened by new research projects and pre-onset                         
early interventions as they were exposed in Riecher-Rössler’s and McGorry’s                   
publication. Rather, the increasing focus on biomarkers, or even on the notion of basic                           
symptoms, seems to point to a form of prevention that could allow for very early                             
detection - before the onset of the positive clinical symptoms that are the core target of                               
the APS category. This attachment to the APS model might be explained, amongst                         
other reasons, by its reliance on a criterion that is often deemed essential if pre-emptive                             
psychiatry is ever to be perceived as an ethically-acceptable form of care: at-risk                         
individuals must seek help of their own volition, meaning that their clinical symptoms                         
must already be distressing enough for them to undertake such a course of action.                           
Clearly, many proponents of pre-emptive psychiatry are convinced that this is the only                         
thing that might legitimise the introduction of a new diagnostic category into the                         
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DSM. A full-threshold diagnosis like schizophrenia would remain ill-fitted for patients                     
whose symptoms are not (yet) severe enough to justify such a label, but their distress                             
still needs to be adequately addressed within a psychiatric framework: ‘A strong                       
consensus exists that individuals meeting APS criteria (which includes a criterion for                       
help-seeking) are symptomatic and in need of clinical care. [...] Thus, treatment is                         
clearly justified, regardless of the justification of reduction of risk or prevention’ (Yung                         
et al., 2012, p.1130). Nevertheless, some might think that the importance of the                         
help-seeking criterion is destined to lessen if valid early markers were one day                         
discovered: it certainly seems like several research projects are currently aiming to do                         
just that. 
 
Thus, I argue that a sharper focus on the various conceptualisations of                       
psychiatric vulnerability that have been suggested by proponents of pre-emptive                   
psychiatry allows for a more constructive examination of their ethical implications. In                       
chapters 4 and 5, I outlined why vulnerability calls for strong moral obligations, for                           
attention to how it is to be defined and to the types of moral duties to which it gives                                     
rise; these chapters will now serve as a basis for the coming analysis of available                             
diagnostic models and associated interventions, which will put a strong emphasis on                       
the ideas of resilience and relational autonomy. Through evaluating in more detail,                       
firstly, the ethical implications of diverse models of vulnerability and, secondly, those of                         
the pre-onset early interventions they stimulate, I therefore defend staging models over                       
attenuated syndromes, despite remaining pragmatic and ethical challenges. 
 
I. THE THERAPEUTIC AND ETHICAL         
IMPLICATIONS OF DIVERSE MODELS OF         
VULNERABILITY 
The second chapter of this dissertation was dedicated to an exploration of the                         
current state of research regarding pre-emptive psychiatry. It proposed a succinct                     
outline of the different instruments that were designed for the early detection of at-risk                           
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individuals, of the various diagnostic models and labels that were elaborated by                       
researchers and psychiatrists, and of the existing structures intended to provide care for                         
at-risk individuals. Far from the very descriptive purpose of that chapter, the goal, here,                           
is to present a commentary on the implications (both ethical and therapeutic) of these                           
various instruments, labels and structures. Indeed, their relations of interdependence or                     
dissociation are meaningful in ways that have too often been overlooked in the debate                           
that has surrounded the development of pre-emptive psychiatry. I have thus identified a                         
series of relevant notions at play in conceptualisations of psychiatric vulnerability, each                       
pulling the development of pre-emptive psychiatry one way or another; and it is now                           
time to focus on them in a way that addresses their various ramifications. 
 
1. Primary Prevention and Secondary Prevention 
This particular distinction is significant in many ways; one could even say that                         
it is actually quite symbolic of the continuity and of the tensions that run through the                               
elaboration of valid detection and intervention methods in pre-emptive psychiatry. The                     
most salient point to be made here is that both primary prevention and secondary                           
prevention are on the same spectrum: what differentiates them is related to                       29
incremental or chronological factors, but there are no necessarily significant differences                     
in the nature of these interventions. They share the same goal (to delay or prevent                             
entirely the decline of a person’s mental health), and rely on similar kinds of inclusion                             
criteria, but they are adaptive to both the current state of health of the person                             
concerned, and the degree to which that person can be said to be specifically at risk of                                 
relapse or deterioration. Similarly, what distinguishes various early detection methods                   
in pre-emptive psychiatry has more to do with scope and scale than with categorisation.                           
Nevertheless, these differences remain highly pertinent from an ethical standpoint. 
29 In order to give a working definition of primary prevention and secondary prevention, I can                               
cite the explanation given by the Institute for Work & Health: ‘Primary prevention aims to prevent                               
disease or injury before it ever occurs. This is done by preventing exposures to hazards that cause disease                                   
or injury, altering unhealthy or unsafe behaviours that can lead to disease or injury, and increasing                               
resistance to disease or injury should exposure occur’; while ‘Secondary prevention aims to reduce the                             
impact of a disease or injury that has already occurred. This is done by detecting and treating disease or                                     
injury as soon as possible to halt or slow its progress, encouraging personal strategies to prevent reinjury                                 
or recurrence, and implementing programs to return people to their original health and function to                             
prevent long-term problems’ (IWH, 2015, p.2). 
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 An argument could be made, as Kolsterkötter did, that what pre-emptive                     
psychiatry is all about are actually different subsections of primary prevention: either                       
universal, selective or indicated prevention (Klosterkötter, 2016, p.2). Use of the APS                       
would then be a form of indicated (primary) prevention, as it targets persons who are                             
already suffering from ‘first complaints and impairments and who are actively seeking                       
advice and help’ (Ibid., p.2). I would contend, however, that this refers to a form of                               
indicated  secondary prevention, and not to a later stage of primary prevention: after all,                           
considering that secondary prevention aims to reduce the impact of a disorder that has                           
already occurred, any argument that stresses that the APS is a diagnosis in its own right                               
- and indeed there are plenty - would put what Klosterkötter designates as indicated                           
prevention more clearly in that category. For the sake of simplicity, I will thus speak                             
mostly of primary and secondary prevention rather than of selective and indicated                       
primary prevention. 
 
Very briefly, in the case of pre-emptive psychiatry, primary prevention                   
methods would target larger sections of a community than the Ultra-High Risk group                         
(UHR) currently does, although it would very probably remain more selective than                       
universal. Nevertheless, a universal approach is not unimaginable in pre-emptive                   
psychiatry, nor is it doomed to inefficacy. Awareness that promoting well-being in an                         
entire community could have a significant impact on that population’s mental health,                       
for example using a ‘whole systems approach’, is growing. The role of public health                           
could therefore become crucial in universal primary prevention, and has actually grown                       
steadily: ‘public mental health models of ‘risk’ and ‘protective’ factors exist at the                         
individual, family and community levels to describe the processes associated with                     
mental health problems’ (Bhui, Dinos, 2011, p.417).   
 
Many obstacles still face those who would favour a public health and universal                         
approach to prevention, though: psychiatric vulnerability is such a multifaceted                   
condition that attempting to prevent it on a universal scale would require immense                         
politico-social will, means, and reach. Several goals would have to be pursued                       
simultaneously: addressing the causes and the consequences of childhood adversities                   
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and vulnerabilities; avoiding the aggravation of existing disabilities or illnesses ‘either                     
through preventing progression of distress or through dealing with behaviours that                     
compound disability, for example substance misuse or minor offending behaviour’;                   
limiting the possibilities for an ‘intergenerational transmission of violence, abuse,                   
trauma, poverty and inequalities to the children of adults experiencing mental health                       
problems’ (Bhui, Dinos, 2011, p.418). The repartition of responsibilities for these                     
ambitions (between healthcare professionals, social workers, policy-makers, politicians               
and others) is, in itself, an incredibly arduous and complex task - though still one worth                               
pursuing. One worry regarding this type of wide-ranging and universal preventive                     
action is that it might take resources away from secondary and tertiary approaches, or                           
even from selective and indicated primary prevention. However, it is not out of the                           
realm of possibility that, rather than compete with these other kinds of preventive                         
measures, a universal approach may actually allow for a finer adaptation of pre-onset                         
early interventions to varying degrees of vulnerability and risk. Universal primary                     
prevention could be integrated within a broader network of measures, which would                       
benefit from the input of specialised teams, all the while encouraging generic policies                         
and actions. Unfortunately, I will not have the opportunity to delve deeper into this                           
particular deliberation at this stage; I will simply point out that universal primary                         
prevention in mental health should not be disregarded as unattainable or ineffectual too                         
quickly.   
 
Selective primary prevention in pre-emptive psychiatry, on the other hand,                   
might appear to be more readily implementable. It would aim at increasing identified                         
at-risk individuals’ resilience when confronted with adverse circumstances, mental                 
health issues and other risk factors, all the while reducing the latter. Here, the target                             
population is already narrowly selected but, because of the wider scope of primary                         
prevention in comparison to secondary prevention, associated interventions do tend to                     
be less clinically-based, and are often integrated into a more holistic and general                         
promotion of health. Translated to the case of pre-emptive psychiatry, this could mean                         
the encouragement of lifestyle changes, or a more accessible provision of psychosocial                       
support: ‘The public health approach relies on primary prevention, promoting                   
individual responsibilities and resilience, while also sustaining existing services and                   
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tackling inequalities’ (Bhui, Binos, 2011, p.417). A detailed analysis of such                     
interventions will be proposed below.   
 
Secondary prevention, on the other hand, targets individuals who are already                     
afflicted with a latent disease or disorder, although it is to be implemented prior to the                               
apparition of serious symptoms. The goal is to detect and start treating an existing                           
disorder as early as possible. The UHR group, significantly more at risk than the                           
general population and already seeking help, is thus the primary objective of such                         
secondary prevention in pre-emptive psychiatry. Treatments envisaged have included                 
the use of antipsychotic drugs, Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) or a combination                       
of the two, pharmacological substances like omega-3 (ω-3), and other forms of                       
supportive counselling (Bechdolf et al., 2012, p.22; Addington, Heinssen, 2012, p.279).                     
Here again, though, the more comprehensive account of these measures will be                       
outlined later on. If one is to evaluate the development of pre-emptive psychiatry from                           
an ethical standpoint, the distinction between primary prevention and secondary                   
prevention matters greatly in that, depending on the diagnostic model selected, one                       
could be greatly favoured over the other. As was just briefly pointed out, this could                             
have a significant impact on the form and implementation of pre-onset early detection                         
and interventions in psychiatry, and on at-risk individuals at large.   
 
The Attenuated Psychosis Syndrome (APS) was developed as a self-contained                   
diagnostic category, and was clearly intended to encourage a form of secondary                       
prevention for psychotic disorders. This focus on a secondary approach is anchored in a                           
very tangible idea: although, in principle, primary prevention can be offered either                       
universally or, more selectively or indicatively, to healthy individuals with known risk                       
factors for psychotic disorders, it cannot be implemented effectively - at least to date -                             
due to the low incidence of psychosis in the general population and the lack of                             
sufficient knowledge regarding etiology and risk factors (Klosterkötter, 2016, p.2).                   
Insofar as this remains the case, targeting persons whose symptoms are distressing                       
enough that they seek psychiatric help is still the best way to go, and so for many                                 
proponents of pre-emptive psychiatry. At this point, I feel that the proposed criteria for                           
the APS, as established in the Appendix of the DSM-5, should be outlined again:   
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 a. At least one of the following symptoms is present in                   
attenuated form, with relatively intact reality testing and is of                   
sufficient severity or frequency to warrant clinical attention: 
● Delusions 
● Hallucinations 
● Disorganized speech. 
b. Symptom(s) must have been present at least once per                 
week in the last 1 month 
c. Symptom(s) must have begun or worsened in the past                 
year 
d. Symptom(s) is sufficiently distressing and disabling to             
the individual to warrant clinical attention 
e. Symptom(s) is not better explained by another mental               
disorder, including: Depressive or bipolar disorder with             
psychotic features and is not attributable to physiological effects                 
of a substance or another medical condition 
f. Criteria for any psychotic disorder have never been met                 
(APA, 2013, p.783). 
 
These criteria emerged in great part from the work of people like McGorry                         
and Yung in the late 1990’s, while they attempted to develop clinical instruments such                           
as the Comprehensive Assessment for the At-Risk Mental States, or CAARMS                     
(Addington, Heinssen, 2012, p.270), in a bid to identify individuals that they would                         
later deem to be ‘Ultra-High Risk’ (UHR). Within the framework of the APS, early                           
detection thus relies almost entirely on (positive) symptomatology; and no provision is                       
made in the APS’ brief outline for a form of pre-symptomatic detection. The distress                           
criterion is highlighted on several occasions, though, as it embodies the all-important                       
safeguard against accusations of disease-mongering with which psychiatrists and                 
researchers are all too familiar.   
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In the same vein, I want to insist once more on the fact that the notion of risk                                   
was strategically removed from the APS’ appellation, and so for two reasons. If the APS                             
was to be seen as capturing the prodrome of psychotic disorders, it would fail to                             
account for other trajectories potentially taken by a patient’s symptoms (towards either                       
non-psychotic disorders or gradual dissipation), and it might cause undue stress and                       
anxiety in diagnosed individuals. Both these pitfalls are made especially problematic by                       
the high number of false positives still disclosed by studies which are concerned with                           
transition rates from UHR to full-threshold psychosis (Blumenthal-Barby, 2014, p.532),                   
hence the ‘proposed reconcepualization of APS as a self-contained rather than an                       
at-risk syndrome’ (Rutigliano, Manalo, Fusar-Poli, 2016, p.61). On the surface, then,                     
the APS is presented as a fully-fledged diagnostic category, and not as the prodrome of                             
psychotic disorders.   
 
Nonetheless, the APS benefits from any detection method or instrument that                     
enhances transition rates to full-threshold psychosis: the more at-risk its target                     
population, the more justified it becomes in the eyes of clinicians, other mental health                           
professionals, ethicists, and even society at large. Inversely, ‘the analysis becomes less                       
favourable towards treatment as the ability to accurately target those at severe risk of                           
illness diminishes, and as the severity of likely side effects increases’ (Bentall, Morrison,                         
2002, p.353). The acceptability of the APS as a diagnosis is thus directly proportional to                             
its accuracy with regards to transition rates. Even with the notion of risk or any other                               
hint at an evolutive trajectory removed from it, the core ambition behind the inclusion                           
of the APS in the newest version of the DSM remains profoundly preventive. If the                             
parentage of the APS did not speak for itself (in a way, it is a direct descendant of Yung                                     
and McGorry’s At-Risk Mental State and of the UHR criteria), the whole rhetoric                         
surrounding it is markedly focused on the idea of countering transition towards                       
full-threshold psychosis (Carpenter, van Os, 2011, p.460; Woods et al., 2010, p.199).                       
Elaborated as a form of secondary prevention, the APS diagnosis conceptualises                     
psychiatric vulnerability as an identifiable medical condition - a source of distress that                         
manifests itself through a series of specific clinical symptoms.   
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It is important to note that non-specific staging models, which I would present                         
as the main counterpart to the APS, are actually far from incompatible with this                           
conceptualisation of vulnerability. On the contrary, they concur wholly with the                     
criteria established by the APS, which is why their proponents are generally ready to                           
defend them wholeheartedly. What staging models do, though, is go beyond the idea of                           
vulnerability as a rigidly defined moment directly preceding a transition towards                     
full-threshold psychosis. Their approach is more evolutionary and dynamic, accounting                   
for a variety of development courses and pre-symptomatic forms of vulnerability: 
 
Further risk stratification is urgently needed to identify               
subgroups with specific needs and response patterns and thus                 
improve the cost-benefit ratio of preventive interventions.             
Hence, it has been suggested to develop prediction models that                   
integrate information from various assessment domains,           
including psychopathology, sociodemographic characteristics,       
neurocognition, blood parameters, neuroimaging, and         
neurophysiology (Studerus, Papmeyer, Riecher-Rössler, 2016,         
p.117). 
 
The earlier stages (and in particular stage 0) delineate states of vulnerability                       
thus characterised by the presence of biomarkers and other prospectively-defined risk                     
criteria, and by the absence of clinical symptoms. For example, research has                       
demonstrated that subtle structural brain changes can be observed in non-symptomatic                     
relatives of schizophrenic patients, therefore putting them, it seems, more at risk for                         
psychotic disorders (McGorry et al., 2014, p.214; Fusar-Poli et al., 2007, p.465). Within                         
the framework of staging, primary and selective prevention could then once again                       
become part of pre-emptive psychiatry’s purpose. More than that, it openly becomes an                         
ideal target for pre-onset early intervention, even if not implementable just yet:                       
‘stratified or personalized interventions remain aspirational, yet potentially within                 
reach’ (McGorry, 2014, p.211). Findings have shown that intervening early is associated                       
with an improved long-term prognosis (Addington, Heinssen, 2012, p.270): it would                     
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make sense to aim for detection methods that allow for intervention as early as                           
possible, so long as therapeutic benefits can be demonstrably improved by this.   
 
Even so, whether or not intervention in the prepsychotic phase alters                     
long-term pathophysiology, it might still very well enable at-risk individuals to be                       
‘successful with life milestones that are essential to future well-being such as successful                         
education, being employed, having a love relationship, and supportive social network’                     
by providing accessible forms of support early on (Carpenter, 2016, p.IX). The British                         
government’s ‘Public Health White Paper for England’ on preventive measures in                     
psychiatry, for example, adopted a public health approach (HM Government, 2010). It                       
set out to outline recommendations for (universal and selective) primary prevention                     
measures, specifically underlining the importance of strengthening protective factors                 
(e.g. social capital, family relations, educational and academic achievement) by helping                     
people become more resistant or resilient to the risks imposed by adverse                       
circumstances, encouraging public health experts to ‘ensure research into resilience,                   
and monitor inequalities for early signs that they are worsening or remaining static’                         
(Bhui, Dinos, 2011, p.418).   
 
From a life-course perspective, new knowledge is required at                 
developmental stages preceding APS, including a broader             
definition of vulnerability to psychopathology at stages where               
primary prevention is considered, stages where vulnerability is               
manifest and prevention of psychopathology such as that               
defined in APS can be addressed. As the field moves toward                     
psychopathology prevention, the classification of established           
mental disorders becomes less decisive, and a focus on                 
symptom domains and underlying behavioral constructs is             
more heuristic. Therapeutic discovery at present is focused on                 
reducing manifest psychopathology, but prevention discovery           
in the future will be based on intervention targets ranging from                     
interruption of pathways to vulnerability and, in the               
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vulnerable, enhancing resiliency (Fusar-Poli et al., 2014,             
pp.184-185). 
 
With staging models, attention can be paid more openly to a vast array of risk factors                               
that are known to increase vulnerability and lifetime risk for psychosis from a very                           
early age, despite the fact that they are not yet ‘sufficiently predictive to allow the                             
development and application of ‘selective’ prevention measures targeting asymptomatic                 
persons at risk’ (Klosterkötter, 2016, p.3). Among these risk factors are neurobiological                       
markers or environmental circumstances, such as exposure to viral agents in the second                         
trimester of pregnancy, birth complications, childhood trauma, migration, the quality                   
of the rearing environment, socioeconomic disadvantage, urban birth and upbringing,                   
and using illicit drugs, particularly cannabis (Klosterkötter, 2016, p.3; Broome et al.,                       
2005, p.24). While all these risk factors would be meaningful even if the APS model                             
were to remain overwhelmingly prevalent in pre-emptive psychiatry (they could be                     
used for the more individualised risk profile and prognosis of a diagnosed patient), they                           
do play a very significant role within staging models.   
 
The great advantage of staging models is that they account for the evolution of                           
psychopathology during the development of mental illnesses starting from their earliest                     
phases; they can therefore become an indispensable instrument in altering the course of                         
these illnesses ‘by providing appropriate interventions that target individual modifiable                   
risk and protective factors’ (McGorry et al., 2014, p.211). More than that, they can                           
facilitate the integration of ‘new data on the biological, social and environmental factors                         
that influence mental illness into clinical and diagnostic infrastructures’ (Ibid., p.211) in                       
a way that the APS on its own cannot. In terms of pre-onset early intervention, staging                               
models can put a stronger emphasis on the future possibility to make available a form of                               
selective, primary prevention to larger subgroups of the population identified as                     
vulnerable, if not necessarily in the UHR group yet. By expanding the scope of                           
preventive efforts to integrate a form of selective primary prevention, proponents of                       
staging models therefore offer a more dynamic conceptualisation of mental illness and                       
of psychiatric vulnerability. Furthermore, identified at-risk individuals don’t necessarily                 
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have to be seen as patients, or be diagnosed with a specific condition like the APS,                               
helping pre-emptive psychiatry move beyond a purely medical setting.   
 
Speaking about at-risk adolescents and young adults, Professor Jan Scott, who                     
works on the early detection of bipolar disorders and other mental health disorders                         
through the application of staging models, says:   
 
You mustn’t change their identity into someone who has a                   
diagnosis of mental illness – just because they have some                   
symptoms that increase their risk of an illness; it has to be                       
remembered that only 20-30% will make that transition. The                 
earlier we intervene with low key, considered support, the                 
better their chances to avoid a serious diagnosis in the future.   
(Professor Jan Scott, interviewed in Newcastle upon Tyne on                 
the 15th of January, 2015).   
 
Through clinical staging, vulnerability can become a multifaceted and interactive                   
condition, the trajectory of which can be altered on a multitude of levels. Our responses                             
to it, be they medical, psychosocial, or even political, should be adaptive to identifiable                           
factors. Referring back to Rogers, Mackenzie and Dodds’ tripartite definition of                     
vulnerability, both inherent and situational forms of vulnerability might thus start to be                         
addressed as such by staged approaches. I would like to argue that, while working with                             
the APS does leave open the possibility to account for these risk/vulnerability factors so                           
as to increase predictive validity, it would inevitably lead to overwhelmingly medical                       
(and potentially pathogenic) responses.   
 
It is necessary to develop a more acute awareness of what, ethically speaking, is                           
at stake when determining which forms of prevention (primary and/or secondary,                     
universal, selective and/or indicated) are best suited to pre-emptive efforts in                     
psychiatry. It would, without a doubt, facilitate the promotion of a more constructive                         
debate on this question. Likewise, the choice between specific and nonspecific                     
approaches is certainly not anodyne. 
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 2. Specific and Nonspecific Approaches  
The APS, just like the ARMS and the UHR criteria, was specifically developed                         
as the diagnostic manifestation of the prodrome of psychotic disorders. Its legitimacy as                         
a diagnosis relies heavily on its predictive validity, and the only outcome that is used to                               
measure it is actual transition to a full-threshold psychotic disorder. However, current                       
research, especially that related to staging models, has started to question the pertinence                         
of staying so attached to the idea of specificity, at least with regards to the earlier stages                                 
of a disorder. Depending on whether pre-emptive psychiatry should strive for                     
specificity or allow for nonspecificity, conceptualisations of vulnerability (and of the                     
answers to bring to it) might change considerably. 
 
Recent discoveries related to pathophysiology (and, more particularly, to                 
biomarkers indicative of psychiatric vulnerability) seem to point out that current                     
clinical nosologies might not be the most adequate tool for early detection:   
 
Diagnostic categories, such as schizophrenia or psychosis, may               
be neurobiologically heterogeneous, comprising a variety of             
conditions with differing aetiologies. It may thus be unlikely                 
that there will be a single neuroimaging feature that predicts                   
transition to psychosis in every high-risk subject (Dwyer,               
McGuire, 2016, p.89). 
 
The limitations linked to a lack of consideration of the brain changes in people at risk                               
for disorders other than psychosis (bipolar disorder, depression, anxiety, or obsessive                     
compulsive disorder) are now more widely recognised: ‘the extent to which the findings                         
reviewed here are specific to the risk for psychosis, as opposed to other disorders or                             
mental illness more generally is thus unclear’ (Dwyer, McGuire, 2016, p.89).                     
Additionally, the ‘genes mediating each neural system endophenotype’ could be only                     
partially distinct from each other: ‘a substantial degree of overlap appears likely for a                           
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number of the most promising genes associated with schizophrenia’ (Cannon et al.,                       
2006, p.284). 
 
Actually, the elaboration of a new diagnostic category designed for at-risk                     
individuals whose symptoms are mostly attenuated doesn’t actually have to aim                     
systematically for specificity. A new ‘attenuated’ syndrome needn’t be the precursor of a                         
particular full-threshold disorder; one could imagine, on the contrary, that it indicates                       
non-specific vulnerability. Nonetheless, if the APS represents the archetype of such                     
elaborative attempts, it would appear that this diagnostic model does indeed tend to go                           
hand in hand with the idea of specificity.   
 
The APS is supposed to be a highly predictive instrument for the                       
identification of individuals who are just a few years away from transition into                         
full-threshold psychosis (Yung et al., 2012, p.1130). 
 
The clinical high-risk syndrome is unusual as a research                 
diagnostic entity in that it specifies risk for a future disorder. Its                       
utility as a research diagnostic entity thus depends in large part                     
upon whether it can indeed predict increased likelihood of                 
conversion to psychosis and whether it can do so with                   
specificity relative to other incident disorders’ (Webb et al.,                 
2015, p.1072). 
 
And the APS is indeed rather specific: several studies have, it seems, confirmed that                           
at-risk individuals identified with CHR criteria are indeed more likely to develop a                         
psychotic disorder than incident bipolar disorders, non-bipolar mood disorders or                   
anxiety disorders (Fusar-Poli, 2017, pp.44-45). The vast majority of comorbid disorders                     
observed in individuals who do not go on to develop psychosis is already present at the                               
baseline (Ibid., pp.44-45). 
 
However, it has also been shown repeatedly that outcomes other than                     
psychotic disorders in the at-risk population cannot be ignored. While the hope is that                           
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diagnosing people this early will help delay or prevent a first psychotic episode, little                           
mention is made of other possible courses for patients diagnosed with the APS, be it                             
towards another, non-psychotic mental disorder, or simply towards natural remission;                   
and this, despite the fact that the version of the APS proposed for the DSM-5                             
establishes that only 32% of help-seeking UHR cohorts transition towards                   
full-threshold psychosis in the three years following detection (APA, 2013, p.785). In a                         
UHR sample, 28% of the participants reported attenuated psychotic symptoms; ‘over                     
the follow-up period, 68% experienced nonpsychotic disorders: mood disorder in 49%,                     
anxiety disorder in 35%, and substance use disorder in 29%. For the majority (90%),                           
non-psychotic disorder was present at baseline, and it persisted for 52% of them’ (Lin et                             
al., 2015, p.249). 
 
In support of specific diagnostic models, findings related to the long-term                     
efficacy of generic care versus more disorder-specific interventions can be mentioned.                     
Indeed, while targeted care for at-risk individuals has demonstrably shown its efficacy,                       
patients who are later directed towards generic primary care tend to lose the benefits                           
gained earlier: 
 
Early intervention in psychosis services produce better clinical               
outcomes than generic teams and are also cost-effective.               
Clinical gains made within such services are robust as long as                     
the interventions are actively provided. Longer-term data show               
that some of these gains are lost when care is transferred back                       
to generic teams (Singh, 2010, p.343). 
 
Recommendations for generic teams are thus to provide high-quality assessments and                     
then channel identified at-risk individuals into disorder-specific pathways for                 
long-term interventions. Following from this kind of evidence, ‘the really important                     
question for service planners and commissioners is the future of generic teams in an                           
increasingly specialised world’ (Singh, 2010, p.344).   
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However, I would like to point out that, while generic supportive care for                         
at-risk individuals has indeed proved to be less effective than specialised interventions,                       
disorder-specificity is not necessarily the most salient characteristic of the more                     
successful option. Other factors can be considered, including the way in which                       
addressing attenuated symptoms and risk has become absolutely central in                   
early-intervention centres. Generic forms of primary care, in contrast, aim mostly for                       
the provision of broad support. Patients who do not undergo enhanced monitoring and                         
CBT tend to be given fewer opportunities to communicate and open up about their                           
condition, or to understand their symptoms. The provision of CBT adapted to the                         
UHR group has been shown to give them a chance to reappraise their most distressing                             
(negative, unusual, paranoid) beliefs and to evaluate collaboratively the difficulties they                     
face (Byrne, 2013, p.8). Vulnerability and risk can therefore be addressed more                       
thoroughly in early-intervention centres than in generic primary care, but                   
disorder-specificity might not be as crucial in that as the provision of a space in which                               
at-risk individuals have the opportunity to express and understand their experiences. 
 
Whether or not pre-emptive psychiatry finally takes the form of a series of                         
attenuated syndromes along the trajectory of specific disorders (psychosis, bipolar                   
disorder, depression, etc.), the aim for specificity is nevertheless far from sterile.                       
Despite the fact that many biomarkers and early signs of vulnerability appear to be                           
nonspecific, hope remains that some will prove to indicate more distinctive                     
development courses: ‘by examining the relationship between various biomarkers and                   
both syndrome and stage, it may be possible to distinguish between those biomarkers                         
that possess a degree of syndromal specificity from those that do not’ (McGorry et al.,                             
2014, p.211). For example, cognitive and motor functioning deficits are thought to be                         
promising candidates for the prediction of psychosis specifically, as ‘hallmark features of                       
schizophrenic psychoses’ which precede the onset of full-threshold psychosis by several                     
years and which can be assessed at a relatively low cost (Studerus, Papmeyer,                         
Riecher-Rössler, 2016, p.116). Interestingly, such cognitive deficits have been observed                   
in children and adolescents who later developed schizophrenia, but not in those who                         
later developed depression or bipolar disorder (Ibid., p.118). However, available                   
evidence also suggests that these cognitive measures remain less predictive than other,                       
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more clinical measures (Ibid., p.128). As such, specificity still remains somewhat                     
elusive, at least with regards to the earliest signs of a given disorder. 
 
In the end, some promising forms of specificity in pre-emptive psychiatry                     
might have less to do with disorder-specificity than with the exploration of symptom                         
etiology. A dynamic trend can be observed in research projects that investigate the                         
pathways and mechanisms that lead from specific adversities to specific symptoms. For                       
example, communication deviance in parents has been implicated in the appearance of                       
thought disorder in their children ; childhood sexual abuse has been linked with                       30
auditory and verbal hallucinations; and events disrupting relations of attachment, like                     
neglect, may have a strong effect on the development of paranoid symptoms: ‘current                         
research on psychological mechanisms underlying these symptoms suggests a number                   
of symptom-specific mechanisms that may explain these associations’ (Bentall et al.,                     
2014, p.1011). Even so, diagnostic categories like the APS remain quite ill-equipped to                         
account for new discoveries in these matters: the kind of specificity these attenuated                         
syndromes call for is decidedly not one that can do away with traditional nosologies.                           
On the contrary, they only make sense as the attenuated versions of existing disorders,                           
and directly on the pathway to them: broad diagnoses - and not specific symptoms - are                               
the outcome of vulnerabilities, adversities and risk factors.   
 
Because diagnostic categories like the APS are based almost entirely on clinical                       
manifestations and positive symptoms, the idea that the earliest signs of a disorder                         
would be indicative of a coherent and linear trajectory towards that disorder has often                           
remained unquestioned. Yet, the earliest vulnerability traits and risk factors - those                       
which form the foundational basis for the elaboration of predictive criteria in current                         
research - actually tend to remain ‘relatively crude’ and nonspecific (McGorry et al.,                         
2014, p.211). It is only over time that more specific syndromes emerge from                         
undifferentiated and nonspecific signs of vulnerability and symptoms. Indeed, it is not                       
30 The expression ‘communication deviance’ was originally introduced by Singer and Wynne                       
in an article published in the 1960’s, which described a style of communication commonly found amongst                               
parents who had children with schizophrenia. Communication deviance is said to occur between parents                           
and children when the first fail to communicate effectively what they mean: this failure can be attributed                                 
to confusing or illogical speech patterns, for example. Such deviances can range from vagueness to                             
outright contradictions, and even to non-verbal forms of communication.   
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my intention to dismiss the importance of identifying specific early symptoms as they                         
do start to manifest themselves. Evidence-based interventions, protocols and                 
treatments have been associated with such specific symptoms and diagnoses, and so                       
should be favoured whenever specificity becomes attainable. The need to adapt                     
evidence-based pre-onset early interventions to each identifiable phase of a disorder is                       
the primary aim of staging models. 
 
Before specificity does become available, though, the overlaps between both                   
early symptoms and markers of vulnerability are too important to be able to                         
differentiate efficiently between at-risk states: ‘it has become increasingly evident that                     
the concept of ‘ultrahigh risk’ might usefully be broadened to one of a ‘pluripotential                           
risk state’, rather than being considered specific to psychosis alone’ (McGorry,                     
Goldstone, 2016, p.17). This lack of specificity matters a great deal, in the sense that                             
adolescents and young adults are primarily concerned (at risk groups tend to be                         
composed of individuals between 12 and 25 years old): there remains a significant                         
possibility that even those who meet UHR criteria may actually be at risk for another                             
underlying mental disorder, or simply going through ‘a merely transient phenomenon’: 
 
The classification of symptoms with psychometric equality             
constitutes a challenging task that reaches far beyond mere                 
comorbidity or ‘clinical noise’. Symptoms that are common to                 
adolescents with potential risk for psychosis are also found in                   
other mental disorders and conditions and thus constitute a                 
considerable overlap along various diagnostic spectra, reaching             
from benign, normal developmental, and transient features to               
severe and disabling psychotic symptoms. Adolescents           
frequently present as diagnostic conundrums and may not be                 
assigned to one specific diagnostic category. Although such an                 
approach is at odds with the traditional concept of classifying                   
mental health disorders into single categories, diagnoses may               
overlap in terms of symptoms with no necessary clear water                   
between single categories (Simon, 2016, pp.50-51). 
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 Following this, several staging models embrace the idea of nonspecificity for                     
the earliest stages of mental disorders. One of them, for example, determines that once                           
the first, at-risk but asymptomatic stage (0) is followed by undifferentiated general                       
symptoms (such as mild anxiety, depressive and somatic symptoms), syndromal                   
specificity can increase slowly through a worsening of these existing symptoms and the                         
acquisition of new ones, associated clinically with behavioural and functional decline                     
(stage 1) (McGorry, 2014, p.212). New clusters of symptoms could emerge from this                         
that might not follow the bounds of current clinical nosologies. Here, then, referring to                           
staging models - instead of relying solely on differentiated ‘attenuated’ diagnoses for                       
every mental disorder - can help highlight how enriching the idea of nonspecificity can                           
be:   
 
We need to stop putting people into boxes so soon. These are                       
youths with problems and a large percentage of them will grow                     
out of these problems, while sadly others won’t. Whilst we can’t                     
always tell exactly what the exact nature of the problem will be,                       
we are becoming quite good at predicting which of these                   
adolescents will go on to have more serious problems in the                     
future.....and there are ‘transdiagnostic’ interventions that can             
improve health and wellbeing for all these young people. 
(Professor Jan Scott, interviewed in Newcastle upon Tyne on                 
the 15th of January, 2015). 
 
The integration of nonspecificity into pre-emptive psychiatry could have a                   
large impact on diagnostic and clinical approaches, as it encourages a stronger focus on                           
cross-cutting symptoms and signs of vulnerability or risk, which resonates with the                       
accounts of capabilities, fertile functionings and corrosive disadvantages I outlined                   
earlier. Each early symptom/vulnerability could then become the focus of more limited                       
interventions that would not necessarily be part of a larger framework.   
 
 
223 
To illustrate this point, a lot of research has been carried out on sleep patterns                             
and sleep disturbances with regards to risk for psychotic or bipolar disorders. If it                           
turned out, as many think is the case, that sleep disturbances are indeed either an early                               
marker or a risk factor, they could become the focus of limited interventions, as they                             
are treatable. It is not yet known whether such interventions can potentially prevent                         
the emergence of psychopathology or bipolar disorder in identified at-risk individuals,                     
but further studies may finally determine that treating sleep disturbances is likely to                         
have preventive value (McGorry et al., 2014, p.216). The same goes for nonspecific                         
cognitive markers: 
 
Neurocognition and social cognition are potentially highly             
valuable markers within the staging model. They may provide                 
clues regarding underlying pathophysiology and/or genetic           
etiology (i.e., endophenotypes). They are also strongly related               
to functioning and disability across a range of psychiatric                 
disorders (which form a key element of defining the stage of                     
illness) independently of symptoms, can be relatively easily               
assessed within the clinical setting, and are amenable to                 
intervention (McGorry et al., 2014, p.213). 
 
A non-specific staging approach provides a way to address questions surrounding the                       
overlaps and heterogeneity that characterise the course, symptoms and outcomes of                     
mental disorders. Were attenuated syndromes like the APS to remain the unique model                         
available, clinical diagnoses would still need to form complex trees of comorbidities in                         
order to make sense of these overlaps. In the end, ‘a neurobiologically-informed staging                         
approach that crosses current diagnostic silos may bring clarity to such complexity’                       
(McGorry et al., 2014, p.219).   
 
The capacity of staging approaches to be ‘agnostic to traditional                   
symptom-based nosological boundaries’ (Ibid., p.219) can thus become a considerable                   
advantage. If future research on biomarkers and other signs of vulnerability establishes                       
that the biological substrates of mental illness do not correspond to the diagnostic                         
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categories that are delineated based on clinical symptoms alone, nonspecific staging                     
models would be able to integrate that fact more efficiently. The capacity to predict                           
outcome and to select among available pre-onset early interventions depends largely on                       
a diagnostic model’s neurobiological and clinical pertinence and, in that sense,                     
nonspecificity can be a significant asset: ‘such an approach is likely to help characterize                           
differential predictors of outcome based on cross-cutting dimensions rather than                   
categorical distinctions’ (McGorry et al., 2014, p.219).   
 
By putting conceptualisations of vulnerability at the heart of an ethical                     
examination of the development of pre-emptive psychiatry, I want to emphasise the                       
significance of a distinction between specific and nonspecific approaches. Further than                     
that, I would hold that nonspecific staging models offer the more comprehensive and                         
pertinent option: by insisting on the evolution from broader and nonspecific signs of                         
vulnerability to more specific and familiar syndromes, clinical staging opens new                     
opportunities to assess ‘the development (or lack thereof) of disability and functional                       
and social impacts’ (McGorry et al., 2014, p.219). Both inherent forms of vulnerability                         
(through biomarkers) and situational ones (through neurocognitive and psychosocial                 
factors) become more fully integrated into a staged approach. This leads me to a last                             
distinction that can have far-reaching implications in pre-emptive psychiatry - that                     
between two possible aims of preventive action: psychosocial functioning or                   
symptomatic recovery. 
 
3. Prioritising Psychosocial Functioning Over         
Symptomatic Recovery 
One could easily imagine that preventive and pre-emptive measures in                   
psychiatry would have a unified and clear-cut objective: to delay or prevent entirely the                           
decline of a person’s mental health. This is not necessarily the case, however, as this                             
seemingly straightforward objective can be translated differently depending on that                   
person’s own priorities and on the diagnostic model selected. Here, I want to focus on                             
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two possible interpretations of pre-emptive psychiatry’s main goal: it can be focused on                         
preserving and promoting psychosocial functioning, and/or on symptomatic recovery.   
 
While it is pertinent to underline the existence of a significant distinction                       
between these two possible goals, I want to insist here on the fact that these ambitions                               
are not necessarily in competition with one another. On the contrary, a conjugation of                           
both would probably be an optimal solution. But I argue that the danger lies in greatly                               
favouring symptomatic recovery over psychosocial functioning, which is a very                   
possible outcome depending on the diagnostic model selected for pre-onset early                     
detection and intervention. This distinction can be paralleled by one between a focus                         
on attenuated positive psychotic symptoms and a focus on negative symptoms and                       
subjective, experienced disturbances (basic symptoms). 
 
Indeed, limiting pre-emptive psychiatry to attenuated syndromes like the APS                   
might have as a (mostly unintended) consequence the overwhelming prioritisation of                     
symptomatic recovery - especially in view of the central place they give to the clinical                             
manifestations of vulnerability and risk. In all fairness, though, favouring a strong focus                         
on symptomatic recovery is far from senseless. Such an approach would be in line with                             
what proponents of the APS and those of staging models defend wholeheartedly - that                           
UHR individuals are ‘probably at risk, but certainly ill’ (Ruhrmann, Schultze-Lutter,                     
Klosterkötter, 2010). These individuals are in enough distress that they seek psychiatric                       
help, and their symptoms (despite not being severe enough to warrant a full-threshold                         
diagnosis) are no less problematic: a meta-analysis has demonstrated that high-risk                     
subjects are ‘as impaired as psychotic patients in quality of life’ (Rutigliano, Manalo,                         
Fusar-Poli, 2016, p.64), in great part because of their symptoms. By insisting on the                           
legitimacy of the APS as a diagnosis in its own right and by removing any reference to                                 
the idea of risk, proponents of this diagnostic model tend to put symptom recovery at                             
the heart of early intervention in psychiatry, favouring it substantially over prediction                       
and prevention (Rutigliano, Manalo, Fusar-Poli, 2016, p.64).   
 
If the APS becomes the predominant model without being integrated into a                       
staged approach, chances are that pre-emptive psychiatry over the world will mostly                       
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fail to incorporate psychosocial functioning as an end to be pursued just as assiduously                           
as symptomatic recovery. The main issue has to do with the formation of psychiatrists                           
and other healthcare professionals: finding ways to educate clinicians so that they can                         
diagnose symptoms, risk and comorbidities more precisely and efficiently,                 
communicate results in a way that is not traumatising or stigmatising, and deliver care                           
according to the needs of a particular patient remains a considerable challenge                       
(Riecher-Rössler, McGorry, 2016, p.184).   
 
Additionally, striving for the preservation and amelioration of psychosocial                 
functioning might require resources and institutional frameworks that would not be as                       
necessary if symptomatic recovery was the sole aim of pre-onset early intervention in                         
psychiatry: the prescription of pharmacological and nonpharmacological treatments,               
the provision of CBT and other psychotherapies could be envisaged within existing                       
mental healthcare structures, especially if early intervention centres were unavailable.                   
Limiting pre-emptive psychiatry to diagnostic models based on the APS therefore runs                       
a significant risk of focusing almost exclusively on symptomatic recovery in many                       
circumstances, and more particularly in situations where early intervention centres and                     
trained clinicians are inaccessible. Here, the response to vulnerability is therefore highly                       
medicalised, and centred on the treatment of its symptoms first and foremost. I want to                             
argue that this restrictive approach is problematically flawed:   
 
The emphasis on relapse prevention should [...] be balanced                 
with a focus on functional recovery and the cost of long-term                     
continuous antipsychotic treatment, which evidence suggests           
may contribute to the longer-term suppression of functioning               
(McGorry, Goldstone, 2016, p.20). 
 
Offering identified at-risk individuals services that aim for both symptom                   
recovery and psychosocial functioning gives them a better chance to live ‘meaningful,                       
connected, and satisfying lives’ (McGorry, Goldstone, 2016, p.15). Here, it is important                       
to highlight that a decrease in psychosocial functioning is neither dependent on nor                         
generated by psychotic symptoms alone. On the contrary, it has been shown that ‘social                           
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disability occurs way before the onset of the first psychotic symptoms’ (Müller,                       
Bechdolf, 2016, p.153). The main conclusion that can be drawn from this is that at-risk                             
individuals would benefit greatly from more behaviourally-driven and sociotherapeutic                 
support (Ibid., p.153): 
 
Arguments in support of giving priority to evidence-based               
psychotherapy in favor of antipsychotic treatment in CHR are                 
that (1) psychotherapy is more acceptable, tolerable and less                 
stigmatizing to clients, (2) there is lesser risk of exposing                   
false-positive persons to pharmacological side effects, (3)             
psychotherapy may be an effective treatment for false-positive               
persons (depression, anxiety disorders) and (4) psychotherapy is               
similarly effective in preventing transition to first-episode             
psychosis as antipsychotics, as well as in improving symptoms                 
and functioning in CHR (Müller, Bechdolf, 2016, p.144). 
 
Pre-onset early interventions could then become more focused on functional outcomes                     
in a way that clearly aims for the enhancement of resilience and the capacity of at-risk                               
individuals to deal more effectively with the risk factors and adversities they encounter                         
in their daily lives, such as stress, and with ‘less emphasis placed on psychosis                           
prevention’ (Rutigliano, Manalo, Fusar-Poli, 2016, p.65).   
 
In a similar line of thought, positive symptoms have often been the main                         
target of therapeutic interventions, both in pre-emptive psychiatry with the APS and in                         
psychiatric care more generally. Recently, however, negative symptoms have started to                     
be more thoroughly investigated, and the role they play in the development of                         
full-threshold psychosis appears to be significant: ‘there is increasing evidence to                     
suggest that negative symptoms as well as cognitive and social functioning                     
meaningfully restrict the prognosis’ (Rutigliano, Manalo, Fusar-Poli, 2016, p.65). This                   
has led to the conclusion that therapies and interventions which encourage at-risk                       
individuals to work on their capacity to recognise emotions, for example, could have                         
considerable benefits, as these would help them navigate social interactions more easily                       
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and in a less anxiety-inducing manner. While the APS may indeed serve as a platform                             
for these kinds of interventions (Rutigliano, Manalo, Fusar-Poli, 2016, p.65), the full                       
array of possible preventive measures focused on psychosocial functioning remains, I                     
argue, better incorporated into more comprehensive approaches. For instance, the level                     
of unemployment in at-risk individuals remains considerably higher than in other                     
groups; and ‘employment is an important pathway to other areas of functioning, and                         
increases the opportunities for social and economic participation’ (McGorry,                 
Goldstone, 2016, p.21). The implementation of measures to support employment in                     
this particular group, like individual placement and support, could substantially help                     
these young people remain more integrated into their community and into active life,                         
in addition to helping them support themselves financially.   
 
The impact of these kinds of measures aiming to preserve and increase                       
psychosocial functioning in at-risk individuals is potentially considerable, and could be                     
‘the most effective model for promoting vocational recovery’ (McGorry, Goldstone,                   
2016, p.21). However, this requires the constitution of accessible support services and                       
specialised early intervention centres, something which is encouraged more easily by a                       
staged approach to psychiatric vulnerability than by DSM categories on their own: ‘the                         
clinical staging model, which has been widely used in somatic medicine but virtually                         
ignored in psychiatry, provides a coherent clinicopathological framework which can                   
restore the utility of diagnosis and promote early intervention’ (Broome, Fusar-Poli,                     
Wuyts, 2013, p.792).   
 
To conclude, there is a tension between seeing psychiatric vulnerability as ‘a                       
syndrome and collection of mental state abnormalities, if a somewhat fuzzy category,                       
and as a region of the psychosis continuum with somewhat arbitrary borders’ (Broome,                         
Fusar-Poli, Wuyts, 2013, p.793). What I defend here is the pertinence of identifying                         
and analysing the implications of these distinctive conceptualisations of pre-emptive                   
psychiatry in order to have an informed and productive ethical debate on the subject.                           
Between primary and secondary prevention (or even selective and indicated                   
prevention), between specificity and nonspecificity, and between symptomatic recovery                 
and psychosocial functioning, two diagnostic models start to become distinguishable.                   
 
229 
Where the APS and other attenuated syndromes that aim to encompass the prodrome                         
of a specific disorder target ultra-high risk groups who are vulnerable by virtue of their                             
clinical and positive symptoms, staged approaches open a wider scope of pre-onset                       
early detection and intervention measures. Staging models are not in conflict with a                         
diagnosis like the APS, but they expand the breadth of prevention in psychiatry beyond                           
what the APS proposes, in a way that I deem ethically significant. Within staging                           
models, vulnerability becomes an evolutive, deeply multifaceted and complex condition                   
that can be affected in myriad ways, at different levels, by different people and                           
institutions, adaptive to individual and chronological factors. It is now time to focus on                           
the concrete interventions and structures that emerged from both these models, and                       
evaluate how they address and respond to vulnerability. 
 
II. PRE-ONSET EARLY INTERVENTIONS IN         
RESPONSE TO PSYCHIATRIC VULNERABILITY 
I have already touched upon the divergences of approaches regarding the                     
aim(s) of pre-onset early intervention in psychiatry between the two models at hand in                           
the previous subsection, when I argued that staging models facilitated a focus on                         
psychosocial functioning in addition to symptomatic recovery. The coming segment                   
will further this line of thought, analysing how the structures in which pre-onset early                           
detection and interventions take place apprehend the vulnerability of identified at-risk                     
individuals. I have explained earlier why I place the ideas of relational autonomy and                           
resilience at the heart of an ethical response to vulnerability. Here, then, one of the                             
main problematics at play is centred on the manner in which pathogenic responses (to                           
borrow Rogers, Mackenzie and Dodds’ terminology) - meaning responses that can                     
engender undue anxiety, stigma or over-medicalisation, to name a few - can be avoided                           
in pre-emptive psychiatry.   
 
The ambition of my dissertation has been to show that conceptualisations and                       
modellings of vulnerability should be at the centre of the ethical debate on pre-emptive                           
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psychiatry, seeing as pre-onset early detection and pre-onset early interventions hinge                     
upon such conceptualisations, and ought to be able to integrate them in all their                           
intricacy. It is now time to evaluate in more detail possible interventions in                         
pre-emptive psychiatry. 
 
1. Holistic Models of Youth Mental Health 
One of the main concerns I articulated in my dissertation has to do with the                             
inevitable slide of pre-emptive practices in psychiatry towards over-medicalisation,                 
especially if diagnostic categories like the APS were to remain predominant. I believe                         
that staging models, despite their heavy reliance on the identification of the                       
‘neurobiological underpinnings of mental ill health’ are, paradoxically, not diminishing                   
at all ‘the central value of psychological and social dimensions of illness and therapy’: ‘on                             
the contrary, if fulfilled, it could add greatly to achieving the dream of a holistic                             
preemptive psychiatry’ (McGorry, 2013, p.394). 
 
Indeed, while specialised early intervention centres have now started to be                     
developed in several countries, like Australia, Germany or the United Kingdom,                     
general psychiatric services will remain the first response available to many                     
help-seeking at-risk individuals. The construction of useful and accessible early                   
intervention centres requires considerable investments into (youth) mental health,                 
with all the infrastructures, means and trained personnel that entails. Such                     
expenditures cannot be taken for granted, especially in view of how limited healthcare                         
resources already are. The selection of a diagnostic model or another must therefore                         
account for how well it can be integrated into more general care structures, and how                             
well it can encourage the creation of early intervention services. As such, I argue that                             
the APS diagnosis on its own, while proven useful in specialised services, is more likely                             
to lead to problems of overdiagnosis, overmedication, and over-medicalisation,                 
discrimination and stigma. For example, while, in many instances, ‘a patient will                       
require a formal diagnosis to be eligible for healthcare benefits’, and ‘receiving an APS                           
label may help defray initial costs with support from select insurance providers’, this                         
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might only compound the potential threat of discrimination by insurance companies                     
(Mittal et al., 2015, p.553). 
 
In this, I do join many of those who already expressed ethical concerns in the                             
debate that surrounded the development of pre-emptive psychiatry - those who ‘argued                       
that the diagnosis of APS in general practice may lead to excessive therapeutics doing                           
more harm than good as well as adding a significant burden, in terms of stigma, to                               
persons experiencing attenuated psychotic symptoms’ (Rutigliano, Manalo, Fusar-Poli,               
2016, p.65). Because psychiatry is rarely subdivided into specialties in the way somatic                         
medicine often is, non-specialised psychiatrists, who remain a large majority, are tasked                       
with keeping up-to-date with research regarding a large variety of mental disorders.                       
The DSM has thus become a widely used clinical tool, as it provides a way to                               
standardise mental health research and diagnostic practices across borders and clinics,                     
despite the fact that it doesn’t include information or guidelines regarding treatment                       
options.   
 
To be fair, I want to insist again on the fact that proponents of the APS have                                 
clearly denounced resorting too early to the use of antipsychotics in the treatment of                           
at-risk individuals. While the few studies that have been led on the potential for                           
antipsychotics to delay or prevent a first psychotic episode have tended to yield rather                           
positive short-term results (Addington, Heinssen, 2012, p.280), their use remains                   
widely discouraged. This reluctance arose from the very same concerns mentioned just                       
earlier, meaning the risks of stigmatisation that are associated with these treatments                       
and their problematic side-effects, especially in view of the high rates of false positives                           
(Conus, 2016, p.160). These side effects can include the development of metabolic                       
syndrome, important weight gain, or sexual dysfunction (Ibid., 2016, p.160), which are                       
admittedly very troubling in young persons who are at a crucial stage of their lives and                               
for whom self-image remains pivotal. In addition to this, the long-term follow-ups of                         
the medication trials cited above have ‘revealed their failure to durably influence the                         
rate of transition to psychosis’ (Conus, 2016, p.160).   
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Correspondingly, the types of pre-onset early intervention that have been                   
promoted by those who wish to see pre-emptive psychiatry gain traction generally tend                         
to be as low threshold, as low stigma and as available away from traditional psychiatric                             
settings as can be (Riecher-Rössler, McGorry, 2016b, pp.182-183). And this is so even                         
if the APS were to remain the first and major instrument for early detection: the                             
approach defended for UHR individuals is centred on the need to address problems and                           
symptoms of which they are already aware (and which led them to seek help in the first                                 
place). In that sense, even though risks of a worsening of these individuals’ condition                           
and a transition to full-threshold psychosis should not be concealed, they should not be                           
presented as the actual main issue (Riecher-Rössler, McGorry, 2016b, pp.182-183).                   
Nonetheless, despite this strong awareness that the best responses to the UHR state                         
should not be overly medical, a wider development of pre-emptive psychiatry                     
worldwide makes the possibility of a slide towards over-medicalisation distinctly                   
conceivable. I believe it would be amplified if the APS and other diagnostic categories                           
following a similar model remained the sole focus of early detection methods, for the                           
reasons outlined above. 
 
Nevertheless, I am not arguing either that integrating the APS into the wider                         
framework of nonspecific staging models would provide a comprehensive and                   
satisfying solution to this problem. Early intervention services would remain the best                       
option over general care structures, and would thus still require considerable                     
investments in youth mental health. However, I contend that if the APS were to be                             
more clearly encompassed within staging models and combined with the ideas of                       
primary prevention, nonspecificity and psychosocial functioning, risks of               
over-medicalisation would be decreased in the wider development of pre-emptive                   
psychiatry. Staging models offer a detailed conceptual framework that is integral to the                         
good development of pre-emptive psychiatry. By providing a more comprehensive                   
account of the vulnerabilities shared by at-risk individuals, they might be helpful in                         
bringing better awareness of possible - and less ‘pathogenic’ - responses (at different                         
levels and by different agents). Therefore, I want to outline the kinds of pre-onset early                             
intervention that nonspecific staging models could help bring to the fore. 
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The fact that the concept of graduation is built into the framework of staging                             
models grants them a considerable advantage. They are, at their core, turned towards                         
the adaptation of treatment to each identifiable stage of a disorder. Their aim is                           
twofold: lessening risk factors, and enhancing resilience. As such, they can facilitate a                         
more far-reaching integration of what proponents of pre-emptive psychiatry argue                   
should be a progressive answer to psychiatric vulnerability: ‘simple, safe and benign                       
interventions’ as a first line, only followed by more complex treatments for UHR                         
individuals who do not respond to these (however, the optimal duration - or tapering                           
down - of these interventions before reaching such a conclusion remains unclear)                       
(Riecher-Rössler, McGorry, 2016b, p.185). Another asset of nonspecific staging models                   
resides in the ‘individualisation’ of risk that they promote (likely better than the APS on                             
its own can, as it relies so heavily on clinical features of vulnerability):   
 
A sufficient estimation of the individual time to transition by                   
clinical variables alone does not seem expectable. Including               
measures of neurobiological processes associated with the             
development of a first manifest psychosis could fill this gap and                     
might enable an improved estimation of the magnitude of risk                   
(Ruhrmann, 2016, p.134). 
 
Multifactorial prediction models (specific and nonspecific) could help tailor both the                     
detection of vulnerabilities, and the interventions best suited to them. Because staging                       
models facilitate the integration of these various facets of risk, they can help bolster                           
more targeted (and less invasive) interventions, all the while covering a wider array of                           
vulnerabilities: ‘another important step will be the inclusion of courses related                     
measures, including changing patterns of environmental risk and protective factors and                     
their interaction with the dynamic individual state of vulnerability and resilience’                     
(Ruhrmann, 2016, p.139). So what shape can these more ‘benign’ and targeted                       
interventions take? Can they really be implemented in non-stigmatising settings? 
 
At-risk individuals and their families need clear information from mental                     
health professionals who deal with prevention regarding the notions of risk and                       
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vulnerability, as well as assistance in coping with this kind of information. In that sense,                             
a variety of interventions can become particularly pertinent, such as monitoring,                     
motivational interviewing concerning substance use (a recognised risk factor),                 
supportive therapies, cognitive behavioural therapy, and family therapy (Müller,                 
Bechdolf, 2016, pp.153-154). For example, Integrated Psychological Interventions (IPI)                 
can include up to 55 sessions over a period of 12 months, including individual therapy,                             
group sessions, cognitive remediation and counselling for relatives (Ibid., 2016,                   
pp.149-150). Individual therapy sessions ‘incorporate a number of different modules                   
including psychoeducation, symptom management, stress management and crisis               
management’; group sessions are composed of ‘activity schedules and work on positive                       
affect such as mood and enjoyment, social skills and problem solving’; while cognitive                         
remediation ‘involves computer-based training of attention, memory and               
concentration’ (Müller, Bechdolf, 2016, pp.149-150). These kinds of integrative                 
interventions aim to operate on several levels: they are supposed to help at-risk                         
individuals and their families understand risk and vulnerability better so as to                       
encourage them to take measures when possible, or react to adverse circumstances in a                           
non-detrimental manner.   
 
According to the literature, specialised early detection services can help at-risk                     
individuals cope with their attenuated symptoms, their social isolation, and even lessen                       
potential stigma instead of enhancing or causing it (Uttinger, Papmeyer,                   
Riecher-Rössler, 2016, p.69). Psychoeducational Multi-Family Group (PMFG)             
treatment can be made accessible to at-risk adolescents and their primary caregivers.                       
Participants have reported benefiting from group sessions like these, and they have                       
demonstrated improvement in symptoms and functional outcome: ‘family processes                 
and individual coping skills hypothesized to underlie changes in symptoms and                     
functional outcome did change significantly over time in predicted directions’ (O’Brien,                     
2007, p.330). 
 
Several pre-onset early intervention programmes have attempted to               
implement this more holistic vision of mental health. First among them is Headspace,                         
the National Youth Mental Health Foundation in Australia, headed, among others, by                       
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McGorry. Headspace provides pre-onset early intervention mental health services to                   
identified at-risk youth (between 12 and 25 years old, generally). Programmes like this                         
one are mostly non-medicalised: they cover four core areas: mental health, yes, but also                           
physical health, work and study support, and alcohol and other drug services. Their                         
first objective is to provide participants with an accessible, safe and non-stigmatising                       
environment. Professor Jan Scott, interviewed in Newcastle upon Tyne on the 15th of                         
January, 2015, explained the reasoning that drives these programmes: 
 
We need youth mental health. We need to make services easily                     
accessible to young people who usually don’t go see their GPs,                     
who don’t think in terms of mental illness and don’t want to see                         
middle-aged, middle-class people in suits sitting in offices. We                 
see in the programme in Australia (Headspace clinics) young                 
people who are failing at school or at work, and who may have                         
any spectrum of diagnoses or no clear diagnosis at all. As well as                         
inputs from a keyworker (and medics if necessary), they can                   
attend a group-class two or three afternoons a week for things                     
like physical fitness, art classes (which help facilitate discussion                 
of emotions, etc)... And in the middle of the afternoon there are                       
‘tea-time sessions’ which give them the occasion to talk about                   
sleep patterns, coping with stress, and other topics. We                 
observed that boys initially prefer physical activities, while girls                 
favour art classes; but gradually they all start to take part in                       
everything. The important thing is that they get social                 
interactions; they get more structured routines in their days                 
because they are expected to turn up to most of the                     
sessions...this makes life a little less stressful, a little more                   
predictable and a bit more understandable and manageable...               
Eventually, you can help get them back to school or                   
employment. That’s not about diagnosis – it has very little to do                       
with it, actually. 
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Following the findings highlighted by proponents of staging models, Headspace and                     
other programs like it thus favour a holistic model of support. Within the staging                           
framework, then, environmental, modifiable factors, as well as underlying                 
pathophysiology, become major targets for preventive intervention.   
 
The problem of making these interventions as widely accessible and                   
non-stigmatising as possible remains. While ‘centrally located buildings with a loose or                       
no visible association to psychiatry (e.g. not in the same building as acute psychiatric                           
wards) would be best suited for that matter’ (Uttinger, Papmeyer, Riecher-Rössler,                     
2016, p.77), pre-emptive psychiatry cannot always take place in such dedicated                     
environments. Accessibility is particularly decisive here, as more vulnerable                 
populations tend to be those who suffer from a lack of access to these interventions the                               
most:   
 
Evidence suggests that there are disparities in the prevalence of                   
mental health problems and access to mental healthcare for                 
high-risk groups [...] These disparities call for a change of                   
practice that will enhance inclusivity and accessibility to safe                 
and effective services as part of a total systems approach to                     
public health (Bhui, Dinos, 2011, p.418). 
 
Several solutions have been envisaged to facilitate access to early intervention services                       
and other structures: simplifying referral pathways, for example, or the cultivation of                       
close links with local providers, as well as the ‘youth-friendliness’ of the service and its                             
structure, which lies in part in its detachment from overly medicalised settings                       
(McGorry, Goldstone, 2016, p.23). Regarding the Headspace programme, young                 
people, it seems, were often more likely to present with mood and anxiety symptoms                           
and disorders, ‘self-reporting their reason for attendance as problems with how they                       
felt’. However, while client demographic characteristics did tend to reflect                   
population-level distributions, and clients from regional areas and of Aboriginal and                     
Torres Strait Islander background were particularly well represented, those who were                     
born outside Australia were underrepresented (Rickwood et al. 2014, p.108). 
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 All in all, relying solely on the APS and similar diagnostic categories to                         
promote the development of pre-emptive psychiatry, by limiting the idea of                     
vulnerability to its clinical and symptomatic manifestations, arguably leaves the door                     
more open to problems of over-medicalisation. By being integrated into staging                     
models, though, it could encourage the promotion of a more holistic vision of both                           
psychiatric vulnerability and mental health, bringing a larger array of pre-onset early                       
interventions to the fore. Hopefully, it would also help highlight the need for                         
specialised youth mental health services, separate from more traditional and clinical                     
settings and better able to place the ideas of resilience and relational autonomy at the                             
heart of pre-emptive psychiatry. 
 
2. Relational Autonomy and Resilience in           
Pre-Emptive Psychiatry 
I reach, at this stage, the crux of the argument I want to bring forward in this                                 
dissertation: by re-centring the ethical debate that surrounds the development of                     
pre-emptive psychiatry around conceptualisations of vulnerability (and their               
integration into possible diagnostic models), it becomes possible to go beyond a                       
somewhat simplistic challenge to pre-emptive psychiatry as a whole. Incorporating                   
specific diagnostic categories like the APS into the larger framework of nonspecific                       
staging models accentuates the existence of various developmental courses in at-risk                     
individuals. This, in turn, facilitates the promotion of less medicalised pre-onset early                       
interventions, which would - as far as possible - take place in non-stigmatising settings                           
that offer holistic forms of support.   
 
In a bid to avoid pathogenic responses to identifiable vulnerabilities, resilience                     
and relational autonomy can therefore become centre-stage in pre-emptive psychiatry.                   
Of course, this doesn’t erase the ethical concerns which were raised on several                         
occasions throughout this debate. Nevertheless, I argue that this shift in focus                       
encourages more constructive conversations on this topic, in a way that a frank                         
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opposition between tenants of ‘biomedical psychiatry’ and its detractors cannot really                     
do.   
 
There is a certain wariness surrounding attempts to deal with young people’s                       
vulnerability: many of these responses are perceived to be more pathogenic than                       
actually helpful. One of the main reproaches levelled against such attempts is related to                           
their links with the mental health sector and their ‘medicalising’ rhetoric or services.                         
Adolescents and young adults who go through social and emotional struggles should                       
not necessarily be under the supervision of mental health professionals: the assumption                       
that ‘discourses and practices associated with ‘mental health’ are necessarily helpful,                     
meaningful or desirable to young people experiencing distress, or for those struggling                       
to manage difficult circumstances’ should perhaps be questioned more than it currently                       
is (Fogg, 2016).   
 
However, while the rates of false positives in the identification of individuals                       
specifically at-risk for psychosis have been mentioned on several occasions throughout                     
this dissertation, I want, now, to point to the other side of that coin: the (potential)                               
duty to inform these same individuals when preventive and pre-emptive measures can                       
be envisaged and have been shown to be helpful:   
 
Full disclosure promotes autonomy, allows for the clearest               
psychoeducation about additional risk factors, helps to clarify               
and/or correct previous diagnoses/treatments, facilitates early           
intervention and bolsters communication between providers           
but there are important considerations involving heritability,             
comorbidity, culture, and stigma. Non-disclosure advances           
nonmaleficence by limiting stigma and stress (which may               
inadvertently exacerbate the condition), and confusion (related             
to the rapidly evolving diagnosis) in a sensitive developmental                 
period but is complicated by varying patient preferences and                 
the possibility that, as new treatments without adverse effects                 
become available, the risk with false positives no longer                 
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justifies the accompanying loss of autonomy (Mittal et al., 2015                   
p.543). 
 
While predictive validity remains lower than could be hoped for (and perhaps                       
too low to justify some labels or the recourse to pharmacological and/or medical                         
treatments), transition rates for at-risk individuals remain significantly higher than for                     
the general population. Here, vulnerability starts to be identified at a level that could                           
justify the involvement of mental health professionals. Nonetheless, it has been argued                       
that at-risk individuals may have a legitimate interest in not knowing about their                         
vulnerabilities and exposure to risk, so as to avoid deleterious psychological                     
consequences:   
 
A person who learns to be at high risk of developing a disorder                         
that is stigmatised and associated with a lifetime of struggle can                     
suffer psychological harm or discrimination. A person who is                 
diagnosed with such a disorder can lose hope and self-esteem                   
and thus compromise the successful management of his or her                   
symptoms (Bortolotti, Widdows, 2011, p.673). 
 
This ‘right not to know’, despite the criticisms levelled against it, has been ‘explicitly                           
recognised by various recent ethical and legal instruments relating to biomedical issues’                       
and can been seen as an ‘expression of autonomy’ (Andorno, 2004, p.436). But such a                             
right cannot be presumed: it must be ‘activated’ by the individual’s explicit choice (Ibid.,                           
2004, p.435). In that sense, at-risk individuals, and more particularly those who seek                         
help, should be made aware of the measures they can take or of the interventions in                               
which they can partake so as to overcome their difficulties. Whether or not the notion                             
of risk should be an integral part of the pre-emptive discourse is a question that has                               
been directly addressed or subjacent throughout this dissertation, and so will not be                         
addressed here. Identifiable at-risk individuals are generally at a stage in their lives                         
when they are ‘finishing their education and beginning their working lives, developing                       
intimate relationships, and moving from their families of origin to establish themselves                       
as independent adults’ (McGorry, Goldstone, 2016, p.16). It is therefore crucial to                       
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elaborate pre-onset early interventions that account for this in a satisfying manner,                       
without undue pressure, stigma, or unjustified treatments.   
 
Interestingly, the few studies that have been concluded on potential stigma                     
experienced by at-risk individuals tend to show that fear of stigma itself has been more                             
detrimental to them than actual experiences of it: there is an ‘existing gap between the                             
fear of disclosing their problems that causes patients to withdraw and the actual                         
support and acceptance they experience in real life if they are able to overcome the fear’                               
(Uttinger, Papmeyer, Riecher-Rössler, 2016, p.74). The argument follows that helping                   
these young at-risk persons acquire relevant understanding and knowledge about their                     
condition, as well as supporting them in becoming more autonomous and resilient, can                         
actually play an important role in lessening this fear of stigma. This ‘internalised’                         
stigma seems to be rooted in the same kinds of (very common) stereotypes about                           
mental illness that could generate the stigmatising responses that they fear so much.                         
This, in combination with the insight that some of their own experiences (or                         
attenuated symptoms) are anomalous, can engender very damaging chain-reactions: the                   
uncertainty about what they feel is ‘wrong with them’ and the fear of ‘going mad’ can                               
contribute in a problematic way to long delays in seeking help and reaching early                           
intervention services (Uttinger, Papmeyer, Riecher-Rössler, 2016, p.75). This is a                   
particularly vicious circle: 
 
Comparison of the risk symptoms with internalized cultural               
norms by the patient (e.g. negative prejudices against psychic                 
illnesses among the general public) may result in catastrophic                 
appraisals, such as ‘I am crazy and totally different to other                     
people’. Such an appraisal could exacerbate symptoms, as well as                   
feelings of depression and anxiety, which are then maintained                 
by safety behavior and through poor perception of the self and                     
others. Interventions incorporating strategies, such as           
normalization, and addressing cognitions and cognitive core             
beliefs with flexibility are therefore important (Müller,             
Bechdolf, 2016, p.149). 
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 As such, giving these young people access to services and centres in which these                           
experiences are overtly discussed and normalised can be extremely helpful in                     
overcoming such kinds of anxieties - and have been said to be so by participants                             
themselves. Conversations using informal and everyday language, or the lack of                     
dramatic or catastrophic reactions on the part of trained professionals and support                       
workers can play a significant role in this (Uttinger, Papmeyer, Riecher-Rössler, 2016,                       
p.77). It seems that early detection services help at-risk individuals ‘cope with                       
symptoms and potential stigmatization rather than enhancing or causing the latter’                     
(Uttinger et al., 2015). Additionally, Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA)                 
have also been used to conduct an in-depth qualitative study of a small sample of EIP                               
service-users: ‘it appears that participants’ accounts were interpreted as representing a                     
shift from an initial avoidance of acknowledging their experiences, towards an                     
acceptance of their presence’ (Harris et al., 2012). ‘Initial contacts with the EIP service                           
encouraged participants to confront their experiences. Whereas, later on, the service                     
provided an opportunity for some participants to talk about the experiences and                       
develop ways of recognizing symptoms, both of which were interpreted as initial steps                         
towards an acceptance and control of their experiences’ (Ibid.). 
 
One of the main reasons why I claim that relational autonomy can occupy a                           
central place in psychiatric pre-emptive care is to be found in the forms of support                             
offered in integrated psychological interventions, and, in particular, in                 
psychoeducation. Available to at-risk individuals themselves or their family members,                   
psychoeducation groups are entirely turned towards the provision and integration of                     
first-hand information that can enable participants to deal with the difficulties they                       
face, and to flourish within their families, social circles and communities. Self-help and                         
support groups, in particular, do so with the understanding that transfers of                       
information between people who go through similar experiences, in a safe and                       
non-judgemental place, can provide a valuable opportunity to vent one’s frustrations                     
and share one’s concerns, insights or strategies. Psychoeducational programmes for                   
at-risk individuals have been shown to be beneficial with both objective measures and                         
patient’s subjective evaluations (Hauser et al., 2009, p.141).   
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 Here, autonomy arises from both comprehension and sharing; and the                   
importance of that capability cannot be understated: ‘patients with psychotic disorders                     
who receive psychoeducation have lower relapse and rehospitalization rates, higher                   
social and global functioning, and improved quality of life compared to patients who                         
receive standard treatment alone’ (Müller, Bechdolf, 2016 p.145). The impact of                     
psychoeducation sessions on at-risk individuals have also been investigated: a                   
significant ‘increase in knowledge, higher quality of life, a reduction of the feeling of                           
being entrapped by the risk symptoms and an improvement in the global clinical                         
impression’ were thus established (Ibid., 2016, p.145).   
 
The provision of holistic, multimodal interventions are, in this way, more                     
effective in enabling young at-risk persons maintain or regain their capability to                       
interact with others in various social settings, and pursue their academic or professional                         
careers. Elements like these ones can be critical in pre-emptive psychiatry, and are more                           
clearly tied to staging models than to attenuated syndromes like the APS: 
 
A holistic and integrated biopsychosocial approach to clinical               
intervention, which takes into account the developmental stage               
of the young person, as well as the stage of their illness; the                         
focus of treatment is not only on the amelioration of distressing                     
symptoms and achieving symptomatic remission, but also             
strongly emphasises psychosocial interventions designed to           
assist the young person to maintain or regain their normal                   
educational, vocational, and social developmental trajectory to             
enable a full functional recovery (McGorry, Goldstone, 2016,               
p.23). 
 
As such, reducing the development of pre-emptive psychiatry to the                   
elaboration of diagnostic categories like the APS can be problematic, both on the part                           
of proponents and of detractors of pre-emptive psychiatry. It can lead to a stronger                           
focus on medicalised interventions than is really warranted, thus disregarding the need                       
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for multimodal, nonspecific and holistic approaches to mental health, which are all the                         
more crucial in the earliest stages of mental disorders.   
 
Despite the efforts taken by those who defend the prospects for pre-emptive                       
psychiatry to be good for at-risk individuals (and society more generally), however,                       
several obstacles remain - some pragmatic, others more theoretical or ethical. If                       
preventive measures are to become a cornerstone of psychiatric and psychological care,                       
these problems will need to be overcome in a satisfying manner. 
 
III. REMAINING CONSIDERATIONS, BOTH       
PRAGMATIC AND ETHICAL 
The development of pre-emptive psychiatry has not gone smoothly, to say the                       
least. As I mentioned in Chapter 3, its proponents immediately had to face well-known                           
criticisms against overdiagnosis, discrimination, stigmatisation, overmedication, and             
over-medicalisation. Working on the earliest stages of mental disorders is, for its                       
detractors, a new way to widen pre-existing diagnostic categories, thus participating in                       
the ‘disease-mongering’ efforts of those who are often suspected to collude with the                         
pharmaceutical industry. In reaction, defenders of prevention in psychiatry sometimes                   
adopt an overly cautious and calculating stance, which (I argue) actually works against                         
them in this instance. Their strong fixation on the distress criterion, which is closely                           
associated with positive symptoms, the UHR state and the APS diagnosis often diverts                         
attention from the more holistic and multimodal pre-onset early interventions they are                       
attempting to implement. This, in addition to difficulties in grounding early detection                       
methods and less medicalised pre-onset early interventions in evidence-based practices,                   
accentuates risks of seeing pre-emptive psychiatry adopt a more pernicious form.  
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1. Grounding Pre-Emptive Psychiatry in         
Evidence-Based Practices  
In order to garner attention, investments and recognition from public                   
policy-makers, scientists, medical professionals and the general public, developing                 
practices must be grounded in evidence. Exploring whether or not this requirement is                         
really legitimate and sensible is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this project. What                         
remains is that the pursuit of evidence is the primary preoccupation of those who want                             
to develop pre-emptive psychiatry. Early identification methods and pre-onset early                   
interventions must imperatively be proved effective if they are are to become an                         
integral part of mental health care.   
 
Even in terms of cost-effectiveness or cost-utility, reaching accurate                 
estimations regarding preventive measures can become quite arduous. The                 
development of early intervention services in Australia and in the United Kingdom                       
showed that some governments were ready to invest considerable sums of money in                         
order to develop pre-onset early detection and interventions as part of standard mental                         
health services. The rationale behind this is that ‘there is a higher success rate if                             
psychotic symptoms are treated early than if they are treated after they have been                           
present for some time’, and that it decreases the ‘psychosocial impact of a psychotic                           
illness that leads to secondary disability’ (Pelosi, Birchwood, 2003, p.196). But these                       
assertions need to be empirically demonstrated in order to justify the continuation of                         
this use of limited resources, when some remain convinced that proponents of                       
pre-emptive psychiatry’s ‘wishful thinking has misled health policymakers who are                   
diverting resources to specialised teams, making it even more difficult to provide                       
decent care to people with severe and enduring mental disorders’ (Ibid., 2003,                       
pp.196-197).   
 
Nonetheless, while short-term costs have been shown to be significantly                   
higher in specialised early intervention services compared to more traditional care                     
structures, long-term costs are said to be greatly decreased thanks to lower outpatients                         
 
245 
costs (Phillips et al., 2009, p.28; McCrone et al., 2010, p.381). This could be in large part                                 
because early intervention services tend to lead to better vocational and quality of life                           
outcomes (McCrone et al., 2010, p.377). Specific preventive interventions are thus said                       
to save substantial resources in the longer term, first because they reduce treatment                         
costs associated with full-threshold psychotic disorders (by preventing or delaying                   
severe episodes, or by improving long-term prognosis), and secondly, because they                     
improve UHR individuals’ overall experiences and quality of life (Phillips et al., 2009,                         
p.34). However, quality of life is notoriously difficult to integrate adequately into                       
cost-utility studies, even though its significance is now more widely recognised                     
(Roberts, Reich, 2002, p.1055; McCrone et al., 2010, p.381).   
 
Additionally, encouraging a more universal public health approach relies on                   
the idea that youth mental health services can have a considerable impact - an idea                             
which needs to be substantiated. Strengthening protective factors like social capital,                     
family relations, educational and academic achievement by ‘helping people become                   
more resistant or resilient to the risks imposed by adverse circumstances’ (Bhui, Dinos,                         
2011, p.418), requires a stronger focus on public mental health and models of                         
vulnerability. Therefore, it is vital for the future of pre-emptive psychiatry to                       
consolidate evidence showing that balancing universal or selective interventions with                   
more directed ones for those who are most vulnerable is a necessity. However, these                           
kinds of short-term, massive investments into public and youth mental health often                       
require a high level of evidence themselves, both of their economical and of their                           
medical utility.   
 
Evaluating the actual impact of inequalities, discrimination, trauma and other                   
early adversities remains quite arduous, considering how multifaceted they can be. Just                       
like evaluating how the strengthening of resilience can really ameliorate a person’s                       
condition and prevent a deterioration of that person’s health can be exceedingly                       
challenging. Professor Jan Scott explained how so, based on her experiences in the                         
Australian Headspace programme: 
 
 
246 
One of the projects I am working on in Australia at the moment                         
is all about finding young children with environmental risks,                 
and who may be showing some ‘soft’ signs of vulnerability (e.g.                     
they might be more anxious than their peers, etc). We’re                   
looking at mentoring schemes and ‘out of school’ activities to                   
develop self-confidence, self-esteem, etc. The idea is to make                 
them more resilient and see if, in 10 years’ time, they’re less                       
likely to have serious problems. Even this intervention with                 
children, you could argue, is getting to be too late. The problem                       
is that, at these very early stages, unless you offer such                     
interventions for a lot of children, you won’t be able to show                       
that it stopped a progression to psychosis or bipolar disorder in                     
adolescence or early adulthood. The interventions and             
outcomes won’t be specific enough; there will only be very                   
generic changes in population resilience with this ‘public health’                 
type strategy. So the number of children who develop or                   
demonstrate problems in adolescence is lower at the end.                 
However, to show an impact on severe mental disorders you                   
probably need to use a ‘closing-in strategy’ targeting youth at                   
risk and focus a study on groups of adolescents that are already                       
around stage 1-2 and in the peak age range for onset of                       
‘adult’-type mental disorders. This is probably where you have                 
more chance of showing a difference in transition rates i.e. that                     
this many converted versus did not. 
(Professor Jan Scott, interviewed in Newcastle upon Tyne on                 
the 15th of January, 2015). 
 
One of the reasons why medication remains so widely used and unquestioned                       
in psychiatry is related to the fact that intensive psychosocial interventions, which                       
could become an integral part of psychiatric care (pre-emptive or not), are not yet                           
evidence-based (McGorry, Goldstone, 2016, p.20). Further exploration of these kinds                   
of intervention has thus become a key issue for future research.   
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 2. Pre-Onset Early Detection of Psychiatric           
Vulnerability and Pre-Onset Early Interventions Outside           
of Psychiatry 
The researchers who have been the driving force behind the development of                       
early detection methods for at-risk individuals mostly come from the field of                       
psychiatry. They were the first to try and elaborate criteria to recognise the prodrome                           
of psychotic disorders and identify vulnerability markers.   
 
If transition rates between the at-risk mental state or the APS and                       
full-threshold psychosis have reached the level they did, it is because psychiatrists have                         
concerned themselves with the necessity to ameliorate the prognosis of their patients,                       
and studies appeared to point to pre-onset early intervention as their best hope.                         
Unacceptable delays in reaching a correct diagnosis have been said to be responsible for                           
the fast deterioration of many patients’ mental state, and so the early and accurate                           
identification of those individuals who are on the path towards full-threshold psychosis                       
became crucial. It might appear, then, that the development of pre-onset early detection                         
and interventions is firmly anchored in psychiatry.   
 
What I want to highlight, however, is the need for psychiatrists themselves to                         
allow for and encourage pre-emptive measures that they might not, as psychiatrists, be                         
best placed to carry out. The response to psychiatric vulnerability must exceed the                         
bounds of purely psychiatric care. 
 
I have already mentioned difficulties related to the decline of transition rates in                         
the past few years, which could be explained by the fact that individuals who have been                               
identified as at-risk are simultaneously accessing pre-onset early intervention services.                   
It is not simple to assess which of these interventions has proved more effective than                             
others, and what might clarify this downward curve in transition rates. In line with                           
what was developed earlier in this chapter, it seems that some of them have a lot to do                                   
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with the provision of supportive networks and relationships to at-risk individuals, with                       
the time taken to inform and educate them about their condition, or with their access                             
to non-stigmatising environments in which they can find their marks again.   
 
As mentioned previously, two broad categories of pre-onset early                 
interventions can be implemented in psychiatry: pharmacological treatments and                 
psychotherapies. If the latter are deemed more appropriate and ethically-justifiable than                     
the former (when the pharmacological treatments in question are characterised by                     
problematic side effects), the role of psychologists and other therapists is to become                         
integral in the development of holistic models of youth mental health. The prevalence                         
of CBT in pre-onset early intervention could be questioned, and its efficacy tested                         
against other approaches to psychological therapy (or combined to them). Teachers,                     
educators, social workers and a multitude of other professionals could also see their role                           
in the primary prevention of serious mental health disorders extended, in great part                         
thanks to the inputs and data produced by psychiatric research. 
 
Defending staging models over attenuated syndromes means defending a                 
vision of pre-emptive psychiatry that highlights the necessity for a cohesive and wide                         
array of responses to vulnerability, many of which are related to education, social                         
support and other fields, more than they are to medical and psychiatric care. A                           
remaining challenge for proponents of pre-emptive psychiatry is thus to actively                     
encourage and promote a wider recognition of our duties to vulnerable individuals. 
 
As I pointed out in Chapter 5, Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, associated as                       
it is with the notions of fertile functionings and corrosive disadvantages developed by                         
Wolff and de-Shalit, indicates that a society of equals is a society in which                           
‘disadvantages do not cluster, a society where there is no clear answer to the question of                               
who is the worst off’ (Wolff, de-Shalit, 2007, p.10). One of the aims of pre-emptive                             
psychiatry might thus be to participate in a more general effort to encourage the                           
dedication of scarce resources to the improvement of a population’s most fertile                       
capabilities and the reduction or elimination of corrosive disadvantages (Nussbaum,                   
2011, pp.98-99).   
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 I hope that the arguments I have presented in this dissertation can convince                         
psychiatrists and other medical professionals, as well as policy-makers and ethicists                     
working on the development of pre-emptive psychiatry, to pay closer and more direct                         
attention to the concept of vulnerability, and on the way it is integrated within various                             
diagnostic models. Despite its crucial role in the elaboration of both pre-onset early                         
detection and pre-onset early interventions in psychiatry, as well as in the ethical                         
debate that has surrounded them, the notion of vulnerability has too rarely been                         
acknowledged as central. The main contribution I hope to have made in this domain is                             
the proposition of a re-framing of this debate around vulnerability, focusing first and                         
foremost on morally acceptable or imperative responses to our growing ability to                       
identify and detect those individuals who are more likely to suffer from mental health                           
problems in the future. I strongly believe that this can lead to more constructive and                             
collaborative conversations on this topic. I would welcome the presentation of                     
competing accounts of vulnerability - accounts which might encourage different kinds                     
of moral responses or which might fit better with alternative diagnostic models. So                         
long as this discussion moves away from the simplified and dichotomous yes/no                       
question outlined at the start of this dissertation regarding the worth of implementing                         
pre-onset early detection and interventions in psychiatry, I believe that it can                       
contribute more readily to the promotion of ethically-informed pre-emptive measures                   
in psychiatry. 
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Conclusion 
One of the driving forces of this project has been my wish to contribute                           
constructively to the debate surrounding the ethics of pre-emptive psychiatry. In                     
contrast to my initial intent to establish and highlight the existence of a series of                             
problematic ethical issues linked with the development of pre-onset early detection and                       
interventions in psychiatry, I became convinced that I needed to leave behind the more                           
conservative reflexes which can be characteristic of applied ethics.   
 
It is the role of those who concern themselves with ethical considerations to                         
alert others about the potential outcomes, the hidden dangers or the ungrounded                       
assumptions attached to the development of a new practice or technique. The                       
development of pre-emptive psychiatry was not spared these kinds of cautionary                     
predictions and forewarnings: to list them all once again would have brought little else                           
than a new drop in an already large ocean of objections. Proponents of pre-emptive                           
psychiatry, made well-aware of these potential pitfalls, had integrated these reflections                     
into their own deliberations already, well-enough that the full introduction of a new                         
diagnostic category into the DSM was delayed.   
 
However, the debate on the ethics of pre-emptive psychiatry had become more                       
subdued, on the brink of deeming pre-emptive psychiatry as a whole too perilous for                           
at-risk individuals, and in wait of further evidence-based criteria and measures - either                         
to bring it back to the realm of ethically-acceptable practices, or to condemn it                           
definitively as harmful. In order to come out of this deadlock and contribute something                           
of value to this discussion, I thus believed it necessary to appraise whether or not the                               
debate on the ethics of pre-emptive psychiatry had fulfilled its own role adequately.   
 
I hope to have been successful in showing that, in some ways, it failed to do so:                                 
re-framing this conversation around what is really at the heart of current pre-emptive                         
efforts - meaning models of vulnerability - has allowed me to consider the possibility of                             
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developing ethically-informed pre-onset early detection and intervention measures in                 
psychiatry. 
 
I have found that, in a considerable number of publications on the subject, the                           
Ultra High Risk criteria, the At-Risk Mental State and the Attenuated Psychosis                       
Syndrome remained the sole focus of ethical enquiries, neglecting other models of                       
vulnerability proposed for the development of pre-emptive psychiatry. This led the                     
debate on the ethics of pre-onset early detection and interventions in psychiatry to be                           
built around one central question, which can be formulated as such: is pre-emptive                         
psychiatry worth the risks to which it gives rise? A simple yes/no question, which set                             
proponents of pre-emptive psychiatry on one side, and its detractors on the other. But                           
exploring various models of vulnerability and the repercussions they might have on the                         
implementation of pre-onset early detection and intervention measures sheds a                   
different light on the potential dangers that are associated with them.  
 
The concept of vulnerability is widely recognised to generate strong                   
normative statements, whatever philosophical tradition serves as a frame of reference.                     
It might thus be possible to identify and understand more adequately the                       
responsibilities and duties we have when faced with the possibility to detect                       
vulnerability, so as to assess and test different diagnostic models and suggested                       
interventions against them. In order to do that, however, a precise account of                         
vulnerability and of the normative framework within which it stands was much                       
needed. I thus determined that Rogers, Mackenzie and Dodds’ work on inherent and                         
situational vulnerabilities, the latter including the generation of pathogenic                 
vulnerabilities, offered a conceptualisation of vulnerability that fit strikingly well with                     
the preoccupations and findings of researchers working on early detection in                     
psychiatry.   
 
It allowed me to formulate available diagnostic models in a                   
philosophically-rich manner, which also exposed the explanatory power of Rogers,                   
Mackenzie and Dodds’ account, in line with the methodological criteria I had outlined                         
in Chapter 1. As for the normative framework associated with this conceptualisation of                         
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vulnerability (to which the notion of pathogenic vulnerabilities already alluded), I                     
established that Nussbaum’s capabilities approach and her outline of central capabilities,                     
combined with Wolff and de-Shalit’s notions of fertile functionings and corrosive                     
disadvantages, provided a clear, adaptable and comprehensive structure. In consonance                   
with Childress and Beauchamp’s principles of autonomy and beneficence, which must                     
be specified and balanced against one another, this normative framework highlights our                       
responsibilities to preserve and promote vulnerable individuals’ autonomy, and the                   
necessity to favour empowerment over outrightly protective responses.   
 
Based on the inputs of these various accounts, I found that two models of                           
vulnerability could be said to compete with each other in pre-emptive psychiatry. On                         
one side, attenuated syndromes like the APS, tailored for indicated secondary                     
preventive measures, specific and turned towards symptomatic recovery, which could                   
be argued to conceptualise vulnerability as a diagnosable disorder in need of medical                         
intervention and treatment. On the other hand, staging models of psychiatric                     
vulnerability, which encompass attenuated syndromes within a wider framework,                 
integrating the possibility of selective primary prevention and nonspecificity, and                   
turned towards psychosocial functioning in addition to symptomatic recovery. Staging                   
models, I argued, are more in line with the account of vulnerability I developed                           
previously, facilitating the elaboration of measures and interventions which aim to                     
preserve and promote at-risk individuals’ capacities for self-determination and                 
resilience, and which rely on supportive and empowering networks, relationships and                     
environments.   
 
My aim was not to attack or dismiss attenuated syndromes as models of                         
vulnerability, but to stress the importance of integrating them into a more                       
comprehensive and adequate conceptualisation of vulnerability - in other words, of                     
integrating them into the framework of staging models of vulnerability. Despite                     
remaining challenges, which point to the difficulty of relying on evidence-based                     
pre-onset early detection methods and early interventions, as well as to the necessity of                           
responding to psychiatric vulnerability through fields other than psychiatry itself, I                     
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therefore conclude that staging models offer a solid opportunity to develop                     
ethically-informed pre-emptive measures in psychiatry.   
 
I hope that this dissertation has brought something of value to the debate                         
surrounding the ethics of pre-onset early detection and interventions in psychiatry by                       
re-framing it around conceptualisations of vulnerability. I am convinced that, in doing                       
so, the conversations we may have around their development can take on a more                           
constructive outlook. There are obviously several ways in which one might decide to                         
dispute the account of vulnerability I have outlined here, favouring another alternative                       
and defending different responses to it as more ethically acceptable. But it would also                           
mean that the current form of the debate, which sees pre-emptive psychiatry as a whole                             
under fire and questioned for the threat it poses to at-risk individuals, has been                           
somewhat remodelled.   
 
By following more closely the preoccupations of the mental health                   
professionals who are involved in the elaboration of early detection methods and                       
associated interventions, I believe that ethicists can offer inputs which might cease to                         
be solely incapacitating. What current pre-emptive efforts have shown is that we are                         
now capable of identifying and predicting psychiatric vulnerability to a level that was                         
previously unknown: it seems to me more beneficial to explore the responsibilities we                         
may have in view of these growing capacities, rather than focus immediately on the                           
problems that arise with them.  
 
It is also my hope that mental health professionals, and all others who are                           
involved in preserving and promoting at-risk individuals’ capacities for                 
self-determination and resilience while lessening the impact of risk factors, will be                       
better able to articulate their motivations when these are not entirely therapeutic. The                         
work they carry out requires considerable confidence and investments into youth                     
mental health, in a way that goes beyond simple psychiatric care: public health in                           
general has a considerable role to play in the prevention of serious mental disorders.                           
Despite my misgivings about Goodin’s relational account of vulnerability, I strongly                     
agree with what drives it: the conviction that we have, as a state and as a society, a                                   
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strong responsibility to react adequately to vulnerability. Where Goodin speaks of                     
protection, I favour empowerment and relational autonomy, but the weight of that                       
responsibility is no less important.   
 
I have no wish to downplay the relevance of the ethical issues that the                           
development of pre-emptive psychiatry generates, but I believe that it is the duty of                           
ethicists to accompany and help guide these developments, rather than simply warn                       
against them. The efforts of mental health professionals, policy-makers and others                     
involved in pre-emptive psychiatry must be substantiated and promoted if they are to                         
receive sufficient backing and investments to become ethically viable. 
 
Hopefully, this dissertation can contribute to a more general shift away from a                         
debate that I have often found oversimplified, rigid and dichotomous, and towards a                         
more enriching conversation about how we ought to respond to our growing capacity                         
to identify vulnerabilities in both individuals and populations. 
 
Re-framing the debate on the ethics of pre-emptive psychiatry around models                     
of vulnerability is a first step towards developing ethically-informed pre-onset early                     
detection and intervention measures. It helps delineate several models of vulnerability                     
from each other, which could have vastly different implications in the development of                         
pre-emptive measures. Staging models, in that sense, encourage the implementation of                     
pre-onset early interventions respectful of at-risk individuals’ need for support in the                       
preservation and the promotion of their capacities for self-determination and for                     
resilience.   
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